Forwarded from Tabz - Live News (Tabz)
What’s happening with Spain, with tens of thousands of Illegal Immigrants invading it, happened in the United States during the Sleepy Joe Biden Administration, and it will happen again, only worse, if the Dumocrats ever again gain power.
DON’T LET OUR COUNTRY BE DESTROYED. VOTE REPUBLICAN, AND BE PROUD OF THE U.S.A.
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Forwarded from Tabz - Live News (Mister Iowan)
WSJ reports the strike campaign would be a few days long and be aimed at getting Iran to return to the negotiating table.
WSJ citing U.S. officials also claims that Trump has been calling the Iranians "crazy" and became very frustrated at the Camp David meeting, suggesting more violent strikes to "break Tehran's will". Iran likewise doesn't trust the United States due to negotiations repeatedly breaking down and Trump repeatedly threatening military force, according to WSJ.
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Forwarded from Rerum Novarum // Intel, Breaking News, and Alerts 🇺🇸
⚽️⚡️- FIFA has scrapped its plan to sell private investors shares in the World Cup following global backlash and the UEFA's threats to boycott future tournaments, according to the NY Post.
Forwarded from Tabz - Live News (Tabz)
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Following the June 24 earthquakes, U.S. military forces worked hand-in-hand with State Department to turn logistics into life-saving action — rapidly deploying first responders, critical equipment, and relief assistance to the communities that needed it most.
At the direction of SOUTHCOM, the U.S. military supported U.S. government relief operations in the country.
📎 U.S. Southern Command
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Forwarded from Geopolitics Watch (Beirut)
@GeoPWatch
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Just days before the Ceuta crisis, Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez traveled to Algeria to restore diplomatic and economic relations after four years of tensions. The visit marked a major reset in Spain-Algeria relations after years of strained ties.
During the visit, Sánchez met with Algerian President Abdelmadjid Tebboune and senior government officials. Both countries reaffirmed Algeria as one of Spain's principal strategic partners, discussed expanding energy cooperation, increasing Spanish investment, strengthening trade, coordinating on migration, and agreed to hold a new high-level bilateral summit later this year to deepen cooperation further.
Historically, when Spain has taken actions that Morocco views as contrary to its interests over Western Sahara, relations have at times deteriorated sharply. The clearest example came in 2021, when Spain allowed Polisario leader Brahim Ghali to receive medical treatment. Morocco strongly protested, recalled its ambassador, and during the ensuing diplomatic crisis, a mass migration event into Ceuta followed.
To understand why this matters, you have to understand the Western Sahara dispute.
Morocco considers Western Sahara an integral part of its territory and has proposed an autonomy plan under Moroccan sovereignty. The Polisario Front, backed primarily by Algeria, seeks independence for Western Sahara and has proclaimed the self-declared Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic.
This is why Morocco pays such close attention to Spain's relationship with both Algeria and the Polisario Front. Spain is the former colonial power in Western Sahara and remains one of the most influential European countries involved in the dispute. When Madrid takes steps that Rabat interprets as favoring Algeria or Polisario as happened with the Ghali case in 2021 it has, in the past, led to severe diplomatic crises.
There is another important point that is often overlooked. Morocco has never recognized Spanish sovereignty over Ceuta and Melilla. To this day, Rabat officially considers both cities to be Moroccan territory under Spanish administration. While Morocco has generally pursued its claims through diplomatic channels, the status of Ceuta and Melilla remains one of the most sensitive issues in Spain–Morocco relations.
Does this mean Sánchez's visit to Algeria caused the current migration crisis? No, there is currently no public evidence to support that conclusion. However, given the events of 2021, Morocco's longstanding rivalry with Algeria, the central importance of Western Sahara in Moroccan foreign policy, and Morocco's official claim over Ceuta and Melilla, it is another plausible angle worth considering as events continue to unfold. It should be treated as a possibility based on historical precedent, not as an established explanation.
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/CIG/ Telegram | Counter Intelligence Global
Since the end of the Cold War, the Morocco-Algeria rivalry has remained one of the most enduring and consequential fault lines in North African geopolitics. Despite repeated diplomatic freezes, military posturing, and ideological divergence, neither state has crossed the threshold into direct confrontation.
At the heart of this standoff lies a persistent cold war dynamic. For decades, Rabat and Algiers have circled one another with distrust, investing in their military arsenals and aligning with divergent global powers. Morocco, steeped in a long-standing alliance with the West (particularly the United States, with which it has maintained a diplomatic relationship since 1786), presents itself as a model of stability and transatlanticism. Algeria, by contrast, defines its geopolitical identity through the legacy of its anticolonial struggle, leaning toward Russia and the principles of the Non-Aligned Movement. But this is not an isolated feud, as the Morocco-Algeria rivalry reverberates far beyond North Africa. It intersects with Europe’s energy calculus, challenges American strategic planning in the Mediterranean, and complicates security cooperation in the broader Middle East. At stake is not just the influence both countries seek to exert within the region, but also the viability of multilateralism in a strategically vital corridor.
The enduring rivalry between Morocco and Algeria is less a product of recent diplomacy than the deep imprint of a history impacted by colonial boundaries, war, and decades of mutual distrust. Morocco emerged from French and Spanish colonial rule in 1956 with its monarchy intact and a strategic interest in restoring its pre-colonial borders. Algeria’s trajectory was far more harrowing as it was colonised by France in 1830 and treated not as a protectorate but as an extension of French territory. Algeria secured its independence after a devastating eight-year war, a struggle that not only birthed a fiercely republican state but also instilled a deeply rooted ethos of anti-colonial sovereignty, defining principles that would soon collide with Morocco’s regional ambitions. In 1963, barely a year after Algeria’s independence, tensions rose into open conflict during the Sand War. Moroccan troops crossed into Algeria, seeking to reclaim areas in Tindouf and Bechar, territories Rabat considered historically Moroccan. A ceasefire was reached in early 1964, but the war generated lasting suspicion, shaping bilateral relations for decades to come.
Yet it was not the Sand War, but the fate of Western Sahara that would become the defining fracture. When Spain withdrew in 1975, Morocco swiftly annexed the territory, branding it the “Southern Provinces”. Algeria, invoking its colonial doctrine, threw its weight behind the Polisario Front, a guerrilla movement demanding self-determination for the Sahrawis. Thus began the Western Sahara War, a 16-year struggle between Moroccan forces and the Polisario, the group backed, financed and sheltered by Algiers. For Morocco, Western Sahara offered not only historical symbolism but also tangible assets such as phosphate wealth, fishing grounds, and a critical Atlantic coastline. For Algeria, the annexation was unacceptable, so supporting the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic became both an ideological commitment and a strategic hedge against Moroccan expansionism. Although a ceasefire was reached in 1991 along with the promise of a referendum, Sahrawi independence has yet to be concluded.
In 2020, Morocco normalised relations with Israel through the US-brokered Abraham Accords. In return, Washington officially recognised Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara, prompting diplomatic regional upheaval and a red line crossed for Algiers. Algeria, deeply pro-Palestinian and wary of Israeli influence in North Africa, denounced the move as a betrayal. Tensions escalated quickly, and Algiers accused Morocco of sponsoring separatist movements within its own territory, condemning its alliance with what it called “the Zionist entity”. In August 2021, Algeria severed diplomatic ties entirely, marking the lowest point in bilateral relations in decades.
Continued
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EST - European Student Think Tank
Morocco and Algeria: A Strategic Rivalry Shaping the Maghreb - EST
Written by: Pablo Villar Bolaños Edited by: Lenaig Deslandes Abstract Since the end of the Cold War, the Morocco-Algeria rivalry has remained one of the most enduring and consequential fault lines in North African geopolitics. Despite repeated diplomatic…
The assets produce around 117,000 boe/d, equal to 5% of BP’s global output, and employ 1,100 people.
This is bigger than one disposal.
BP is cutting debt, simplifying the company and walking away from an ageing, high-tax basin where output has collapsed from 4.5M boe/d in 2000 to about 1M today.
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/CIG/ Telegram | Counter Intelligence Global
In the West, the supremacy of capital disciplines the state to prop up high profits in old industries.
In China, the state creates markets and steers capital towards new strategic industries.
State-capital relations are key in understanding the China-west competitiveness divergence.
Real industrial policy is not throwing subsidies at corporations but leveraging and creating public and private capacity towards goals like a green transformation.
https://archive.is/20260801024453/https://www.ft.com/content/871976c7-8c4f-405e-803e-d86cf22bcf0f
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While Google claims the images carried a watermark to distinguish them from real satellite imagery, the watermark was not noticeable in most AI generated images
2. When your opponent starts posting high res imagery of their own, bake AI editing tools directly into Google Earth so no one ever trusts satellite imagery again
There's no legitimate use case for this tool. None.
Step 3 will be to have a bunch of shady nominally pro-Iranian slop accounts post AI edited imagery, get caught and community noted.
Satellite imagery, unlike basically everything else, still carries some perception of authenticity in people's heads. It needs to be ruined.
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/CIG/ Telegram | Counter Intelligence Global
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The group arrived after the military captured Bara, Jabrat al-Sheikh and two other strategic areas, securing a roughly 400-kilometer trade corridor linking Omdurman with the North Kordofan capital, El-Obeid.
Former RSF commander Al-Nour “Gubba” Adam, who defected in April, was among those receiving the fighters. He said defections were continuing and urged remaining RSF members to lay down their arms.
The latest surrender follows the arrival of 280 former RSF fighters in Omdurman on July 22 with 30 fully equipped combat vehicles, as Mada Masr reported. That force had served under Gubba before his defection. Its commander, Hussein al-Dodo, apologized to the Sudanese people for abuses committed while serving with the RSF.
Other prominent defectors include field commander Ali “Savanna” Rizgallah and Fares al-Nour, a former adviser to RSF commander Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo who handled sensitive political and negotiation files.
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There is a vast gap between the impressive capability of the State of Israel to know, at almost any moment, the whereabouts of every Iranian commander or scientist, and the profound lack of understanding of the Iranian regime, its motivations, its worldview, and its centers of power.
The story of Ahmadinejad and the Kurds sounds so absurd that it was hard to believe it was part of Israel's strategy. But beyond that, it points to a problematic decision-making process that left Israel in a more complex position vis-à-vis Iran in general, and the nuclear challenge in particular.
Whether it's hubris, underestimation of the Iranian adversary, or internal struggles within the security system, some of the moves that were made were indeed effective operationally, but precisely in relation to the central threat—namely, the nuclear program—the result today is more complex.
True, Iran is not enriching uranium, but in the Iranian system, there is no longer a figure like Ali Khamenei, who, according to this perception, has blocked over the years the final decision to advance toward nuclear weapons. At the same time, Iran still possesses the knowledge, the infrastructure, and the capability to advance anew to military enrichment levels when it decides to do so.
Worse still, Iran's entrenchment in the Strait of Hormuz and its continued ability to exert military pressure have illustrated the strategic cost of the campaign. The result may be that a future American administration will be deterred from further broad military involvement against Iran, in a way that could also undermine Israel's deterrence.
In the end, the claim is not merely that Israel did not achieve all its goals, but that in certain respects, it now faces a more complex reality than the one it sought to change. Iran has absorbed significant blows, but the regime remains in place, and even appears more determined to wield its power—even in the face of the American presence in the Gulf.
The bottom line is that if this was indeed the decision-making perception that guided the campaign, it amounts to a significant strategic failure. Tactical and operational achievements cannot substitute for strategy, and certainly not when the result could be the erosion of prior gains and pushing Iran closer to, rather than farther from, the nuclear Rubicon.
This failure obliges Israel to return to the drawing board, conduct an in-depth investigation of the shortcomings, and formulate a more realistic strategy toward Iran under its new leadership. Israel has significant advantages over Iran: intelligence, operational, and technological. But these advantages must not lead to disdain for the adversary or underestimation of the Iranian regime, its capabilities, and its decision-making processes.
What's more, this campaign not only failed to bring Israel closer to the Gulf states but, in many respects, even distanced them from it. The heavy economic and security damages that the war has inflicted—and continues to inflict—on the region have led many Gulf states to view Israel as a central factor that drove the escalation. Even in the case of the United Arab Emirates, it is worth remembering that Abu Dhabi denied that Netanyahu even visited the country, a step that illustrates how even states maintaining close ties with Israel now fear public identification with it.
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X (formerly Twitter)
Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش (@citrinowicz) on X
הכתובת הייתה על הקיר...
יש פער עצום בין היכולת המרשימה של מדינת ישראל לדעת כמעט בכל רגע היכן נמצא כל מפקד או מדען איראני, לבין חוסר הבנה עמוק של המשטר האיראני, מניעיו, תפיסת עולמו ומוקדי הכוח שלו…
יש פער עצום בין היכולת המרשימה של מדינת ישראל לדעת כמעט בכל רגע היכן נמצא כל מפקד או מדען איראני, לבין חוסר הבנה עמוק של המשטר האיראני, מניעיו, תפיסת עולמו ומוקדי הכוח שלו…
/CIG/ Telegram | Counter Intelligence Global
Israel is mid-tier military power in its region, and limited resources, manpower, and the constraints of geography preclude it from ever mounting a serious military challenge to Iran, which has ten times its population, a large industrial base, and the most favorable geography imaginable for a defensive war.
What the Israelis would like to do, in a perfect world, is turn Iran into another Syria or Libya. They'd like to see it destabilized, its infrastructure destroyed, and its polity broken into warring ethnic and sectarian enclaves. "Regime change" is not what they're looking for, because even a controllable comprador regime can be overthrown, bringing the plan back to square one. This is exceptionally likely in Iran.
But this is an aspirational goal. Because the Israelis wield enormous influence over American politics, they have a unique opportunity. They can burn the political capital of an American president and effectively lease the US military for free. They gain access to carrier strike groups, thousands of sophisticated standoff munitions, aircraft, drones, missile interceptors, and so on, and they're able to do it at minimal cost to themselves.
The Iranians are forced to expend thousands of their own missiles and drones, and only a fraction of these are used against Israel. Iranian infrastructure is destroyed, the country is blockaded, military losses are incurred, all from American, not Israeli weapons. The cost/benefit ratio here is mind boggling.
The biggest risk is that the Israelis wind up taking so much of the blame that the American system rips out their influence apparatus in response. This may be a real long term risk, but there's no sign of it happening anytime soon.
The real Israeli strategic failure will come if Iran emerges from this stronger than it started, with its offensive capability maintained, economic concessions from its neighbors, and so on. This is looking like an increasingly likely possibility.
One of the more remarkable developments to me is that the American public is content to watch the Israelis totally sit out this phase of the war after Trump admin officials openly said they're protecting Israeli interests. I've seen precisely zero outrage about it.
@CIG_telegram
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/CIG/ Telegram | Counter Intelligence Global
U.S Treasury Secretary, Scott Bessent, is considering buying $5-10 billion worth of Japanese Yen as revealed by a Reuters photo of a note on Bessent's desk during the meeting with President Trump and the rest of the White House team at Camp David.
Earlier on Friday morning, around two hours before the photo was taken, Reuters reported that the Treasury had notified a number of banks that it may intervene in the yen market on Friday, quoting a source familiar with the situation.
Japanese authorities had stepped in to prop up the yen earlier on Friday in Tokyo. That triggered a substantial strengthening of the Japanese currency during morning trading hours.
There appears to have been another sizeable strengthening of the yen against the dollar during the late afternoon on Friday. Data from LSEG shows the dollar dropped from about 158.9 yen at around 4:14 p.m. (2014 GMT) to about 157.6 yen just before 5 p.m. (2100 GMT) — a drop of about 0.8%.
The U.S. Treasury has not intervened to prop up the yen since 2011, when it joined other G7 countries in a coordinated action after a devastating earthquake and tsunami rocked Japan.
The Japanese Yen is the weakest link in the USD global system. A collapse of the yen carry system would throw Wall Street into a crisis.
The yen carry trade involves investors borrowing yen at low interest rates and swapping into dollars to invest in assets that yield more, like US stocks and bonds.
The trade has helped funnel a lot of money into US markets, boosting liquidity and asset prices. This system has become increasingly fragile in the last two years and it worsened significantly when the U.S. and Israel attacked Iran, causing the subsequent global oil crisis which shook Japan's economy to the core and made worse by PM, Sanae Takaichi's grand plans of rebuilding the Japanese military through massive government spending causing inflation to rise, in stark contrast to the previous Japanese governments that were fiscally responsible and extremely cautious with public spending.
@CIG_telegram
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Forwarded from Rerum Novarum // Intel, Breaking News, and Alerts 🇺🇸
🇪🇹⚡- Loud explosions heard in the northwest Tigray region of Ethiopia, along Eritrea's border.
Forwarded from Rerum Novarum // Intel, Breaking News, and Alerts 🇺🇸
Rerum Novarum // Intel, Breaking News, and Alerts 🇺🇸
🇪🇹⚡- Loud explosions heard in the northwest Tigray region of Ethiopia, along Eritrea's border.
🇪🇹⚡- BREAKING: TPLF-70 and TPLF-13 have launched an offensive on the town of Sheraro, along Eritrea's border. The Ethiopian air force is responding to the attacks.
Note, TPLF-70 is based in Sudan, while TPLF-13 is based along the Debre Damo Highlands. Both belong to the TPLF-D led separatist branch of the TPLF, the Tigray Defense Forces.
Note, TPLF-70 is based in Sudan, while TPLF-13 is based along the Debre Damo Highlands. Both belong to the TPLF-D led separatist branch of the TPLF, the Tigray Defense Forces.
In 2021, the TPLF lost Western Tigray and its access to Sudan to ENDF supported, ethnic Amhara militias
@CIG_telegram
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