Cobbie fails to realise that the whitepaper was not in the same Sourceforge file and folder as the license.

More importantly, MIT licensing covers source code.

The PDF is not source code. But the simple part is the research paper is in a separate folder without any license.

https://web.archive.org/web/20091127010808/http://sourceforge.net/projects/bitcoin/files/

Notice - separate directories and NO license on the Wp

https://web.archive.org/web/20091128183828/http://sourceforge.net/project/shownotes.php?release_id=640697

No license in the Paper folder.

As author - I have copyright

I have also registereed.

The registration in the US is only a preclude to court action.

This is what people don't seem to understand. The people falsely filing saying that they wrote the whitepaper now have to defend. If they cannot, they either have to admit that they committed intentional fraud and falsified the filing or commit perjury in court.

They need to prove they created the whitepaper and the code if they want to defend. If they do not, that is they don't prove, then they could end up in prison

I fail to understand why people think that I work to their timetable.

The simple fact is I'm willing to take two years or more to put everything into place properly.

I am highly rational and incredibly detailed in calculating

I did note these in 2017...

CSW
Jan 21, 2021
https://metanet-icu.slack.com/archives/C5131HKFX/p1611221252079200?thread_t

https://t.me/CSW_Slack/2447

1/2
The reality is that if BTC core changed their name to SegWit or lightning coin or anything else similar, I would have absolutely no problems with them.

I'm very happy for developers to continue on alternative paths and even ones I don't believe are valuable. The fact that I don't believe something will be successful is not a reasoning for why other people will stop.

Those who want to develop lightning want to make a system that is analogous to the one we have already. It has no interest to me and it has no relationship to bitcoin.

The Bitcoin White Paper defines digital cash. It is a system that allows for micro payments. Lightning and the other systems being sold as digital gold do not allow for any of this.

There is nothing anarchist in my system at all. It was never released on a cypherpunk mailing list or anything cypherpunk or anarchist in any manner.

The nature of bitcoin is one that allows you to send payments directly from one party to another.

This statement is used to head up the abstract. Sending bitcoin from an individual to a node to a node to another person eventually is not analogous to a direct electronic cash payment.

The first paragraph of the bitcoin White Paper defines bitcoin as a system that allows for small online payments. The system that does not exist is not digital gold. Digital gold is common, digital gold has existed for forty years in one form or another.

The system that interested me and that has not come to fruition and that should be pushed is very simply a system that allows for small casual transactions.

The creation of a system to do small transactions is the true invention of bitcoin. It is not a system that allows for exchanges of large amounts of money for high fees as a primary mechanism.

And, no I don't have a timeframe I'm sorry.

The fact that you can form a record that does not change unless you redo the proof of work does not mean you cannot change the ownership structure in bitcoin either. There is a difference between saying that a record has been changed and that a ledger entry has been made.

When you run corporate accounts under Sarbanes Oxley in the USA or under provisions in the UK in IFRS it is necessary to ensure that records do not change. That is distinct and different from saying that they cannot be updated.

You can update a record without changing the original entry

The nature of large transactions provides for changes. This would not work on small transactions. The cost of reversing a transaction is part of the process. If you make a five dollar coffee purchase, it can be considered final straightaway. If you make a $5 million purchase, that is never finalised until the law says it is finalised.

And yes, nodes may add any necessary rules through the incentive structure of bitcoin

The consensus mechanism is the mining of blocks

I think bitcoin would be far larger without silk Road

The narrative of silk Road has hindered bitcoin by decades. It ruined the last twelve years and it has put barriers in front of us even now

There is nothing that cannot be done in the original protocol that is not being discussed here.

The alert key allowed for the freezing of funds.

The system was messy but still allowed for addendums to the system. Users would never know unless they were the people impacted. A court order could be written on chain and all of this would be public.

Each UTXO could be captured using a spandrel for the miners. It's only the miners that make these decisions. The so-called user nodes have no decision on this matter.

The cost of doing such an action would be extensive. It's going to preclude recovering small amounts completely and any amount such as US$50,000 would even be out of reach.

CSW
Jan 27, 2021
https://metanet-icu.slack.com/archives/C5131HKFX/p1611739466369100?thread_ts=1611739466.369100&cid=C5131HKFX
1/2
https://t.me/CSW_Slack/2453

Creo que a estas alturas, mi consejo para cualquier persona que SERIAMENTE quiera entender Bitcoin, lo que le diría es: que debería leer a Satoshi en los años 2008 a 2010, esa es la información ORIGINAL, El resto es basura modificada, esto es lo que he tenido que hacer para poder entender algo:

1 - Leer Cualquier tipo de literatura ORIGINAL, hasta finales del 2010, que es cuando Satoshi Nakamoto abandona el proyecto de forma pública:

- Conversaciones de Satoshi antes de publicar el WP
- Wei Dai/Satoshi Nakamoto 2008 Bitcoin emails
https://www.gwern.net/docs/bitcoin/2008-nakamoto

- La Cryptography Maling List
https://es.ramonquesada.com/espanol-es/the-cryptography-mailing-list/

@SatoshisQuotes
@BitCoin2008_2010
@BitCoinWP
@BitCoinSourceForge
@BitcoinTalkForum

Tuve que leer y aprender sobre los personajes de la época:
@Hal_Finney
@RayDillinger
@IanGrigg
@JosephVaughnPerling
@GavinAndresen1
@MikeHearn

Martti Malmi - Sirius
https://t.me/joinchat/AAAAAEfZIWK-pPNt0xbJ8w

Theymos - Michael Marquardt
https://t.me/joinchat/AAAAAE_evyVGPv9FDEI4jg

Dustin Trammell - SourceForge
https://t.me/joinchat/Vlm2uAXrH13D_wQO

Pieter Wuille - sipa
https://t.me/joinchat/AAAAAEc2oE6pd2JpIHqucA

James A Donald
https://t.me/joinchat/AAAAAFPGFm-RDcFBjmQmdQ

Ross Ulbricht - Silk Road
https://t.me/joinchat/AAAAAE43D07PuY3QgGIHcw

Jeff Garzik
https://t.me/joinchat/AAAAAEnS3SUbOxZ8fQZVOQ

Laszlo Hanyecz
https://t.me/joinchat/AAAAAFYeLyoiFQcE30uEHA

Los que habían estado desarrollando elementos que ayudaron al nacimiento de BitCoin:

David Chaum DigiCash eCash
https://t.me/joinchat/AAAAAEu1E8J3iuH-LzjEKA

Wei Dai b-money 1998 https://t.me/joinchat/AAAAAEUCtPG9jbF7V7JVRQ

Adam Back - 1997 Hashcash
https://t.me/joinchat/AAAAAEx2e1ZJMmZDBC0l-g

Scott Stornetta - 1991
https://t.me/joinchat/AAAAAFKwuZGrT6_yCoF81g

Nick Szabo Bit Gold 2005 https://t.me/joinchat/AAAAAE6IAofLEvS0rNZ03w

También otros proyectos sobre dinero digital previos a BitCoin, QUE FRACASARON EN SU INTENTO, esto es crucial para saber porque esos proyectos FRACASARON y BitCoin no:

eGold 1996 - 2008
https://t.me/joinchat/AAAAAElncNE4G4zBzbnJmw

DigiCash
https://t.me/joinchat/BSWwuAkQjr9hNDg0

Liberty Dollar
- Bernard von NotHaus
https://t.me/joinchat/AAAAAFN-4GB-M3ITMx2LNA

Liberty Reserve (2006 - 2013)
https://t.me/joinchat/AAAAAExUu3yzrgFieGCaLg

2- Una vez se haya leído todo eso, entonces comparé lo leído, con lo que dice Craig:

@Craig_Wright
@CSW_Academic
@CSW_Articles
@CSW_Books
@CSW_Business
@CSW_Cybersecurity
@CSW_Economics
@CSW_Ideology
@CSW_interviews
@CSW_interviewsVideos
@CSW_Legal
@CSW_Patent
@CSW_Religion
@CSW_Satoshi
@CSW_Slack.
@CSW_VideoTalks
@CSW_Videos
@CSW_Asperger
@theArtofBitcoin
@TheSatoshiAffaire
@DonLynam

CSW personal Batlles
@BitCoinWP
@Double_Spend
@BitCoinDatabaseOwnership
@BitCoin_Domain

3 - A parti de entonces saqué mis conclusiones y una vez termines con eso, no te quedará ninguna duda, ni tampoco ganas de escuchar lo que dicen por ahí los mamarrachos que se inventan las cosas.

Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System
Satoshi Nakamoto
satoshin@gmx.com
www.bitcoin.org

Abstract. A purely peer-to-peer version of electronic cash would allow online payments to be sent directly from one party to another without going through a financial institution. Digital signatures provide part of the solution, but the main benefits are lost if a trusted third party is still required to prevent double-spending.
We propose a solution to the double-spending problem using a peer-to-peer network.
The network timestamps transactions by hashing them into an ongoing chain of hash-based proof-of-work, forming a record that cannot be changed without redoing the proof-of-work. The longest chain not only serves as proof of the sequence of events witnessed, but proof that it came from the largest pool of CPU power. As long as a majority of CPU power is controlled by nodes that are not cooperating to attack the network, they'll generate the longest chain and outpace attackers. The network itself requires minimal structure. Messages are broadcast on a best effort basis, and nodes can leave and rejoin the network at will, accepting the longest proof-of-work chain as proof of what happened while they were gone.

1. Introduction

Commerce on the Internet has come to rely almost exclusively on financial institutions serving as trusted third parties to process electronic payments. While the system works well enough for most transactions, it still suffers from the inherent weaknesses of the trust based model.
Completely non-reversible transactions are not really possible, since financial institutions cannot avoid mediating disputes. The cost of mediation increases transaction costs, limiting the minimum practical transaction size and cutting off the possibility for small casual transactions, and there is a broader cost in the loss of ability to make non-reversible payments for non- reversible services. With the possibility of reversal, the need for trust spreads. Merchants must be wary of their customers, hassling them for more information than they would otherwise need.
A certain percentage of fraud is accepted as unavoidable. These costs and payment uncertainties can be avoided in person by using physical currency, but no mechanism exists to make payments over a communications channel without a trusted party.
What is needed is an electronic payment system based on cryptographic proof instead of trust, allowing any two willing parties to transact directly with each other without the need for a trusted third party. Transactions that are computationally impractical to reverse would protect sellers from fraud, and routine escrow mechanisms could easily be implemented to protect buyers. In this paper, we propose a solution to the double-spending problem using a peer-to-peer distributed timestamp server to generate computational proof of the chronological order of transactions. The system is secure as long as honest nodes collectively control more CPU power than any cooperating group of attacker nodes.

https://t.me/BitcoinWP/394

2. Transactions

We define an electronic coin as a chain of digital signatures. Each owner transfers the coin to the next by digitally signing a hash of the previous transaction and the public key of the next owner and adding these to the end of the coin. A payee can verify the signatures to verify the chain of ownership.
The problem of course is the payee can't verify that one of the owners did not double-spend the coin. A common solution is to introduce a trusted central authority, or mint, that checks every transaction for double spending. After each transaction, the coin must be returned to the mint to
issue a new coin, and only coins issued directly from the mint are trusted not to be double-spent.
The problem with this solution is that the fate of the entire money system depends on the
company running the mint, with every transaction having to go through them, just like a bank.
We need a way for the payee to know that the previous owners did not sign any earlier transactions. For our purposes, the earliest transaction is the one that counts, so we don't care about later attempts to double-spend. The only way to confirm the absence of a transaction is to be aware of all transactions. In the mint based model, the mint was aware of all transactions and decided which arrived first. To accomplish this without a trusted party, transactions must be publicly announced [1], and we need a system for participants to agree on a single history of the order in which they were received. The payee needs proof that at the time of each transaction, the majority of nodes agreed it was the first received.

https://t.me/BitcoinWP/395

3. Timestamp Server

The solution we propose begins with a timestamp server. A timestamp server works by taking a hash of a block of items to be timestamped and widely publishing the hash, such as in a newspaper or Usenet post [2-5]. The timestamp proves that the data must have existed at the time, obviously, in order to get into the hash. Each timestamp includes the previous timestamp in its hash, forming a chain, with each additional timestamp reinforcing the ones before it.

https://t.me/BitcoinWP/396

4. Proof-of-Work

To implement a distributed timestamp server on a peer-to-peer basis, we will need to use a proof- of-work system similar to Adam Back's Hashcash [6], rather than newspaper or Usenet posts.
The proof-of-work involves scanning for a value that when hashed, such as with SHA-256, the hash begins with a number of zero bits. The average work required is exponential in the number of zero bits required and can be verified by executing a single hash.
For our timestamp network, we implement the proof-of-work by incrementing a nonce in the
block until a value is found that gives the block's hash the required zero bits. Once the CPU effort has been expended to make it satisfy the proof-of-work, the block cannot be changed without redoing the work. As later blocks are chained after it, the work to change the block would include redoing all the blocks after it.
The proof-of-work also solves the problem of determining representation in majority decision making. If the majority were based on one-IP-address-one-vote, it could be subverted by anyone
able to allocate many IPs. Proof-of-work is essentially one-CPU-one-vote. The majority
decision is represented by the longest chain, which has the greatest proof-of-work effort invested in it. If a majority of CPU power is controlled by honest nodes, the honest chain will grow the fastest and outpace any competing chains. To modify a past block, an attacker would have to
redo the proof-of-work of the block and all blocks after it and then catch up with and surpass the work of the honest nodes. We will show later that the probability of a slower attacker catching up diminishes exponentially as subsequent blocks are added.
To compensate for increasing hardware speed and varying interest in running nodes over time, the proof-of-work difficulty is determined by a moving average targeting an average number of blocks per hour. If they're generated too fast, the difficulty increases.

https://t.me/BitcoinWP/397

5. Network

The steps to run the network are as follows:
1) New transactions are broadcast to all nodes.
2) Each node collects new transactions into a block.
3) Each node works on finding a difficult proof-of-work for its block.
4) When a node finds a proof-of-work, it broadcasts the block to all nodes.
5) Nodes accept the block only if all transactions in it are valid and not already spent.
6) Nodes express their acceptance of the block by working on creating the next block in the chain, using the hash of the accepted block as the previous hash.
Nodes always consider the longest chain to be the correct one and will keep working on
extending it. If two nodes broadcast different versions of the next block simultaneously, some nodes may receive one or the other first. In that case, they work on the first one they received, but save the other branch in case it becomes longer. The tie will be broken when the next proof-
of-work is found and one branch becomes longer; the nodes that were working on the other branch will then switch to the longer one.

New transaction broadcasts do not necessarily need to reach all nodes. As long as they reach
many nodes, they will get into a block before long. Block broadcasts are also tolerant of dropped messages. If a node does not receive a block, it will request it when it receives the next block and realizes it missed one

https://t.me/BitcoinWP/398

6. Incentive

By convention, the first transaction in a block is a special transaction that starts a new coin owned by the creator of the block. This adds an incentive for nodes to support the network, and provides
a way to initially distribute coins into circulation, since there is no central authority to issue them.
The steady addition of a constant of amount of new coins is analogous to gold miners expending
resources to add gold to circulation. In our case, it is CPU time and electricity that is expended.
The incentive can also be funded with transaction fees. If the output value of a transaction is less than its input value, the difference is a transaction fee that is added to the incentive value of the block containing the transaction. Once a predetermined number of coins have entered circulation, the incentive can transition entirely to transaction fees and be completely inflation free.
The incentive may help encourage nodes to stay honest. If a greedy attacker is able to assemble more CPU power than all the honest nodes, he would have to choose between using it to defraud people by stealing back his payments, or using it to generate new coins. He ought to find it more profitable to play by the rules, such rules that favour him with more new coins than everyone else combined, than to undermine the system and the validity of his own wealth.

https://t.me/BitcoinWP/399

7. Reclaiming Disk Space

Once the latest transaction in a coin is buried under enough blocks, the spent transactions before it can be discarded to save disk space. To facilitate this without breaking the block's hash, transactions are hashed in a Merkle Tree [7][2][5], with only the root included in the block's hash.
Old blocks can then be compacted by stubbing off branches of the tree. The interior hashes do
not need to be stored.
A block header with no transactions would be about 80 bytes. If we suppose blocks are
generated every 10 minutes, 80 bytes * 6 * 24 * 365 = 4.2MB per year. With computer systems
typically selling with 2GB of RAM as of 2008, and Moore's Law predicting current growth of 1.2GB per year, storage should not be a problem even if the block headers must be kept in memory.

https://t.me/BitcoinWP/400

8. Simplified Payment Verification

It is possible to verify payments without running a full network node. A user only needs to keep
a copy of the block headers of the longest proof-of-work chain, which he can get by querying
network nodes until he's convinced he has the longest chain, and obtain the Merkle branch linking the transaction to the block it's timestamped in. He can't check the transaction for himself, but by linking it to a place in the chain, he can see that a network node has accepted it, and blocks added after it further confirm the network has accepted it.
As such, the verification is reliable as long as honest nodes control the network, but is more vulnerable if the network is overpowered by an attacker. While network nodes can verify transactions for themselves, the simplified method can be fooled by an attacker's fabricated
transactions for as long as the attacker can continue to overpower the network. One strategy to protect against this would be to accept alerts from network nodes when they detect an invalid block, prompting the user's software to download the full block and alerted transactions to
confirm the inconsistency. Businesses that receive frequent payments will probably still want to
run their own nodes for more independent security and quicker verification.

https://t.me/BitcoinWP/401

9. Combining and Splitting Value.

Although it would be possible to handle coins individually, it would be unwieldy to make a
separate transaction for every cent in a transfer. To allow value to be split and combined,
transactions contain multiple inputs and outputs. Normally there will be either a single input from a larger previous transaction or multiple inputs combining smaller amounts, and at most two outputs: one for the payment, and one returning the change, if any, back to the sender.
It should be noted that fan-out, where a transaction depends on several transactions, and those transactions depend on many more, is not a problem here. There is never the need to extract a complete standalone copy of a transaction's history.

https://t.me/BitcoinWP/402

10. Privacy

The traditional banking model achieves a level of privacy by limiting access to information to the parties involved and the trusted third party. The necessity to announce all transactions publicly
precludes this method, but privacy can still be maintained by breaking the flow of information in another place: by keeping public keys anonymous. The public can see that someone is sending
an amount to someone else, but without information linking the transaction to anyone. This is similar to the level of information released by stock exchanges, where the time and size of individual trades, the "tape", is made public, but without telling who the parties were.
As an additional firewall, a new key pair should be used for each transaction to keep them
from being linked to a common owner. Some linking is still unavoidable with multi-input
transactions, which necessarily reveal that their inputs were owned by the same owner. The risk is that if the owner of a key is revealed, linking could reveal other transactions that belonged to the same owner.

https://t.me/BitcoinWP/403

11. Calculations

We consider the scenario of an attacker trying to generate an alternate chain faster than the honest chain. Even if this is accomplished, it does not throw the system open to arbitrary changes, such as creating value out of thin air or taking money that never belonged to the attacker. Nodes are not going to accept an invalid transaction as payment, and honest nodes will never accept a block containing them. An attacker can only try to change one of his own transactions to take back money he recently spent.
The race between the honest chain and an attacker chain can be characterized as a Binomial
Random Walk. The success event is the honest chain being extended by one block, increasing its lead by +1, and the failure event is the attacker's chain being extended by one block, reducing the gap by -1.
The probability of an attacker catching up from a given deficit is analogous to a Gambler's Ruin problem. Suppose a gambler with unlimited credit starts at a deficit and plays potentially an infinite number of trials to try to reach breakeven. We can calculate the probability he ever reaches breakeven, or that an attacker ever catches up with the honest chain, as follows [8]:
p = probability an honest node finds the next block
q = probability the attacker finds the next block
qz = probability the attacker will ever catch up from z blocks behind

https://t.me/BitcoinWP/404

12. Conclusion

We have proposed a system for electronic transactions without relying on trust. We started with the usual framework of coins made from digital signatures, which provides strong control of ownership, but is incomplete without a way to prevent double-spending. To solve this, we proposed a peer-to-peer network using proof-of-work to record a public history of transactions that quickly becomes computationally impractical for an attacker to change if honest nodes control a majority of CPU power. The network is robust in its unstructured simplicity. Nodes work all at once with little coordination. They do not need to be identified, since messages are not routed to any particular place and only need to be delivered on a best effort basis. Nodes can leave and rejoin the network at will, accepting the proof-of-work chain as proof of what
happened while they were gone. They vote with their CPU power, expressing their acceptance of
valid blocks by working on extending them and rejecting invalid blocks by refusing to work on them. Any needed rules and incentives can be enforced with this consensus mechanism.

https://t.me/BitcoinWP/405

From the BitCoin White Paper:

- Not double spending.
- Not trusted third party.
- Peer-to-peer distributed timestamp server.
- From one party to another.
- Timestamps transactions by hashing.
- Chain of hash-based proof-of-work.
- Record in a public history of transactions
- Small casual transactions (micro transactions)
- Payment system based on cryptographic proof.
- Protect sellers from fraud.
- Routine escrow mechanisms could easily be implemented.
- Chronological order of transactions.
- Chain of digital signatures.
- Verify by the chain of
ownership.
- The earliest transaction is the one that counts.
- The proof-of-work solves the decision making.
- The honest chain will grow the fastest.
- Incentive make more profitable to play by the rules.
- Moore's Law, storage should not be a problem.
- Accept alerts from network nodes (WP Section: 8- SPV)
- Privacy: by keeping public keys anonymous.(similar to stock exchanges)
- A new key pair should be used for each transaction.
- Nodes do not need to be identified.


Not from the BitCoin White Paper:
- RBF (Replace By Fees)
- SegWit (Segregated Witness)
- Lingtning Network
- Taproot

https://t.me/BitcoinWP/406

CSW
Jun 26, 2021
https://metanet-icu.slack.com/archives/C5131HKFX/p1624710449324400?thread_ts=1624710449.324400&cid=C5131HKFX

https://t.me/CSW_Slack/2638

Craig Wright awarded default judgment in first Bitcoin white paper lawsuit
Jun 28, 2021
https://coingeek.com/craig-wright-awarded-default-judgment-in-first-bitcoin-white-paper-lawsuit/