"The Art of Being Nice: More Than Just Pleasantries"…
Being nice is often misunderstood as mere politeness or superficial pleasantries. In reality, genuine kindness is a powerful force that shapes relationships, communities, and ultimately, the very fabric of society.
It's a conscious choice that requires awareness, empathy, and consistent practice…
At its core, being nice encompasses several key elements:
Active Listening and Presence: True kindness begins with giving others our full attention. It means putting away our phones during conversations, maintaining eye contact, and truly absorbing what others are saying rather than simply waiting for our turn to speak.
When someone shares their thoughts or feelings, a nice person acknowledges them without immediately jumping to solutions or comparing them to their own experiences.
Empathy in Action:
Being nice requires stepping outside our own perspective to understand others' feelings and circumstances. This might mean recognizing that a colleague's sharp tone comes from personal struggles, or understanding that a stranger's rudeness may reflect their own bad day rather than any personal slight. Empathy transforms our interactions from transactional to meaningful.
Thoughtful Speech:
Kind people understand the weight of words. They choose language that uplifts rather than diminishes, that includes rather than excludes. This doesn't mean avoiding difficult conversations – rather, it means approaching them with care and consideration. A nice person delivers hard truths with compassion and constructive criticism with genuine desire to help.
Small Acts, Big Impact:
Kindness manifests in countless small ways: holding doors, offering seats to those who need them, remembering names, acknowledging birthdays, sending thank-you notes. These seemingly minor gestures create ripples of positivity that extend far beyond the immediate interaction. They show others they are seen and valued.
Boundaries and Self-Care:
Contrary to common misconception, being nice doesn't mean being a pushover. True kindness includes setting healthy boundaries and practicing self-care. After all, we can't pour from an empty cup. Nice people understand that saying "no" when necessary and maintaining personal limits actually enables them to be more genuinely kind when they do engage.
Forgiveness and Understanding:
Nice people practice forgiveness – both of others and themselves. They understand that everyone makes mistakes and deserves second chances. This doesn't mean accepting abuse or repeated bad behavior, but rather approaching human imperfection with grace and understanding.
Proactive Kindness:
Being nice isn't just about responding well to others – it's about actively creating positive situations. This might mean introducing people who could benefit from knowing each other, sharing opportunities, or stepping up to help before being asked. Nice people look for ways to make others' lives better, even in small ways.
The Ripple Effect:
Perhaps most importantly, being nice creates a positive feedback loop in communities. When we treat others with kindness, they're more likely to pass that kindness forward. Over time, this creates a more supportive, understanding, and pleasant environment for everyone. In an increasingly divided world, genuine niceness can be a powerful force for connection and healing.
In conclusion, being nice is a skill that requires practice, awareness, and genuine effort. It's not about maintaining a facade of pleasantness, but about contributing to a more compassionate world through conscious choices and actions. The beauty of kindness is that it benefits both the giver and receiver, creating connections and community in a world that desperately needs both.
Editors Comments: Being nice is akin to the fundamental components and principles of natural common law which are;
“Cause no harm or loss to another living man or woman; their rights and or their property.”
Peace to all men and women:
🌹 🐝 🌈 🕊️ ❤️
Being nice is often misunderstood as mere politeness or superficial pleasantries. In reality, genuine kindness is a powerful force that shapes relationships, communities, and ultimately, the very fabric of society.
It's a conscious choice that requires awareness, empathy, and consistent practice…
At its core, being nice encompasses several key elements:
Active Listening and Presence: True kindness begins with giving others our full attention. It means putting away our phones during conversations, maintaining eye contact, and truly absorbing what others are saying rather than simply waiting for our turn to speak.
When someone shares their thoughts or feelings, a nice person acknowledges them without immediately jumping to solutions or comparing them to their own experiences.
Empathy in Action:
Being nice requires stepping outside our own perspective to understand others' feelings and circumstances. This might mean recognizing that a colleague's sharp tone comes from personal struggles, or understanding that a stranger's rudeness may reflect their own bad day rather than any personal slight. Empathy transforms our interactions from transactional to meaningful.
Thoughtful Speech:
Kind people understand the weight of words. They choose language that uplifts rather than diminishes, that includes rather than excludes. This doesn't mean avoiding difficult conversations – rather, it means approaching them with care and consideration. A nice person delivers hard truths with compassion and constructive criticism with genuine desire to help.
Small Acts, Big Impact:
Kindness manifests in countless small ways: holding doors, offering seats to those who need them, remembering names, acknowledging birthdays, sending thank-you notes. These seemingly minor gestures create ripples of positivity that extend far beyond the immediate interaction. They show others they are seen and valued.
Boundaries and Self-Care:
Contrary to common misconception, being nice doesn't mean being a pushover. True kindness includes setting healthy boundaries and practicing self-care. After all, we can't pour from an empty cup. Nice people understand that saying "no" when necessary and maintaining personal limits actually enables them to be more genuinely kind when they do engage.
Forgiveness and Understanding:
Nice people practice forgiveness – both of others and themselves. They understand that everyone makes mistakes and deserves second chances. This doesn't mean accepting abuse or repeated bad behavior, but rather approaching human imperfection with grace and understanding.
Proactive Kindness:
Being nice isn't just about responding well to others – it's about actively creating positive situations. This might mean introducing people who could benefit from knowing each other, sharing opportunities, or stepping up to help before being asked. Nice people look for ways to make others' lives better, even in small ways.
The Ripple Effect:
Perhaps most importantly, being nice creates a positive feedback loop in communities. When we treat others with kindness, they're more likely to pass that kindness forward. Over time, this creates a more supportive, understanding, and pleasant environment for everyone. In an increasingly divided world, genuine niceness can be a powerful force for connection and healing.
In conclusion, being nice is a skill that requires practice, awareness, and genuine effort. It's not about maintaining a facade of pleasantness, but about contributing to a more compassionate world through conscious choices and actions. The beauty of kindness is that it benefits both the giver and receiver, creating connections and community in a world that desperately needs both.
Editors Comments: Being nice is akin to the fundamental components and principles of natural common law which are;
“Cause no harm or loss to another living man or woman; their rights and or their property.”
Peace to all men and women:
🌹 🐝 🌈 🕊️ ❤️
👍12🔥3❤🔥2🙏2👏1
Our English Constitution & Trial By Jury Empower the People through Freedom from Tyranny.
The recent proposal by the Labour government to remove Jury Trials is further evidence of the state’s increasing control.
This will prevent the people from achieving self-governance and the right to make decisions about our justice and liberty.
If the people see the daily bombardment from the media of what the government has done wrong, what the medics have done wrong, what the police have done wrong, and what the monarch has done wrong, they will cry for the destruction of all these things and leave a dangerous void.
The solution is for every man, woman, and child to be educated about the power of our constitution and the power the people have to self-govern through Trial By Jury.
The government has been hiding our constitutional documents and national sovereignty, preventing us from achieving our right to self-govern.
Magna Carta 1215 gave the people the right to Trial By Jury, where twelve ordinary men and women from the community decide the case according to their conscience.
They can judge both the facts and the legislation and have the right to decide if the legislation under which the defendant was made guilty is fair.
The ability of the jury to decide if the legislation should apply in that case is known as Jury Nullification.
This means that the legislation can be selectively applied by the jury according to their conscience. All juries have this right, but they do not know because the Judges hide it from the people.
For example, if a man was driving to work during the lockdown and arrested by the Police under the Corona Virus Act he may end up with a fine. If that man requested his right to a Trial By Jury of twelve of his peers, they would have the right to decide his fate, not the judge.
The jury could decide that restricting his right to travel and then fining him is against his unalienable right to trade and earn a living and say that the ‘Corona Virus Act’ was unfair and shouldn’t apply in this case. The man would walk free without fine or forfeiture..!
Our present system of Jury Trial is the bastardised version of our constitutional right. However, these juries do have the right to Jury Nullification of any Act or law.
But this fact is hidden. The judge also manipulates the jury and ultimately makes the ruling, which is against our Constitution.
Since the 1970s law undergraduates have not been educated about the constitution, so the vast majority of judges, barristers, solicitors and Magistrates do not know that they are neglecting the rights of the people.
Universities caused them to write essays on the pros and cons of judge trials versus jury trials – as if this were a benign academic exercise rather than, perhaps, a manipulation of the psyches of prospective lawyers in order that they would come to unwittingly participate in the denigration of our constitution.
But many did graduate with a strong sense of justice and fought hard for it when in practice, despite the confines of the legal system in which they operated. Many held the Jury in high esteem, but did not really understand why; they did not know that our constitution granted it to us as a right.
Many have been so busy surviving in the system that they did not stop to analyse it until the injustice of 2020 forced them to start uncovering the truth.
https://awakenedgb.wordpress.com/2024/12/14/the-english-constitution-empowers-the-people
Editor’s note: This site is well researched & contains a wealth of good information that empowers living men & women of all backgrounds…
The recent proposal by the Labour government to remove Jury Trials is further evidence of the state’s increasing control.
This will prevent the people from achieving self-governance and the right to make decisions about our justice and liberty.
If the people see the daily bombardment from the media of what the government has done wrong, what the medics have done wrong, what the police have done wrong, and what the monarch has done wrong, they will cry for the destruction of all these things and leave a dangerous void.
The solution is for every man, woman, and child to be educated about the power of our constitution and the power the people have to self-govern through Trial By Jury.
The government has been hiding our constitutional documents and national sovereignty, preventing us from achieving our right to self-govern.
Magna Carta 1215 gave the people the right to Trial By Jury, where twelve ordinary men and women from the community decide the case according to their conscience.
They can judge both the facts and the legislation and have the right to decide if the legislation under which the defendant was made guilty is fair.
The ability of the jury to decide if the legislation should apply in that case is known as Jury Nullification.
This means that the legislation can be selectively applied by the jury according to their conscience. All juries have this right, but they do not know because the Judges hide it from the people.
For example, if a man was driving to work during the lockdown and arrested by the Police under the Corona Virus Act he may end up with a fine. If that man requested his right to a Trial By Jury of twelve of his peers, they would have the right to decide his fate, not the judge.
The jury could decide that restricting his right to travel and then fining him is against his unalienable right to trade and earn a living and say that the ‘Corona Virus Act’ was unfair and shouldn’t apply in this case. The man would walk free without fine or forfeiture..!
Our present system of Jury Trial is the bastardised version of our constitutional right. However, these juries do have the right to Jury Nullification of any Act or law.
But this fact is hidden. The judge also manipulates the jury and ultimately makes the ruling, which is against our Constitution.
Since the 1970s law undergraduates have not been educated about the constitution, so the vast majority of judges, barristers, solicitors and Magistrates do not know that they are neglecting the rights of the people.
Universities caused them to write essays on the pros and cons of judge trials versus jury trials – as if this were a benign academic exercise rather than, perhaps, a manipulation of the psyches of prospective lawyers in order that they would come to unwittingly participate in the denigration of our constitution.
But many did graduate with a strong sense of justice and fought hard for it when in practice, despite the confines of the legal system in which they operated. Many held the Jury in high esteem, but did not really understand why; they did not know that our constitution granted it to us as a right.
Many have been so busy surviving in the system that they did not stop to analyse it until the injustice of 2020 forced them to start uncovering the truth.
https://awakenedgb.wordpress.com/2024/12/14/the-english-constitution-empowers-the-people
Editor’s note: This site is well researched & contains a wealth of good information that empowers living men & women of all backgrounds…
Awakened-GB
The English Constitution Empowers the People
Our English Constitution and Trial By Jury empower the people through freedom from tyranny. The recent proposal by the Labour government to remove Jury Trials is further evidence of the state’…
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THE TRUE NEW YEAR..!
We can all appreciate the kind sentiment and acknowledge the Good Wishes… & intentions that people send each other at this time of year…
However, how many know that this is actually inaccurate, therefore we must clarify that this channel does not endorse the perpetuation of inaccuracies… and blatant lies…
The term "octagon" refers to the number eight, indicating that October is the eighth month of the year. Similarly, "deca," from which December derives its name, corresponds to ten, establishing that December is indeed the tenth month.
Furthermore, January represents the 11th month, while February is the 12th.
From a historical and botanical perspective, the true new year aligns with the transition from February to March, coinciding with the onset of new growth and the blooming of life, marking the genuine start of the…
True New Year…!!!
We can all appreciate the kind sentiment and acknowledge the Good Wishes… & intentions that people send each other at this time of year…
However, how many know that this is actually inaccurate, therefore we must clarify that this channel does not endorse the perpetuation of inaccuracies… and blatant lies…
The term "octagon" refers to the number eight, indicating that October is the eighth month of the year. Similarly, "deca," from which December derives its name, corresponds to ten, establishing that December is indeed the tenth month.
Furthermore, January represents the 11th month, while February is the 12th.
From a historical and botanical perspective, the true new year aligns with the transition from February to March, coinciding with the onset of new growth and the blooming of life, marking the genuine start of the…
True New Year…!!!
💯15
The English Law of Liens
Extracts from Halsbury’s Laws of England, widely regarded within the legal profession as ‘the bible of English Law’.
701. Types. The concept of lien in the simple sense of a legal right to keep possession of property until a claim has been met and has been extended to cover a number of analogous rights. Liens are now variously described as legal, non-possessory, equitable, general, particular, statutory, contractual, judicial and subrogatory. Some of these may exist concurrently.
A lien arising by operation of law or equity and not contractual in its nature does not seem to fall within the definition of ‘security’ in the Consumer Credit Act 1974 but is included for the purposes of the Insolvency Act 1986.
702. Legal Lien. In its primary or legal sense ‘lien’ means a right at common law for a man to retain that which is rightfully and continuously in his possession belonging to another until the present and accrued claims of the person in possession are satisfied, but this is given by law and not by contract. A written agreement to grant a lien is not a bill of sale, for a legal lien does not as a rule arise until possession of the property is obtained. However, in exceptional cases, possession is no essential to constitute a legal lien.
703. Non-possessory Lien. In its secondary sense, ‘lien’ may be applied to a right subsisting in a person who has no possession of the property concerned but who nevertheless has a right against the owner analogous (similar) to a legal lien.
Such a right may arise in equity, by statute or under a court order.
Thus, a trustee has an equitable lien on the estate or fund for money properly expensed on it and a solicitor, in addition to his legal lien on the client’s documents in his possession, has a statutory lien right to ask the court to direct that property recovered is to stand security for his costs.
So also where a party has by his efforts brought into court a fund in the administration of which various parties are interested, his costs and expenses are a first claim on the fund; and a provisional liquidator’s remuneration and his solicitor’s expenses are charged on the funds of the liquidation so that the provisional liquidator has a lien over the company’s assets in his hands.
Likewise, a receiver or receiver and manager appointed by the court has an indemnity over assets and is a secured creditor with a lien for his expenses, remuneration and costs.
A trustee’s lien on the trust estate or fund for money properly expended on it seems to extend to the payment of costs of proceedings authorised by the court.
However, where a beneficiary or minority shareholder is entitled to a similar indeminity there can be no legal lien because there is no possession; and it is not clear whether an equitable or judicial lien could be said to arise in such a case, or whether such a proposition could have any useful effect.
A trustee’s equitable and statutory rights to impound a beneficiary’s interest, where the trustee has committed a breach of trust at the instigation of the beneficiary, do not depend on the trustee’s actual possession of the trust fund.
704. Equitable Liens. An equitable lien is a specie of equitable charge arising by operation of law independent of possession. Re Bond Worth Ltd [1980] Ch 228 at 250-251, [1985] 3 WLR 610 at 613-614 per Nourse J. A right which arises by express contractual agreement is sometimes described as a lien; see Re Bond Worth Ltd supra.
Although the vendor’s and the purchaser’s equitable liens arise in circumstances where there is a contract, a contract is not necessary for the creation of an equitable lien. Eg the trustee’s lien: see Shirlaw v Taylor (1991) 102 ALR 551 at 557, Aust Fed Ct, Full Ct.
Since it arises in equity, it is subject to all the usual conditions affecting equitable rights. Thus relief may be refused where the conduct of the person claiming the right has been questionable or improper.
Extracts from Halsbury’s Laws of England, widely regarded within the legal profession as ‘the bible of English Law’.
701. Types. The concept of lien in the simple sense of a legal right to keep possession of property until a claim has been met and has been extended to cover a number of analogous rights. Liens are now variously described as legal, non-possessory, equitable, general, particular, statutory, contractual, judicial and subrogatory. Some of these may exist concurrently.
A lien arising by operation of law or equity and not contractual in its nature does not seem to fall within the definition of ‘security’ in the Consumer Credit Act 1974 but is included for the purposes of the Insolvency Act 1986.
702. Legal Lien. In its primary or legal sense ‘lien’ means a right at common law for a man to retain that which is rightfully and continuously in his possession belonging to another until the present and accrued claims of the person in possession are satisfied, but this is given by law and not by contract. A written agreement to grant a lien is not a bill of sale, for a legal lien does not as a rule arise until possession of the property is obtained. However, in exceptional cases, possession is no essential to constitute a legal lien.
703. Non-possessory Lien. In its secondary sense, ‘lien’ may be applied to a right subsisting in a person who has no possession of the property concerned but who nevertheless has a right against the owner analogous (similar) to a legal lien.
Such a right may arise in equity, by statute or under a court order.
Thus, a trustee has an equitable lien on the estate or fund for money properly expensed on it and a solicitor, in addition to his legal lien on the client’s documents in his possession, has a statutory lien right to ask the court to direct that property recovered is to stand security for his costs.
So also where a party has by his efforts brought into court a fund in the administration of which various parties are interested, his costs and expenses are a first claim on the fund; and a provisional liquidator’s remuneration and his solicitor’s expenses are charged on the funds of the liquidation so that the provisional liquidator has a lien over the company’s assets in his hands.
Likewise, a receiver or receiver and manager appointed by the court has an indemnity over assets and is a secured creditor with a lien for his expenses, remuneration and costs.
A trustee’s lien on the trust estate or fund for money properly expended on it seems to extend to the payment of costs of proceedings authorised by the court.
However, where a beneficiary or minority shareholder is entitled to a similar indeminity there can be no legal lien because there is no possession; and it is not clear whether an equitable or judicial lien could be said to arise in such a case, or whether such a proposition could have any useful effect.
A trustee’s equitable and statutory rights to impound a beneficiary’s interest, where the trustee has committed a breach of trust at the instigation of the beneficiary, do not depend on the trustee’s actual possession of the trust fund.
704. Equitable Liens. An equitable lien is a specie of equitable charge arising by operation of law independent of possession. Re Bond Worth Ltd [1980] Ch 228 at 250-251, [1985] 3 WLR 610 at 613-614 per Nourse J. A right which arises by express contractual agreement is sometimes described as a lien; see Re Bond Worth Ltd supra.
Although the vendor’s and the purchaser’s equitable liens arise in circumstances where there is a contract, a contract is not necessary for the creation of an equitable lien. Eg the trustee’s lien: see Shirlaw v Taylor (1991) 102 ALR 551 at 557, Aust Fed Ct, Full Ct.
Since it arises in equity, it is subject to all the usual conditions affecting equitable rights. Thus relief may be refused where the conduct of the person claiming the right has been questionable or improper.
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__It is not possible to state a general principle which accounts for the diversity of situations in which an equitable lien arises. __Hewett v Court (1983) 149 CLR 639 at 645, Aust HC, per Gibbs CJ.
Apart from equitable liens arising from contractual dealings in property, equitable liens have been based upon general considerations of justice or upon the principle that he who seeks the aid of equity in enforcing some claim must admit the equitable rights of others associated with the subject matter. Shirlaw v Taylor (1991) 102 ALR 551 at 557-558, Aust Fed Ct, Full Ct.
The vendor’s lien is founded on the principle of equity that he who has obtained possession of property under a contract for payment of its value will not be allowed to keep it without payment. Where through the deposit of deeds and compliance with the statutory formalities, an equitable mortgage arises, there is a lien on the documents.
705. Concurrent Legal and Equitable Liens. Legal and equitable liens may both arise in the same transaction. Thus on the sale of land the vendor’s or purchaser’s equitable lien exists concurrently with a more limited legal lien before conveyance and a legal lien on the title deeds in the claimant’s possession; and it would also seem that a legal lien arising by statute on the sale of goods may exist concurrently with an equitable lien on the same goods. An equitable charge over a chattel can co-exist with a bailment of the chattel: Re Cosslett (Contractors) Ltd [1996] 4 All ER 46 at 61, [1996] 3 WLR 299 at 314 per Jonathan Parker J.
706. Statutory Lien. Where a lien arises by virtue of statute there will be different considerations from those raised by a common law or equitable lien, because the primary question will be the meaning of the statute; and it will not necessarily follow that the principles affecting a common law or equitable lien are intended by the statute to apply.
Statute law may also destroy or nullify a lien which would otherwise be enforcable.
An accountant’s lien in respect of unpaid fees over a client’s books of accounts, files and papers is unenforcable in so far as the existence of the lien conflicts with the requirement imposed by the Companies Act 1985 s 222 (as substituted) […] that a company’s accounting records must be kept at the company’s registered office or such other place as the director’s think fit, and must at all times be open to inspection by the company’s officers: DTC (CNC) Ltd v Gary Sargeant & Co (a firm) 2 All ER 369, [1996] 1 WLR 797.
It may not be clear whether the statute creates a general or a particular lien. __See eg Consumer Credit Act 1974 ss 70(2), 73(5); cf s 72(4). __An example of a statutory particular lien is that created in favour of the unpaid seller by the Sale of Goods Act 1979 [ss 39, 42, 43, 47, 48, 55].
707. Contractual Lien. Where a lien arises by contract there will usually be different considerations from those raised by a common law or equitable lien, because the primary question will be the meaning of the terms of the contract.
Contract has been said to supersede lien and to limit the rights of the person claiming under contract to those for which provision has been made in the contract. Walker v Birch (1795) 6 Term Rep 258; Re Leith’s Estate, Chambers v Davidson (1866) LR 1 PC 296; Fisher v Smith (1878) 4 App Cas 1, HL; Seka Pty Ltd (in provisional liquidation) v Fabric Dyeworks (Aust) Ltd (1991) 4 ACSR 455, Aust Fed Ct.
An example of a contractual lien is a security within the terms of the Consumer Credit Act 1974.
A contract which puports to create a general lien will be strictly construed. Squamish Terminals Ltd v Price-Waterhouse Ltd (1980).
Just as a contract may supersede the lien, so a course of dealing inconsistent with the lien may destroy it. Fisher v Smith (1878 4 App Cas 1, HL.
708. Subrogatory Lien.
Apart from equitable liens arising from contractual dealings in property, equitable liens have been based upon general considerations of justice or upon the principle that he who seeks the aid of equity in enforcing some claim must admit the equitable rights of others associated with the subject matter. Shirlaw v Taylor (1991) 102 ALR 551 at 557-558, Aust Fed Ct, Full Ct.
The vendor’s lien is founded on the principle of equity that he who has obtained possession of property under a contract for payment of its value will not be allowed to keep it without payment. Where through the deposit of deeds and compliance with the statutory formalities, an equitable mortgage arises, there is a lien on the documents.
705. Concurrent Legal and Equitable Liens. Legal and equitable liens may both arise in the same transaction. Thus on the sale of land the vendor’s or purchaser’s equitable lien exists concurrently with a more limited legal lien before conveyance and a legal lien on the title deeds in the claimant’s possession; and it would also seem that a legal lien arising by statute on the sale of goods may exist concurrently with an equitable lien on the same goods. An equitable charge over a chattel can co-exist with a bailment of the chattel: Re Cosslett (Contractors) Ltd [1996] 4 All ER 46 at 61, [1996] 3 WLR 299 at 314 per Jonathan Parker J.
706. Statutory Lien. Where a lien arises by virtue of statute there will be different considerations from those raised by a common law or equitable lien, because the primary question will be the meaning of the statute; and it will not necessarily follow that the principles affecting a common law or equitable lien are intended by the statute to apply.
Statute law may also destroy or nullify a lien which would otherwise be enforcable.
An accountant’s lien in respect of unpaid fees over a client’s books of accounts, files and papers is unenforcable in so far as the existence of the lien conflicts with the requirement imposed by the Companies Act 1985 s 222 (as substituted) […] that a company’s accounting records must be kept at the company’s registered office or such other place as the director’s think fit, and must at all times be open to inspection by the company’s officers: DTC (CNC) Ltd v Gary Sargeant & Co (a firm) 2 All ER 369, [1996] 1 WLR 797.
It may not be clear whether the statute creates a general or a particular lien. __See eg Consumer Credit Act 1974 ss 70(2), 73(5); cf s 72(4). __An example of a statutory particular lien is that created in favour of the unpaid seller by the Sale of Goods Act 1979 [ss 39, 42, 43, 47, 48, 55].
707. Contractual Lien. Where a lien arises by contract there will usually be different considerations from those raised by a common law or equitable lien, because the primary question will be the meaning of the terms of the contract.
Contract has been said to supersede lien and to limit the rights of the person claiming under contract to those for which provision has been made in the contract. Walker v Birch (1795) 6 Term Rep 258; Re Leith’s Estate, Chambers v Davidson (1866) LR 1 PC 296; Fisher v Smith (1878) 4 App Cas 1, HL; Seka Pty Ltd (in provisional liquidation) v Fabric Dyeworks (Aust) Ltd (1991) 4 ACSR 455, Aust Fed Ct.
An example of a contractual lien is a security within the terms of the Consumer Credit Act 1974.
A contract which puports to create a general lien will be strictly construed. Squamish Terminals Ltd v Price-Waterhouse Ltd (1980).
Just as a contract may supersede the lien, so a course of dealing inconsistent with the lien may destroy it. Fisher v Smith (1878 4 App Cas 1, HL.
708. Subrogatory Lien.
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A lien may arise by subrogation in equity where there is a primary and secondary liability of two persons for one and the same debt, the debt being (as between the two) that of one of those persons only, and not equally of both, so that the other, if he should be compelled to pay it, would be entitled to reimbursement from the person by whom (as between the two) it ought to have been paid. Duncan, Fox & Co v North and South Wales Bank (1880) 6 App Cas 1 at 10-11, HL. As to subrogation see also Orakpo v Manson Investments Ltd [1978] AC 95, [1977] 3 All ER 1, HL; Lord Napier and Ettrick v Hunter [1993] AC 713, [1993] 1 All ER 385, HL.
This right of subrogation arises independently of contract or guarantee and is equivalent to the right of contribution which exists in equity where a creditor has a right to come upon more than one person of fund for payment of the debt.
In such a case there is an equity between the persons interested in the different funds that each shall bear no more than due proportion. Deering v Earl of Winchelsea (1787) 2 Bos & P 270, Ex Ch; Stirling v Forrester (1821) 3 Bli 575.
That principle applies equally where ultimately one person is liable for the whole debt and the other is ultimately liable for none of it. The right of subrogation will only carry with it the right to a lien where the person primarily liable was subject to such a lien and not, for instance, where the original loan was clearly intended to be unsecured or where a trustee has no indemnity rights against the trust fund because its contract is unauthorised. Eclesiastical Comrs v Pinney [1900] 2 Ch 736 at 743, CA. Paul v Speinway Ltd (in liquidation) [1976] Ch 220 at 232, [1976] 2 All ER 587 at 597 per Oliver J (applying Wylie V Carlyon [1922] 1 ch 51. The ordinary and typical example of subrogation is that ‘where A’s money is used to pay off the claim of B, who is a second creditor, A is entitled to be regarded in equity as having had assignment to him of B’s rights as a secured creditor’: Burston Finance Ltd v Speirway Ltd [1974] 3 All ER 735 at 738 [1974] 1 WLR 1648 at 1652 per Walton J. This is similar to the statutory transfer of a mortgage, where the receipt for mortgage money indicates that payment has been made by some person not immediately entitled to the equity of redemption: see the Law of Property Act 1925 s 115(2) […] It has been held that ‘it is not open to doubt that where a third party pays off a mortgage he is presumed, until the contrary appears, to intend that the mortgage be kept alive for his own benefit. Ghana Commercial Bank v Chandiram [1960] AC 732 at 745, [1960] 2 All ER 865 at 871, PC.
COMPARISONS AND DISTINCTIONS
709. Distinctions. A lien must be distinguished from a mortgage, a pledge, a bill of sale and an equitable charge.
710. Legal Lien and Mortgage. A legal lien has been held to differ from a mortgage in that it is generally assignable without the express or implied authority of the owner of the subject goods. See 719 post; Tobin v Melrose [1951] SASR 139, S Aust SC. For departures from the supposed principle that a legal lien is not freely assignable see paras 708 ante, 719 post.
A mortgage, in comparison, can be transferred at the will of the mortgagee. See the Law of Property Act 1925 ss 114, 115(2); Taylor v Russell ’1892] AC 244 at 255, HL.
There is, however, authority for the rule that a legal lien can be acquired along with the secured debt itself. See Vered v Inscorp Holdings Ltd (1993) 31 NSWLR 290, NSW SC, per Hodgson J, following Bullv Faulkner (1848) 2 De G & SM 772.
A more substantial difference between legal lien and mortgage may be that, whereas a legal lien lasts only so long as possession of the goods is sustained, a mortgage does not depend on possession, and can arise or subsist without any delivery of possession to the mortgagee. The mortgagee may, however, be entitiled to possession: see Western Bank Ltd v Schindler [1977] Ch 1 at 9, [1976] 2 All ER 393 at 396, CA, per Buckley LJ.
This right of subrogation arises independently of contract or guarantee and is equivalent to the right of contribution which exists in equity where a creditor has a right to come upon more than one person of fund for payment of the debt.
In such a case there is an equity between the persons interested in the different funds that each shall bear no more than due proportion. Deering v Earl of Winchelsea (1787) 2 Bos & P 270, Ex Ch; Stirling v Forrester (1821) 3 Bli 575.
That principle applies equally where ultimately one person is liable for the whole debt and the other is ultimately liable for none of it. The right of subrogation will only carry with it the right to a lien where the person primarily liable was subject to such a lien and not, for instance, where the original loan was clearly intended to be unsecured or where a trustee has no indemnity rights against the trust fund because its contract is unauthorised. Eclesiastical Comrs v Pinney [1900] 2 Ch 736 at 743, CA. Paul v Speinway Ltd (in liquidation) [1976] Ch 220 at 232, [1976] 2 All ER 587 at 597 per Oliver J (applying Wylie V Carlyon [1922] 1 ch 51. The ordinary and typical example of subrogation is that ‘where A’s money is used to pay off the claim of B, who is a second creditor, A is entitled to be regarded in equity as having had assignment to him of B’s rights as a secured creditor’: Burston Finance Ltd v Speirway Ltd [1974] 3 All ER 735 at 738 [1974] 1 WLR 1648 at 1652 per Walton J. This is similar to the statutory transfer of a mortgage, where the receipt for mortgage money indicates that payment has been made by some person not immediately entitled to the equity of redemption: see the Law of Property Act 1925 s 115(2) […] It has been held that ‘it is not open to doubt that where a third party pays off a mortgage he is presumed, until the contrary appears, to intend that the mortgage be kept alive for his own benefit. Ghana Commercial Bank v Chandiram [1960] AC 732 at 745, [1960] 2 All ER 865 at 871, PC.
COMPARISONS AND DISTINCTIONS
709. Distinctions. A lien must be distinguished from a mortgage, a pledge, a bill of sale and an equitable charge.
710. Legal Lien and Mortgage. A legal lien has been held to differ from a mortgage in that it is generally assignable without the express or implied authority of the owner of the subject goods. See 719 post; Tobin v Melrose [1951] SASR 139, S Aust SC. For departures from the supposed principle that a legal lien is not freely assignable see paras 708 ante, 719 post.
A mortgage, in comparison, can be transferred at the will of the mortgagee. See the Law of Property Act 1925 ss 114, 115(2); Taylor v Russell ’1892] AC 244 at 255, HL.
There is, however, authority for the rule that a legal lien can be acquired along with the secured debt itself. See Vered v Inscorp Holdings Ltd (1993) 31 NSWLR 290, NSW SC, per Hodgson J, following Bullv Faulkner (1848) 2 De G & SM 772.
A more substantial difference between legal lien and mortgage may be that, whereas a legal lien lasts only so long as possession of the goods is sustained, a mortgage does not depend on possession, and can arise or subsist without any delivery of possession to the mortgagee. The mortgagee may, however, be entitiled to possession: see Western Bank Ltd v Schindler [1977] Ch 1 at 9, [1976] 2 All ER 393 at 396, CA, per Buckley LJ.
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Further, a legal lien in its true sense arises by operation of law, whereas a mortgage is contractual in origin. Note that for the purposes of the Law of Property Act 1925, ‘mortgage’ includes a lien for securing money or money’s worth: see Law of Property Act 1925 s 205(1)(xvi). A lien is also an ‘incumbrance’: see 205(1)(vii).
Where an equitable mortgage is created through the deposit of the title deeds, the mortgagee has a legal lien on the deeds deposited. The former rule that a deposit of title deeds to a property by way of security created by itself an equitable mortgage of the property has not survived the enactment of the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989 s 2 (as amended): United Bank of Kuwait v Sahib [1997] Ch 107, [1996] 3 All ER 215, CA.
711. Concomitant Legal Lien and Equitable Mortgage. Where a valid equitable mortgage of land has been created through deposit of title deeds, the mortgagee has a concomitant legal lien on the deeds. However, there must now be a contract which complies with the statutory formalities for the equitable mortgage to arise.
As to the historical devlopment of the equitable mortgage by deposit of the title deeds see Russel v Russel (1783) 1 Bro CC 269; Ex p Mountford (1808) 14 Ves 606; London & Cheshire Insurance Co Ltd v Laplagrene Property Co Ltd [1971] Ch 499 at 514, [1971] All ER 766 at 779 per Brightmann J;[…] See now, however, the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989 s 2 (as amended) (seenote 3 infra); and REAL PROPERTY. See also United Bank of Kuwait plc v Sahib [1997] Ch 107, [1996] 3 All ER 215, CA; and para 710 note 6 ante.
712. Equitable Lien and Mortgage. The main distinction between equitable lien and mortgage is that the mortgage is contractual but the lien arises by operation of equity. An equitable lien does not depend on possession and in theory, as an equitable right to a charge, it is assignable; but since it is dependent for enforement on a court order, it is not in practice assignable.
A lien is not, then, in the strictest sense of the word a mortgage, but for the purposes of the Law of Property Act 1925, a mortgage included any charge or lien on any property for securing money or money’s worth. See the Law of Property Act 1925 s 205(1); para 710 text and note 5 ante; and MORTGAGE.
It follows that an equitable lien affecting a legal estate in land will rank for priority according to its registration as a land charge and may be void as against a purchaser if not so registered. See ibid s 97 (as amended); and the Land Charges Act 1972 s 2(1).
It also follows that an equitable lien may be realised by a court as an equitable mortage. See ibid s 90 (amended by the County Courts Act 1984 s 148(1), Sch 2 Pt II para 3(1); and the High Court and County Courts Jurisdiction Order 1991, SI 1991/724, art 2(8), Schedule). As to the consequence of lien being included as a mortgage within the Law of Property Act 1925 see MORTGAGE vol 32 para 895.
713. Pledge or Pawn. A pledge of pawn is a bailment of goods or chattels as security for some debt or engagement. It gives a special assignable interest in the property to the pledgee Donald v Suckling (1866) LR 1 QB 585 at 612. and carries an inherent power of sale in the event of default See Palmer Bailment (2nd Edn, 1991) p 1379 et seq..
It differs from both legal and equitable lien in being essentially contractual, but is similar to legal lien in that actual or constructive delivery occurs and possession passes to the pledgee Dublin City Distillery Ltd v Doherty [1914] AC 823, HL..
The right to possession of the property vests in the pledgee so far as is necessary to secure the debt; in this sense pledge or pawn is intermediate between a simple lien and a motgage which wholly passes the property in the thing conveyed Halliday v Holgate (1868) LR 3 Exch at 302.
The manner in which a possessor’s security is designated in the parent contract or other instrument is a persuasive, but not necessarily decisive, indication as to whether the security is a pledge or a lien.
714. Bill of Sale.
Where an equitable mortgage is created through the deposit of the title deeds, the mortgagee has a legal lien on the deeds deposited. The former rule that a deposit of title deeds to a property by way of security created by itself an equitable mortgage of the property has not survived the enactment of the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989 s 2 (as amended): United Bank of Kuwait v Sahib [1997] Ch 107, [1996] 3 All ER 215, CA.
711. Concomitant Legal Lien and Equitable Mortgage. Where a valid equitable mortgage of land has been created through deposit of title deeds, the mortgagee has a concomitant legal lien on the deeds. However, there must now be a contract which complies with the statutory formalities for the equitable mortgage to arise.
As to the historical devlopment of the equitable mortgage by deposit of the title deeds see Russel v Russel (1783) 1 Bro CC 269; Ex p Mountford (1808) 14 Ves 606; London & Cheshire Insurance Co Ltd v Laplagrene Property Co Ltd [1971] Ch 499 at 514, [1971] All ER 766 at 779 per Brightmann J;[…] See now, however, the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989 s 2 (as amended) (seenote 3 infra); and REAL PROPERTY. See also United Bank of Kuwait plc v Sahib [1997] Ch 107, [1996] 3 All ER 215, CA; and para 710 note 6 ante.
712. Equitable Lien and Mortgage. The main distinction between equitable lien and mortgage is that the mortgage is contractual but the lien arises by operation of equity. An equitable lien does not depend on possession and in theory, as an equitable right to a charge, it is assignable; but since it is dependent for enforement on a court order, it is not in practice assignable.
A lien is not, then, in the strictest sense of the word a mortgage, but for the purposes of the Law of Property Act 1925, a mortgage included any charge or lien on any property for securing money or money’s worth. See the Law of Property Act 1925 s 205(1); para 710 text and note 5 ante; and MORTGAGE.
It follows that an equitable lien affecting a legal estate in land will rank for priority according to its registration as a land charge and may be void as against a purchaser if not so registered. See ibid s 97 (as amended); and the Land Charges Act 1972 s 2(1).
It also follows that an equitable lien may be realised by a court as an equitable mortage. See ibid s 90 (amended by the County Courts Act 1984 s 148(1), Sch 2 Pt II para 3(1); and the High Court and County Courts Jurisdiction Order 1991, SI 1991/724, art 2(8), Schedule). As to the consequence of lien being included as a mortgage within the Law of Property Act 1925 see MORTGAGE vol 32 para 895.
713. Pledge or Pawn. A pledge of pawn is a bailment of goods or chattels as security for some debt or engagement. It gives a special assignable interest in the property to the pledgee Donald v Suckling (1866) LR 1 QB 585 at 612. and carries an inherent power of sale in the event of default See Palmer Bailment (2nd Edn, 1991) p 1379 et seq..
It differs from both legal and equitable lien in being essentially contractual, but is similar to legal lien in that actual or constructive delivery occurs and possession passes to the pledgee Dublin City Distillery Ltd v Doherty [1914] AC 823, HL..
The right to possession of the property vests in the pledgee so far as is necessary to secure the debt; in this sense pledge or pawn is intermediate between a simple lien and a motgage which wholly passes the property in the thing conveyed Halliday v Holgate (1868) LR 3 Exch at 302.
The manner in which a possessor’s security is designated in the parent contract or other instrument is a persuasive, but not necessarily decisive, indication as to whether the security is a pledge or a lien.
714. Bill of Sale.
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A bill of sale is in some sense the converse of a legal lien in that possession is not given but the property in goods or chattels is transferred by a written instrument.
Since a lien arises by operation of law or equity there is no document, and so the registration requirements of the Bills of Sale Acts do not apply.
715. Equitable Charge. An equitable charge is normally a right founded on contract, whereas both legal and equitable liens, in their true sense, arise by operation of law or equity.
The effects of an equitable lien and an equitable charge are similar in that both are equitable interests and not mere equities and both are liable to be defeated under the Limitation Act 1980 s 20(1) (action time-barred after 12 years); and LIMITATION OF ACTIONS para 1002 post. and for non-registation.
LEGAL LIEN
(1) NATURE AND ESSENTIALS
716. General Lien. A general lien entitles a person in possession of chattels to retain them until all claims or accounts of the person in possession against the owner of the chattel are satisfied. It can exist: (1) as a common law right arising from general usage; or
(2) by express agreement.
General liens are discouraged because they give special privileges as against other creditors and tend to upset the equitable distribution of assets in bankruptcy.
They have been regarded as an encroachment upon the common law.
However, where the usage has been frequently recognised the right of lien becomes part of common law and is accepted by the courts without further evidence.
717. Particular Lien. A particular lien at common law is the right to retain goods for which charges have been incurred until those charges have been paid; if the owner of the goods is willing to pay these charges, the goods may not be retained until payment of any general balance due to the person having the particular lien. Jones v Tarleton (1842) 9 M & W 675.
Being consistent with the principal of natural equity, particular liens are favoured by the law, which is contrued liberally in such cases. Jackson v Cummins (1839) 5 M & W 342.
As general liens may arise from general usage, or by express contract, it follows that particular liens may arise in the same manner.
The terms of a contract may be such as to negative a particular lien which might otherwise have arisen Hatton v Car Maintenance Co Ltd [1915] 1 Ch 621., but a particular lien cannot be extended by contract so as to become a general lien against the goods of strangers to the contract. Thus an unpaid seller’s right of stoppage in transitu cannot be defeated by an agreement between the carrier and the buyer: see Oppenheim v Russell (1802) 3 Bos & P 42.
718. Legal Lien by contract. A lien, whether general or particular, may be created and defined by contract. A lien so arising bears in some respects a closer resemblance to a pledge, althought it can exist without an inherent or agreed power of sale, which is a concomitant of pledge.
A general lien often arises by contract between a company and its members under the articles of association. An agreement which is void from the beginning for want of legal formalities cannot give rise to a right of lien, but an agreement to do something which is illegal could give rise to a lien if the work was done. Just as a legal lien may be created by7 contract, it may be negatived by the terms of the contract, either expressly or by implication because it is inconsistent with the terms of the contract, or it may be discharged or superseded by the contract.
719. Nature of Legal Lien. A legal lien is a right of defence to an action in respect of the chattel an action in conversion brought by the owner to recover the chattel. and is not a right of action in itself Tappenden (t/a English and American Autos) v Artus [1964] 2 QB 185 at 194-195, [1963 3 All ER 213 at 215-216, CA, per Diplock LJ, holding further that lien is a self-help remedy, triggered by the performance of work which improves a chattel of which the performer has lawful possession, and does not depend on any implied contractual term.
Since a lien arises by operation of law or equity there is no document, and so the registration requirements of the Bills of Sale Acts do not apply.
715. Equitable Charge. An equitable charge is normally a right founded on contract, whereas both legal and equitable liens, in their true sense, arise by operation of law or equity.
The effects of an equitable lien and an equitable charge are similar in that both are equitable interests and not mere equities and both are liable to be defeated under the Limitation Act 1980 s 20(1) (action time-barred after 12 years); and LIMITATION OF ACTIONS para 1002 post. and for non-registation.
LEGAL LIEN
(1) NATURE AND ESSENTIALS
716. General Lien. A general lien entitles a person in possession of chattels to retain them until all claims or accounts of the person in possession against the owner of the chattel are satisfied. It can exist: (1) as a common law right arising from general usage; or
(2) by express agreement.
General liens are discouraged because they give special privileges as against other creditors and tend to upset the equitable distribution of assets in bankruptcy.
They have been regarded as an encroachment upon the common law.
However, where the usage has been frequently recognised the right of lien becomes part of common law and is accepted by the courts without further evidence.
717. Particular Lien. A particular lien at common law is the right to retain goods for which charges have been incurred until those charges have been paid; if the owner of the goods is willing to pay these charges, the goods may not be retained until payment of any general balance due to the person having the particular lien. Jones v Tarleton (1842) 9 M & W 675.
Being consistent with the principal of natural equity, particular liens are favoured by the law, which is contrued liberally in such cases. Jackson v Cummins (1839) 5 M & W 342.
As general liens may arise from general usage, or by express contract, it follows that particular liens may arise in the same manner.
The terms of a contract may be such as to negative a particular lien which might otherwise have arisen Hatton v Car Maintenance Co Ltd [1915] 1 Ch 621., but a particular lien cannot be extended by contract so as to become a general lien against the goods of strangers to the contract. Thus an unpaid seller’s right of stoppage in transitu cannot be defeated by an agreement between the carrier and the buyer: see Oppenheim v Russell (1802) 3 Bos & P 42.
718. Legal Lien by contract. A lien, whether general or particular, may be created and defined by contract. A lien so arising bears in some respects a closer resemblance to a pledge, althought it can exist without an inherent or agreed power of sale, which is a concomitant of pledge.
A general lien often arises by contract between a company and its members under the articles of association. An agreement which is void from the beginning for want of legal formalities cannot give rise to a right of lien, but an agreement to do something which is illegal could give rise to a lien if the work was done. Just as a legal lien may be created by7 contract, it may be negatived by the terms of the contract, either expressly or by implication because it is inconsistent with the terms of the contract, or it may be discharged or superseded by the contract.
719. Nature of Legal Lien. A legal lien is a right of defence to an action in respect of the chattel an action in conversion brought by the owner to recover the chattel. and is not a right of action in itself Tappenden (t/a English and American Autos) v Artus [1964] 2 QB 185 at 194-195, [1963 3 All ER 213 at 215-216, CA, per Diplock LJ, holding further that lien is a self-help remedy, triggered by the performance of work which improves a chattel of which the performer has lawful possession, and does not depend on any implied contractual term.
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But a lien, depending necessarily on possession of the subject chattel, normally entitles the holder to sue any third party who commits a wrong (such as trespass or conversion) against the chattel during the period of that possession: The Winkfield [1902] P 42, CA. See also para 745 text and note 2 post; and BAILMENT vol 2 (Reissue) para 1889. As to legal lien see also para 702 ante..
Its limited character has both advantages and disadvantages for the party entitled. On the one hand, lien can be asserted even where the secured debt is statute-barred See Higgins v Scott (1831) 2 B & Ad 413. See also BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY vol 3(2) (Reissue) para 490; LIMITATION OF ACTIONS para 1002 et seq post., and the chattel cannot be taken in execution Goods the subject of a lien cannot be taken in execution, because lien is merely a personal right continuing during the possession of the goods: Legg v Evans (1840) 6 M & W 36. As to what can be seized in execution see EXECUTION…
On the other hand, a lien confers no power to sell the chattel As to the enforcement of a legal lien see para 745 et seq post..
It has been held that, in contradistinction to a pledge, a lien confers a mere personal right, which cannot be granted to a third party merely by granting the third party possession of of the chattel, without the consent of the owner. But decisions on solicitors and accountant’s liens have readily inferred the necessary authority and have held the lien to be assignable in cases where the secured debt is also assigned. The benefit of a lien can therefore be assigned along with the debt in respect of which it arises. It is arguable that these decisions afford one of several indications that common law possessory liens are beginning to be recognised as a limited form of property interest.
Donald v Suckling (1866) LR 1 QB 585 at 612-613 per Blackburn J, and at 618-619 per Cockburn CJ. The rule stated in the text does not apply where there is an equitable right of subrogation: see para 708 ante.
The purchaser of an article which is subject to a lien having called upon his vendor to pay off the sum claimed may himself pay off the sum in order to obtain possession of what he has purchased and sue the vendor for any sum properly paid (Bevan v Waters (1828) 3 C & P 520); and goods may, it seems, be delivered by a person who has a lien on them to another person as his agent with notice of the lien so as to preserve his lien (see M’Combie v Davies (1805) 7 East 5). The right to pledge conferred on factors (see AGENCY vol 1(2) (Reissue) para 160) arises entirely by statute, and is an exception to the general rule: Cole v North Western Bank (1875) LR 10 CP 354, Ex Ch.
Bull v Faulkner (1848) 2 De G Sm 722; and see SOLICITORS vol 44 (Reissue) para 250. Vered v Inscorp Holdings Ltd (1993) 31 NSWLR 290. NSW SC. In these decisions it was held that, as the law allows the assignment of debts, it also allows the assignment of the benefit of any lien held over the client’s papers in respect of the debt. Vered v Inscorp Holdings Ltd (1993) 31 NSWLR 290. NSW SC.
The proposition in the text must be read subject to any express or implied prohibition on such assignment by the owner. That might occure, for example, where the chattel subject to the lien is a valuable work of art and the party having the lien has some personal characteristic or resourse, known to the owner, which makes him especially well qualified to hold and safeguard it. For another suh indication see The Freightline One [1986] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 266 at 272 per Sheen J (possessory lien, in common with the statutory right of detention conferred by the Port of London Act 1968 s 39, may survive a change of ownership of the chattel). In Teppenden (t/a English and American Autos [1964] 2 QB 185 at 195, [1963] 3 All ER 213 at 216, CA, Diplock LJ described lien as a remedy in rem, requiring for its exercise no intervention by the courts.
720. Registration.
Its limited character has both advantages and disadvantages for the party entitled. On the one hand, lien can be asserted even where the secured debt is statute-barred See Higgins v Scott (1831) 2 B & Ad 413. See also BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY vol 3(2) (Reissue) para 490; LIMITATION OF ACTIONS para 1002 et seq post., and the chattel cannot be taken in execution Goods the subject of a lien cannot be taken in execution, because lien is merely a personal right continuing during the possession of the goods: Legg v Evans (1840) 6 M & W 36. As to what can be seized in execution see EXECUTION…
On the other hand, a lien confers no power to sell the chattel As to the enforcement of a legal lien see para 745 et seq post..
It has been held that, in contradistinction to a pledge, a lien confers a mere personal right, which cannot be granted to a third party merely by granting the third party possession of of the chattel, without the consent of the owner. But decisions on solicitors and accountant’s liens have readily inferred the necessary authority and have held the lien to be assignable in cases where the secured debt is also assigned. The benefit of a lien can therefore be assigned along with the debt in respect of which it arises. It is arguable that these decisions afford one of several indications that common law possessory liens are beginning to be recognised as a limited form of property interest.
Donald v Suckling (1866) LR 1 QB 585 at 612-613 per Blackburn J, and at 618-619 per Cockburn CJ. The rule stated in the text does not apply where there is an equitable right of subrogation: see para 708 ante.
The purchaser of an article which is subject to a lien having called upon his vendor to pay off the sum claimed may himself pay off the sum in order to obtain possession of what he has purchased and sue the vendor for any sum properly paid (Bevan v Waters (1828) 3 C & P 520); and goods may, it seems, be delivered by a person who has a lien on them to another person as his agent with notice of the lien so as to preserve his lien (see M’Combie v Davies (1805) 7 East 5). The right to pledge conferred on factors (see AGENCY vol 1(2) (Reissue) para 160) arises entirely by statute, and is an exception to the general rule: Cole v North Western Bank (1875) LR 10 CP 354, Ex Ch.
Bull v Faulkner (1848) 2 De G Sm 722; and see SOLICITORS vol 44 (Reissue) para 250. Vered v Inscorp Holdings Ltd (1993) 31 NSWLR 290. NSW SC. In these decisions it was held that, as the law allows the assignment of debts, it also allows the assignment of the benefit of any lien held over the client’s papers in respect of the debt. Vered v Inscorp Holdings Ltd (1993) 31 NSWLR 290. NSW SC.
The proposition in the text must be read subject to any express or implied prohibition on such assignment by the owner. That might occure, for example, where the chattel subject to the lien is a valuable work of art and the party having the lien has some personal characteristic or resourse, known to the owner, which makes him especially well qualified to hold and safeguard it. For another suh indication see The Freightline One [1986] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 266 at 272 per Sheen J (possessory lien, in common with the statutory right of detention conferred by the Port of London Act 1968 s 39, may survive a change of ownership of the chattel). In Teppenden (t/a English and American Autos [1964] 2 QB 185 at 195, [1963] 3 All ER 213 at 216, CA, Diplock LJ described lien as a remedy in rem, requiring for its exercise no intervention by the courts.
720. Registration.
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A common law possessory lien, being dependent for its existence on possession, does not require to be registered under statutory provisions relating to bills of sale and company charges.
721. Care and Custody. The holder of a lien voluntarily in possesssion of a chattel which belongs to another [see BAILMENT vol 2 (Reissue) para 1801.], is a bailee of the chattel [the bailment is probably one for mutual advantage] and (subject to contrary agreement or special circumstances) owes the normal duty of care owed by the bailee towards the owner. This includes a duty to exercise reasonable care in the safekeeping and management of the chattel and a duty to answer for the deliberate wrongs of those to whom the holder of the lien has entrusted the chattel and delegated any part of that duty of care. In general, the party asserting the lien cannot charge the owner for the cost of keeping the chattel during the period of his possession by reason of the lien, and cannot add such costs to the charges in respect of which the lien is asserted.
722. Possession. No legal lien can arise until possession has been obtained by the person claiming the lien. A racehorse trainer may not, therefore, have a lien for his fees where discretion as to the place at which, and the jockey by whom, the horse is to be raced is reserved by contract to the owner. The transfer of deeds to a client’s deeds box by a solicitor may be sufficient to give possession to the client for this purpose. The possession must have been rightfully obtained before a lien can arise. Thus a person who rejects goods for which he has paid is no longer entitled to possession and may assert no lien for the purchase price; and a person who has obtained possession of the property of another by misrepresentation may not set up a lien to which he might otherwise have been entitled; nor may a person paying freight duty or other charges on goods of which he has obtained possession wrongfully retain the goods until repayment of the freight duty or charges.
Similarly, money paid by insurers to brokers under a mistake of fact is not the property of the assured and is not therefore subject to the broker’s lien for unpaid premiums of the assured. A person cannot have a lien over property which he has acquired in an assumed character. Agents employed by a person who subsequently becomes bankrupt by obtaining possession after the bankrupty, either through an act of the bankrupt or their own, set up a lien against the bankrupt’s trustee for money due to them from the bankrupt.
Halsbury’s Laws of England 4th Edition
721. Care and Custody. The holder of a lien voluntarily in possesssion of a chattel which belongs to another [see BAILMENT vol 2 (Reissue) para 1801.], is a bailee of the chattel [the bailment is probably one for mutual advantage] and (subject to contrary agreement or special circumstances) owes the normal duty of care owed by the bailee towards the owner. This includes a duty to exercise reasonable care in the safekeeping and management of the chattel and a duty to answer for the deliberate wrongs of those to whom the holder of the lien has entrusted the chattel and delegated any part of that duty of care. In general, the party asserting the lien cannot charge the owner for the cost of keeping the chattel during the period of his possession by reason of the lien, and cannot add such costs to the charges in respect of which the lien is asserted.
722. Possession. No legal lien can arise until possession has been obtained by the person claiming the lien. A racehorse trainer may not, therefore, have a lien for his fees where discretion as to the place at which, and the jockey by whom, the horse is to be raced is reserved by contract to the owner. The transfer of deeds to a client’s deeds box by a solicitor may be sufficient to give possession to the client for this purpose. The possession must have been rightfully obtained before a lien can arise. Thus a person who rejects goods for which he has paid is no longer entitled to possession and may assert no lien for the purchase price; and a person who has obtained possession of the property of another by misrepresentation may not set up a lien to which he might otherwise have been entitled; nor may a person paying freight duty or other charges on goods of which he has obtained possession wrongfully retain the goods until repayment of the freight duty or charges.
Similarly, money paid by insurers to brokers under a mistake of fact is not the property of the assured and is not therefore subject to the broker’s lien for unpaid premiums of the assured. A person cannot have a lien over property which he has acquired in an assumed character. Agents employed by a person who subsequently becomes bankrupt by obtaining possession after the bankrupty, either through an act of the bankrupt or their own, set up a lien against the bankrupt’s trustee for money due to them from the bankrupt.
Halsbury’s Laws of England 4th Edition
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Summary of the English Law of Liens from Halsbury's Laws of England:
Key Points:
1. Types and Basic Definition:
- A lien is fundamentally a legal right to keep possession of property until a claim has been met
- Types include: legal, non-possessory, equitable, general, particular, statutory, contractual, judicial and subrogatory liens
- Multiple types can exist concurrently
2. Main Categories:
Legal Liens:
- Arise at common law
- Require rightful and continuous possession
- Don't typically require a written agreement
- Act as a defense rather than a right of action
Equitable Liens:
- Arise by operation of law independent of possession
- Similar to equitable charges
- Don't necessarily require a contract
- Subject to equitable principles and conditions
Statutory Liens:
- Created by statute
- Interpretation depends primarily on statutory meaning
- Can override or nullify other types of liens
- May be general or particular
Contractual Liens:
- Arise from contract terms
- Primary interpretation based on contract language
- May supersede other types of liens
- Strictly construed, especially for general liens
3. Important Distinctions:
- Liens differ from mortgages, pledges, bills of sale, and equitable charges
- General liens allow retention of property until all claims are satisfied
- Particular liens only allow retention until specific charges are paid
- Legal liens typically require possession while equitable liens don't
4. Key Characteristics:
- Most liens require possession to be maintained
- Cannot typically be assigned without owner's authority
- Holder has duty of care for the property
- No inherent power of sale (unlike mortgages or pledges)
- Registration may be required depending on type
This is a complex area of law where multiple types of liens can coexist and interact, with different rules governing their creation, maintenance, and enforcement.
Key Points:
1. Types and Basic Definition:
- A lien is fundamentally a legal right to keep possession of property until a claim has been met
- Types include: legal, non-possessory, equitable, general, particular, statutory, contractual, judicial and subrogatory liens
- Multiple types can exist concurrently
2. Main Categories:
Legal Liens:
- Arise at common law
- Require rightful and continuous possession
- Don't typically require a written agreement
- Act as a defense rather than a right of action
Equitable Liens:
- Arise by operation of law independent of possession
- Similar to equitable charges
- Don't necessarily require a contract
- Subject to equitable principles and conditions
Statutory Liens:
- Created by statute
- Interpretation depends primarily on statutory meaning
- Can override or nullify other types of liens
- May be general or particular
Contractual Liens:
- Arise from contract terms
- Primary interpretation based on contract language
- May supersede other types of liens
- Strictly construed, especially for general liens
3. Important Distinctions:
- Liens differ from mortgages, pledges, bills of sale, and equitable charges
- General liens allow retention of property until all claims are satisfied
- Particular liens only allow retention until specific charges are paid
- Legal liens typically require possession while equitable liens don't
4. Key Characteristics:
- Most liens require possession to be maintained
- Cannot typically be assigned without owner's authority
- Holder has duty of care for the property
- No inherent power of sale (unlike mortgages or pledges)
- Registration may be required depending on type
This is a complex area of law where multiple types of liens can coexist and interact, with different rules governing their creation, maintenance, and enforcement.
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Media is too big
VIEW IN TELEGRAM
Claim / Lien Monetisation Process. Solicitors; Lawyers will throw you under the bus, the first available opportunity they get. They work clandestinely for the court system NOT YOU..!
Maxims to Learn:
“Any act done by me against my will is not my act”.
“Consent makes the law. A contract is a law between the parties, which can acquire force only by consent”.
“Every consent involves a submission; but a mere submission does not necessarily involve consent”.
“He who mistakes is not considered as consenting”.
““No action arises out of an immoral consideration.
No action arises on an immoral contract”.
“In the agreements of the contracting parties, the rule is to regard the intention rather than the words.”
“He who does not deny, admits. [A well-known rule of pleading]
1 Whereas; the overreaching and life-long consequences and implications of my mother and father’s coercion, to register my arrival into this physical corporeal realm; by the registration, of a ‘Birth Certificate’ (a securities bond). Took place without informed knowledge & consent and of the far-reaching future consequences, implications & difficulties, that their uniformed actions would create for me, as a man; from the age of 21 (twenty-one) onwards; in the years to come. Therefore; for a contract to be lawful, there must be certain elements in place: Offer, acceptance, consideration & a meeting of the minds. Furthermore, full and clear non misleading disclosure must have been given within the offer, for consideration. If disclosure of the intent, or facts of the contract are not present or disclosed in honour, said contract: would be null & void ‘ab initio’, ‘from their inception’. “Consensus facit legem” ~ “Consent makes the law”.
1 A contract is a law between the parties, which can acquire force only by consent”. “No action arises out of an immoral consideration. No action arises on an immoral contract.” And i: am; without evidence; knowledge or understanding, that any evidence to the contrary exists and furthermore;
1 Whereas; the ‘Legal Fictional Construct; the Artificial Person’ named JOHN/JANE DOE™ as shown on the ‘Driving Licence’ and/or ‘Passport’ and/or ‘Correspondence’, including, but not limited to; JOHN / JANE DOE™, John / Jane Doe™, John / Jane DOE™, Mr / Mrs John/ Jane DOE™, J/J l. Doe™, J/J. DOE™, Mr/MRS. J/J DOE™, together with all derivatives, permutations, punctuations, orderings & stylings of these names therefore; are uttering’s & subrogation, constructive fraud; which were created via the registration of a ‘Birth Certificate’ (a securities bond) ‘Cestui Que Vie Trust’, on or around the time, i: a man / woman ; john/ jane: by and of; the family bloodline; lawful house; doe; an; immortal spirit; (and i wish it to be known and established that), i: am; now incarnate, born into this physical body, of this corporeal realm; as a living breathing being, with a soul; and the flesh lives and the blood flows, and we are sovereign and nothing stands between i: and the Devine. And therefore i: humbly ask for; require & demand remedy.
As i: am; without evidence; knowledge or understanding, that any evidence to the contrary exists and furthermore;
“Any act done by me against my will is not my act”.
“Consent makes the law. A contract is a law between the parties, which can acquire force only by consent”.
“Every consent involves a submission; but a mere submission does not necessarily involve consent”.
“He who mistakes is not considered as consenting”.
““No action arises out of an immoral consideration.
No action arises on an immoral contract”.
“In the agreements of the contracting parties, the rule is to regard the intention rather than the words.”
“He who does not deny, admits. [A well-known rule of pleading]
1 Whereas; the overreaching and life-long consequences and implications of my mother and father’s coercion, to register my arrival into this physical corporeal realm; by the registration, of a ‘Birth Certificate’ (a securities bond). Took place without informed knowledge & consent and of the far-reaching future consequences, implications & difficulties, that their uniformed actions would create for me, as a man; from the age of 21 (twenty-one) onwards; in the years to come. Therefore; for a contract to be lawful, there must be certain elements in place: Offer, acceptance, consideration & a meeting of the minds. Furthermore, full and clear non misleading disclosure must have been given within the offer, for consideration. If disclosure of the intent, or facts of the contract are not present or disclosed in honour, said contract: would be null & void ‘ab initio’, ‘from their inception’. “Consensus facit legem” ~ “Consent makes the law”.
1 A contract is a law between the parties, which can acquire force only by consent”. “No action arises out of an immoral consideration. No action arises on an immoral contract.” And i: am; without evidence; knowledge or understanding, that any evidence to the contrary exists and furthermore;
1 Whereas; the ‘Legal Fictional Construct; the Artificial Person’ named JOHN/JANE DOE™ as shown on the ‘Driving Licence’ and/or ‘Passport’ and/or ‘Correspondence’, including, but not limited to; JOHN / JANE DOE™, John / Jane Doe™, John / Jane DOE™, Mr / Mrs John/ Jane DOE™, J/J l. Doe™, J/J. DOE™, Mr/MRS. J/J DOE™, together with all derivatives, permutations, punctuations, orderings & stylings of these names therefore; are uttering’s & subrogation, constructive fraud; which were created via the registration of a ‘Birth Certificate’ (a securities bond) ‘Cestui Que Vie Trust’, on or around the time, i: a man / woman ; john/ jane: by and of; the family bloodline; lawful house; doe; an; immortal spirit; (and i wish it to be known and established that), i: am; now incarnate, born into this physical body, of this corporeal realm; as a living breathing being, with a soul; and the flesh lives and the blood flows, and we are sovereign and nothing stands between i: and the Devine. And therefore i: humbly ask for; require & demand remedy.
As i: am; without evidence; knowledge or understanding, that any evidence to the contrary exists and furthermore;
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Key Distinctions Between Law & Legislation:
1. Basic Definitions
- Laws (Common Law) are fundamental principles that apply equally to everyone
- Statutes (Legislation) are rules and regulations created by Parliament that require individual consent
2. Main Characteristics
- Laws:
* Based on enduring principles
* Apply equally to all citizens
* Evolve slowly over time
* Focus on protecting rights and freedoms
* Cannot be repealed by statutes
- Statutes:
* Can favour certain groups over others
* Subject to frequent changes
* Require individual consent
* Created by Parliament
* Can be challenged through trial by jury
3. Legal System Elements
- Juries are considered the highest authority under the law
- Judges interpret legislation but cannot direct jury decisions
- Common law takes precedence over statutes
- Courts belong to the people, not to legal officials
- Individual consent is fundamental to statute enforcement
4. Constitutional Aspects
- Parliament makes legislation but doesn't make law
- People have the right to withdraw consent from statutory governance
- The jury system is constitutionally protected
- Administrative courts have limited authority
- Removal of jury trials is considered unconstitutional
The text emphasises that understanding this distinction is crucial for maintaining individual rights and preventing government overreach through legislation.
Understanding Law and Legislation: A Clear Guide
The fundamental difference between law and legislation lies in their origin, application, and authority. Here's a clear breakdown of these important distinctions:
Common Law
Common law represents the bedrock of our legal system. These are fundamental principles that have evolved over centuries and apply equally to everyone in society. Unlike legislation, common law cannot be easily changed or repealed, as it's based on long-standing principles of justice and fairness.
Legislation (Statutes)
Legislation consists of rules and regulations created by Parliament. Unlike common law, these statutes require individual consent and can be changed relatively quickly. They may treat different groups differently and can be challenged through jury trials.
The Role of Courts and Juries
In our legal system, juries hold the highest authority under the law. While judges can interpret legislation, they cannot direct jury decisions. This is crucial because courts fundamentally belong to the people, not to legal officials. Every man or woman has the right to a jury trial, and this right is protected by the constitution.
Constitutional Framework
Parliament's role is specifically limited to creating legislation - it doesn't make law in the traditional sense. This means:
- People can withdraw their consent from statutory governance
- The jury system must be protected
- Administrative courts have restricted powers
- Jury trials cannot be constitutionally removed
Understanding these distinctions is vital for protecting individual rights and preventing governmental overreach. Common law serves as a check on legislative power, ensuring that fundamental rights and freedoms remain protected regardless of what statutes may be enacted.
This system of checks and balances helps maintain individual liberty while allowing for necessary regulation through legislation, provided it has proper consent and doesn't violate common law principles.
1. Basic Definitions
- Laws (Common Law) are fundamental principles that apply equally to everyone
- Statutes (Legislation) are rules and regulations created by Parliament that require individual consent
2. Main Characteristics
- Laws:
* Based on enduring principles
* Apply equally to all citizens
* Evolve slowly over time
* Focus on protecting rights and freedoms
* Cannot be repealed by statutes
- Statutes:
* Can favour certain groups over others
* Subject to frequent changes
* Require individual consent
* Created by Parliament
* Can be challenged through trial by jury
3. Legal System Elements
- Juries are considered the highest authority under the law
- Judges interpret legislation but cannot direct jury decisions
- Common law takes precedence over statutes
- Courts belong to the people, not to legal officials
- Individual consent is fundamental to statute enforcement
4. Constitutional Aspects
- Parliament makes legislation but doesn't make law
- People have the right to withdraw consent from statutory governance
- The jury system is constitutionally protected
- Administrative courts have limited authority
- Removal of jury trials is considered unconstitutional
The text emphasises that understanding this distinction is crucial for maintaining individual rights and preventing government overreach through legislation.
Understanding Law and Legislation: A Clear Guide
The fundamental difference between law and legislation lies in their origin, application, and authority. Here's a clear breakdown of these important distinctions:
Common Law
Common law represents the bedrock of our legal system. These are fundamental principles that have evolved over centuries and apply equally to everyone in society. Unlike legislation, common law cannot be easily changed or repealed, as it's based on long-standing principles of justice and fairness.
Legislation (Statutes)
Legislation consists of rules and regulations created by Parliament. Unlike common law, these statutes require individual consent and can be changed relatively quickly. They may treat different groups differently and can be challenged through jury trials.
The Role of Courts and Juries
In our legal system, juries hold the highest authority under the law. While judges can interpret legislation, they cannot direct jury decisions. This is crucial because courts fundamentally belong to the people, not to legal officials. Every man or woman has the right to a jury trial, and this right is protected by the constitution.
Constitutional Framework
Parliament's role is specifically limited to creating legislation - it doesn't make law in the traditional sense. This means:
- People can withdraw their consent from statutory governance
- The jury system must be protected
- Administrative courts have restricted powers
- Jury trials cannot be constitutionally removed
Understanding these distinctions is vital for protecting individual rights and preventing governmental overreach. Common law serves as a check on legislative power, ensuring that fundamental rights and freedoms remain protected regardless of what statutes may be enacted.
This system of checks and balances helps maintain individual liberty while allowing for necessary regulation through legislation, provided it has proper consent and doesn't violate common law principles.
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‘The Fundamental Distinction Between Law & Legislation’
Common law and legislative statutes represent two distinct systems of governance in our society.
While often conflated, they serve different purposes and operate under different principles.
Common Law:
- Represents fundamental principles of justice that apply equally to all
- Evolves gradually through judicial precedent and jury decisions
- Protected by constitutional frameworks
- Cannot be repealed by Parliament
- Based on the principle "lawful or unlawful"
Statutes (Legislative Acts):
- Created by Parliament as regulatory instruments
- Subject to individual consent rather than collective imposition
- Can favour specific sectors of society
- Can be modified or repealed through legislative process
- Based on the principle "legal or illegal"
As confirmed in Halsbury's Laws, statutes are defined as "legislative rules of society given the force of law by the consent of the governed."
This definition underscores that statutes derive their authority from consent rather than inherent legal force.
Key Legal Principles and Case Law:
- Washington v Dowling, 92 Fla 601, 109 So 588 defines a statute as "an act of the legislature as an organized body"
- Coyle v Smith, 221 US 559 establishes that state power derives from "the consent of the governed"
- McLaughlin v Poucher, 127 Conn 441, 17 A2d 767 defines the state as a "body politic"
The Role of Juries:
Jury trials represent a cornerstone of common law justice. A jury's verdict can effectively nullify unjust statutes, as they are bound by principles of justice rather than legislative directives. This power serves as a crucial check against governmental overreach.
Constitutional Implications:
The distinction between law and legislation is constitutionally significant.
While Parliament can create statutes, it cannot override common law principles protected by constitutional frameworks. This separation ensures fundamental rights remain protected regardless of legislative changes.
This framework provides essential protections against arbitrary power while maintaining societal order through both enduring legal principles and adaptable regulatory mechanisms.
Common law and legislative statutes represent two distinct systems of governance in our society.
While often conflated, they serve different purposes and operate under different principles.
Common Law:
- Represents fundamental principles of justice that apply equally to all
- Evolves gradually through judicial precedent and jury decisions
- Protected by constitutional frameworks
- Cannot be repealed by Parliament
- Based on the principle "lawful or unlawful"
Statutes (Legislative Acts):
- Created by Parliament as regulatory instruments
- Subject to individual consent rather than collective imposition
- Can favour specific sectors of society
- Can be modified or repealed through legislative process
- Based on the principle "legal or illegal"
As confirmed in Halsbury's Laws, statutes are defined as "legislative rules of society given the force of law by the consent of the governed."
This definition underscores that statutes derive their authority from consent rather than inherent legal force.
Key Legal Principles and Case Law:
- Washington v Dowling, 92 Fla 601, 109 So 588 defines a statute as "an act of the legislature as an organized body"
- Coyle v Smith, 221 US 559 establishes that state power derives from "the consent of the governed"
- McLaughlin v Poucher, 127 Conn 441, 17 A2d 767 defines the state as a "body politic"
The Role of Juries:
Jury trials represent a cornerstone of common law justice. A jury's verdict can effectively nullify unjust statutes, as they are bound by principles of justice rather than legislative directives. This power serves as a crucial check against governmental overreach.
Constitutional Implications:
The distinction between law and legislation is constitutionally significant.
While Parliament can create statutes, it cannot override common law principles protected by constitutional frameworks. This separation ensures fundamental rights remain protected regardless of legislative changes.
This framework provides essential protections against arbitrary power while maintaining societal order through both enduring legal principles and adaptable regulatory mechanisms.
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‘PERMANENT-TRESPASSES’
Permanent Trespasses ~ Could be applied to Birth certificates and/or the continuing use of ‘Latching on our Good Names’… by the Courts… etc…
Bouvier's Law Dictionary, 1856 Edition - Letter P
“When trespasses of the same kind, are committed on several days, and are in their nature capable of renewal or continuation, and are actually renowned or continued from day to day, so that the particular injury, done on each particular day, cannot be distinguished from what was done on another day, these wrongs are called permanent trespasses, in declaring for such trespasses they may be laid with a continuando.
3 Bl. Com. 212; Bac. Ab. Trespass, B 2; Id. 1 2; 1 Saund. 24, n. 1. Vide Continuando; Trespass.
Permanent Trespasses ~ Could be applied to Birth certificates and/or the continuing use of ‘Latching on our Good Names’… by the Courts… etc…
Bouvier's Law Dictionary, 1856 Edition - Letter P
“When trespasses of the same kind, are committed on several days, and are in their nature capable of renewal or continuation, and are actually renowned or continued from day to day, so that the particular injury, done on each particular day, cannot be distinguished from what was done on another day, these wrongs are called permanent trespasses, in declaring for such trespasses they may be laid with a continuando.
3 Bl. Com. 212; Bac. Ab. Trespass, B 2; Id. 1 2; 1 Saund. 24, n. 1. Vide Continuando; Trespass.
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*SPECIAL EVENT ANNOUNCEMENT*
The PSC & Lancashire Farmers Movement proudly present a revolutionary all-day event focused on sovereignty, bringing multiple groups together for the first time.
*Date:* Sunday, February 23rd Time: 1:00 PM
*Venue:*
Lowerhouse Cricket Club: Burnley, Lancashire,
BB12 6LP
*Featured Speakers:*
- Nick Kitchen (Community Assemblies of the British Isles)
- Gregory (The English Counties Assembly, Lancashire)
- Mark Byford "The Bowler Hat Farmer" (The Food Finders Hub)
- Steff Weaver (Lancashire Farmers Movement)
- David Adelman (The People's Lawyer UK)
- Marc Horn (Peace Keepers)
- Cassie Freedom (National Residents Association)
*Special Guest Speaker:*
Graham Moore "Daddy Dragon" The English Constitutionalist of the (English Constitution Society)
*Important Information:*
- Entrance fee: £10.00 (cash only)
- No advance bookings required - early arrival recommended
- Camper vans welcome at the cricket ground
- Bar facilities and refreshments available
- PSC stall offering herbal teas
- PSC raffle will be held
*Dining Options:*
While food will not be served at the venue, Sycamore Farm restaurant is located just across Liverpool Road, offering breakfast and other meals.
*Parking:*
Due to limited space at the cricket club, additional parking is available on nearby streets off Lowerhouse Lane. Please park considerately.
This historic gathering will bring together like-minded individuals and various groups, featuring knowledgeable speakers sharing their expertise. We look forward to welcoming you to this unique event.
"Together we are stronger"
For further information, contact: Carlo Event Administrator.
Respect to you all Carlo
Please share this announcement widely.
The PSC & Lancashire Farmers Movement proudly present a revolutionary all-day event focused on sovereignty, bringing multiple groups together for the first time.
*Date:* Sunday, February 23rd Time: 1:00 PM
*Venue:*
Lowerhouse Cricket Club: Burnley, Lancashire,
BB12 6LP
*Featured Speakers:*
- Nick Kitchen (Community Assemblies of the British Isles)
- Gregory (The English Counties Assembly, Lancashire)
- Mark Byford "The Bowler Hat Farmer" (The Food Finders Hub)
- Steff Weaver (Lancashire Farmers Movement)
- David Adelman (The People's Lawyer UK)
- Marc Horn (Peace Keepers)
- Cassie Freedom (National Residents Association)
*Special Guest Speaker:*
Graham Moore "Daddy Dragon" The English Constitutionalist of the (English Constitution Society)
*Important Information:*
- Entrance fee: £10.00 (cash only)
- No advance bookings required - early arrival recommended
- Camper vans welcome at the cricket ground
- Bar facilities and refreshments available
- PSC stall offering herbal teas
- PSC raffle will be held
*Dining Options:*
While food will not be served at the venue, Sycamore Farm restaurant is located just across Liverpool Road, offering breakfast and other meals.
*Parking:*
Due to limited space at the cricket club, additional parking is available on nearby streets off Lowerhouse Lane. Please park considerately.
This historic gathering will bring together like-minded individuals and various groups, featuring knowledgeable speakers sharing their expertise. We look forward to welcoming you to this unique event.
"Together we are stronger"
For further information, contact: Carlo Event Administrator.
Respect to you all Carlo
Please share this announcement widely.
❤🔥4👍2
‘John Harris: a Freeman Under Article 61 of Magna Carta 1215’
There are some people in the sovereignty movement who are actively trying to disparage the term ‘Freeman’ by aligning the word with the word ‘fail’. These are posts on social media titled ‘Freeman Fails’. Why would anyone want to malign this word and deliberately turn their readers away from it?
As we know, the system, under its own rules, has to tell us the truth, but it does so alongside the lie to create disinformation. The truth is often presented with a lie to confuse us and prevent us from fully knowing the truth. The media will give us a truth sandwich, placing the truth in a paragraph between two paragraphs of lies: Lie, Truth, Lie. And the controlled puppets will do exactly the same in their social media posts.
They have recently tried to draw a distinction between a ‘Freeman’, who in their view is a failure when challenging the system, and a man who has been ‘Born Free’. They disparage ‘Freemen’ as ‘failures’ and then write about John Harris, elevating him from the status of ‘Freeman’ by saying that he was ‘born free’. They do this by using a clip from an interview that has been taken out of context. This post aims to present the evidence that ‘Freeman’ and ‘Born Free’ mean the same thing: a Sovereign Man.
In his talks about Sovereignty, John always said that he was born free. This term ‘born free’ relates to the status of the ‘Freemen’ described in Magna Carta 1215. They had the status of ‘freeholders’ and jurors in their local Hundred Court and it was in these courts that these ‘freemen’ created Common Law; the law of the people.
In his 2009 ‘It’s An Illusion’ tour, John Harris stated that he was in Lawful Rebellion under Magna Carta 1215 and said that as a living man, he was ‘free’ and only subject to the Common Law jurisdiction – see the slides and video of this talk below.
In the early 1970s, around the time that the Heath Government stopped the English constitution from being taught in schools, colleges, and universities, they decided to change the meaning of Common Law.
The Common Law as described in Magna Carta 1215, was intended to be decided by the people in a Trial By Jury where the role of judge was taken by the Jurors. In contemporary courts, we have Judges determining both the facts and the law, interpreting and applying the law, and deciding cases with a verdict, which creates Case Law.
Case Law is decided by Judges and not the people of the juries so it cannot be the Common Law because that was supposed to be made by the people for the people.
In the video below, John Harris explains, as Lysander Spooner did in our previous post, that the jury has the discretion to use jury nullification of unfair government policies. This means the power is with the people to decide how they will be governed. He repeatedly says that as a living man, he was subject only to the Common Law, not the acts and statutes of the government corporation.
He explains that statutory instruments are contracts made for Persons under the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom.
These Persons are implied corporations registered at Birth by the Birth Notification form that creates the Certified Copy of an Entry (Birth Certificate). Thus Persons are implied corporations limited by Contract Law, and not the living man or woman that was ‘born free’.
A Person operates in the legal realm as a persona, a mask, or a legal fiction, not a man or woman. This means that Persons are enslaved by the socially dominant members of society. Acts and statutes are not the law and only apply to the legal fiction, ALL CAPS name.
These are quotes from the slides John used for his ‘It’s An Illusion’ talk.
“The Magna Carta 1215 started the process of the separation of power (devolution) away from the Sovereign to a Parliament of Barons, on the pretence that Parliament was set up to represent us the people and to protect us from a tyrannous Sovereign.
There are some people in the sovereignty movement who are actively trying to disparage the term ‘Freeman’ by aligning the word with the word ‘fail’. These are posts on social media titled ‘Freeman Fails’. Why would anyone want to malign this word and deliberately turn their readers away from it?
As we know, the system, under its own rules, has to tell us the truth, but it does so alongside the lie to create disinformation. The truth is often presented with a lie to confuse us and prevent us from fully knowing the truth. The media will give us a truth sandwich, placing the truth in a paragraph between two paragraphs of lies: Lie, Truth, Lie. And the controlled puppets will do exactly the same in their social media posts.
They have recently tried to draw a distinction between a ‘Freeman’, who in their view is a failure when challenging the system, and a man who has been ‘Born Free’. They disparage ‘Freemen’ as ‘failures’ and then write about John Harris, elevating him from the status of ‘Freeman’ by saying that he was ‘born free’. They do this by using a clip from an interview that has been taken out of context. This post aims to present the evidence that ‘Freeman’ and ‘Born Free’ mean the same thing: a Sovereign Man.
In his talks about Sovereignty, John always said that he was born free. This term ‘born free’ relates to the status of the ‘Freemen’ described in Magna Carta 1215. They had the status of ‘freeholders’ and jurors in their local Hundred Court and it was in these courts that these ‘freemen’ created Common Law; the law of the people.
In his 2009 ‘It’s An Illusion’ tour, John Harris stated that he was in Lawful Rebellion under Magna Carta 1215 and said that as a living man, he was ‘free’ and only subject to the Common Law jurisdiction – see the slides and video of this talk below.
In the early 1970s, around the time that the Heath Government stopped the English constitution from being taught in schools, colleges, and universities, they decided to change the meaning of Common Law.
The Common Law as described in Magna Carta 1215, was intended to be decided by the people in a Trial By Jury where the role of judge was taken by the Jurors. In contemporary courts, we have Judges determining both the facts and the law, interpreting and applying the law, and deciding cases with a verdict, which creates Case Law.
Case Law is decided by Judges and not the people of the juries so it cannot be the Common Law because that was supposed to be made by the people for the people.
In the video below, John Harris explains, as Lysander Spooner did in our previous post, that the jury has the discretion to use jury nullification of unfair government policies. This means the power is with the people to decide how they will be governed. He repeatedly says that as a living man, he was subject only to the Common Law, not the acts and statutes of the government corporation.
He explains that statutory instruments are contracts made for Persons under the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom.
These Persons are implied corporations registered at Birth by the Birth Notification form that creates the Certified Copy of an Entry (Birth Certificate). Thus Persons are implied corporations limited by Contract Law, and not the living man or woman that was ‘born free’.
A Person operates in the legal realm as a persona, a mask, or a legal fiction, not a man or woman. This means that Persons are enslaved by the socially dominant members of society. Acts and statutes are not the law and only apply to the legal fiction, ALL CAPS name.
These are quotes from the slides John used for his ‘It’s An Illusion’ talk.
“The Magna Carta 1215 started the process of the separation of power (devolution) away from the Sovereign to a Parliament of Barons, on the pretence that Parliament was set up to represent us the people and to protect us from a tyrannous Sovereign.
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Common Law @ Lawful Rebellion
John Harris... (R.I.P.) was just a commoner, an ordinary man, a humble carpenter…
John devoted a good deal of his time, to bring the truth & knowledge your about to see in this video to us all... at great personal sacrifice to himself and his family…
Sadly;…
John devoted a good deal of his time, to bring the truth & knowledge your about to see in this video to us all... at great personal sacrifice to himself and his family…
Sadly;…
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Now what we are seeing is the devolution of power away from Government to the third sector (Private Companies) to remove the oath of office to destroy the Sovereign and the people’s Sovereignty.”
The first part of this quote illustrates that John did not understand the power the Magna Carta 1215 conferred to the people as ‘Freemen’ with the right to hold Trial By Jury to determine the Common Law that he wants to follow as a man ‘born free’.
However, he correctly states later that the people of England are Sovereign and should reclaim their sovereignty using his affidavit based on Article 61 of Magna Carta.
He served the Affidavit to the Queen on 22 March 2008, which was unrebutted and therefore still stands as truth in law. It was based on Article 61 of Magna Carta 1215, saying he was Sovereign in law, not the Queen. She only gets her authority from the people, which we can revoke with our lawful dissent. His affidavit makes him the highest authority in any court by removing the power the Judges and Barristers acquired having taken their Oath to the Queen. John used Article 61, because it is lawful and peaceful with no violence.
Three people can sign an Affidavit to make a lawful document.
Peaceful resistance to the demands made on pieces of paper. He returned all their paperwork back to them: ‘No Contract Return to Sender’.
Lawful Rebellion is for the Sovereigns of England and no King or Queen has the right to rule us, only to protect. The power is held and granted by the will of the people. Lawful Rebellion is the line drawn in the sand by the people to say NO!
Watch the full video here:
“It’s Just an Illusion “
https://t.me/CommonLawLawfulRebellion/419
The first part of this quote illustrates that John did not understand the power the Magna Carta 1215 conferred to the people as ‘Freemen’ with the right to hold Trial By Jury to determine the Common Law that he wants to follow as a man ‘born free’.
However, he correctly states later that the people of England are Sovereign and should reclaim their sovereignty using his affidavit based on Article 61 of Magna Carta.
He served the Affidavit to the Queen on 22 March 2008, which was unrebutted and therefore still stands as truth in law. It was based on Article 61 of Magna Carta 1215, saying he was Sovereign in law, not the Queen. She only gets her authority from the people, which we can revoke with our lawful dissent. His affidavit makes him the highest authority in any court by removing the power the Judges and Barristers acquired having taken their Oath to the Queen. John used Article 61, because it is lawful and peaceful with no violence.
Three people can sign an Affidavit to make a lawful document.
Peaceful resistance to the demands made on pieces of paper. He returned all their paperwork back to them: ‘No Contract Return to Sender’.
Lawful Rebellion is for the Sovereigns of England and no King or Queen has the right to rule us, only to protect. The power is held and granted by the will of the people. Lawful Rebellion is the line drawn in the sand by the people to say NO!
Watch the full video here:
“It’s Just an Illusion “
https://t.me/CommonLawLawfulRebellion/419
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Common Law @ Lawful Rebellion
John Harris... (R.I.P.) was just a commoner, an ordinary man, a humble carpenter…
John devoted a good deal of his time, to bring the truth & knowledge your about to see in this video to us all... at great personal sacrifice to himself and his family…
Sadly;…
John devoted a good deal of his time, to bring the truth & knowledge your about to see in this video to us all... at great personal sacrifice to himself and his family…
Sadly;…
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