JOGWD Report

Once the surrounding conditions have been analysed, we come to the focal point, the counter-offensive. At the turn of the first and second week of June we observed a sudden increase in activity along the entire front, especially in the South. It is quite evident that the very first Ukrainian attacks, above all in the direction of Vasylivka (close to the Dnieper) and Robotyne ( just further east) did not fare very well and even seemed to be led by troops with little training. However, let's try to intercept a pattern to remove some of the fog of war and understand what are the Ukrainian intentions and objectives in what is only the first phase of an operation that will certainly be long, tiring, bloody and complex. The main effect of generalized attacks along the front is to stretch and disperse russian forces, using up available reserves, eroding encircling offensive thrusts (think of Avdiivka and Marinka), and gaining altitude advantages. We observe this in Bakhmut with Klishchivka and Yakovlivka, south of Velyka Novosilka, of Orikhiv and of Lobkove. Having covered the terrain-oriented dimension of this phase, let's instead move on to the crucial one, enemy-oriented efforts. According to direct sources in the 37th Marine Brigade, one of those that carried out the wedging at Makarivka, their orders were to advance as fast as possible, wait for Russian reinforcements to arrive, entrench and repel Russian counterattacks. Counterattacks which, according to any Russian source, were very numerous and according to evidence from the field and russians themselves, almost always ineffective. We can assume that this trend is generalized across the board, but what does this tell us? Why should the Ukrainians voluntarily dig in and halt their advance? Let's combine those orders with an analysis of the losses, which are a tad bit higher for the russians but most importantly a lot higher in tanks, ifvs, APCs and above all artillery and means for logistics. What caused the bulk of these losses? Medium / long range artillery, Himars, Excalibur, Bonus / Smart ammunition focused on logistics, short and medium range air defense, electronic warfare systems, counter battery radars and especially on opposing artillery, while tanks and jfvs concentrated from advantageous positions, on Russian counterattacks, all augmented by constant attacks by suicide drones at various depths and by storm shadow strikes on the logistics routes and on the air bases from which the ground attack helicopters depart (especially on pilot barracks). Here is the pattern, at this stage the Ukrainians are trying to impose disproportionate attrition on the Russians by drawing reserves forward, within range of supporting fire, advancing to advantageous positions for subsequent offensive thrusts and highlighting the lines logistics to then hit them. All this seems to replace the preparatory phase through an air campaign typical of NATO offensives, obviously not available to Kiev, which in any case entails a non-negligible cost for the Ukrainian forces both in terms of equipment (although the bulk of the losses are caused by mines and are therefore recoverable) and ammunition, which also leads to explain the need to use cluster munitions. Finally it is necessary to notify that although there has been talk of 9/12 brigades for the counter-offensive, it seems that the actual numbers are up to three times greater, with various brigades being prepared or waiting.
It's also important to say that the russian offensive to the north is intended ti relief pressure on the south, while this is working in some limited way (basically slowing down the efforts but not much else) it's also playing the ukrainians game imposing great costs on the largest theater reserves of the RuAF.

👍7❤4

258 viewsedited 11:58