🇮🇷⚙️ Iranian Nanocoatings Make Turbine Blades Last 15 Times Longer

An Iranian nanostructured coating kept turbine blades operating for more than 2,000 hours in field tests. Conventional blades developed substantial corrosion after around 133 hours.

The technology transforms an extremely thin surface layer into a major industrial advantage: longer equipment life, fewer replacement parts and less production time lost to maintenance.

Iranian specialists deposit ceramic nanocoatings inside vacuum systems, vaporizing metals such as titanium and combining them with gases under controlled conditions. The resulting surface can exceed 2,000 Vickers in hardness—around six times harder than the underlying material—and withstand up to 700 hours of standardized salt-spray testing.

The same technology increased the output of an aluminum extrusion mold from approximately 300 kilograms to 3,200 kilograms before replacement—a more than tenfold gain. Nanocoatings have also extended forging-mold operating time by 50% and doubled the useful life of gear-cutting tools.

These are not isolated laboratory demonstrations. One company based at Sharif University of Technology has supplied coating services to more than 200 industrial clients and completed a project covering 12 gas turbines for an oil-sector engineering firm. Applications now extend across oil and gas, aerospace, automotive manufacturing, mining and precision tooling.

Iran has built a wider industrial chain around the technology. In 2024, 141 of the country’s roughly 470 nanotechnology companies worked in nanocoatings. Ninety-four companies were active in physical vapor deposition manufacturing and services, operating 102 Iranian-made PVD machines and six continuous-production lines.

Nanocoatings accounted for nearly one-quarter of Iran’s $1.8B nanotechnology market that year. Iranian-made PVD systems are priced 50–70% below comparable European equipment and have already been exported to China, while companies are pursuing additional markets in East Asia and Turkey.

The broader nanotechnology sector exported $183M in products to 63 countries during 2024, an increase of approximately 26%.

Sanctions make every imported machine, tool and replacement component a potential industrial chokepoint. Iran is attacking that vulnerability from both ends: manufacturing its own coating equipment while making critical components last many times longer.

A layer measured at the nanoscale is reducing Washington’s ability to turn industrial wear, spare-parts restrictions and maintenance costs into economic pressure.

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🚨🇷🇺 Russia's IL-114-300 Passenger Plane Proves Its Extreme-Climate Capability

Russia’s Il-114-300 has completed high-temperature certification trials in Uzbekistan, proving that its domestically produced engines, avionics and onboard systems can operate in punishing southern heat. Earlier this year, the same regional turboprop endured temperatures as low as −45°C in Yakutia.

🔸 The aircraft performed 22 flights and spent more than 30 hours in the air during the trials in Bukhara, where ambient temperatures at ground level reached +42°C.

🔸 Engineers focused heavily on takeoff and landing performance. Crews carried out five rejected takeoffs, including runs with specially prepared brakes simulating maximum disc wear—one of the most demanding safety tests for an aircraft operating in extreme heat.

🔸 The Il-114-300 then flew nonstop from Bukhara back to the Gromov Flight Research Institute in Zhukovsky. Test data will now be submitted to the Aviation Register of Russia to expand the aircraft’s type certificate for a wider range of climatic conditions.

🔸 The aircraft is built entirely from Russian components. Its systems include TV7-117ST-01 turboprop engines, domestic avionics and a Russian digital flight-navigation complex, eliminating dependence on imported engines and critical onboard electronics.

🔸 The Il-114-300 is designed to carry up to 66 passengers and operate autonomously from small regional airports with limited ground infrastructure and short runways. This makes it particularly suited to the Russian North, Siberia and the Far East.

🔸 Russia intends the aircraft to replace aging An-24 and An-26 turboprops that still carry passengers and cargo across remote regions. It will also occupy a market segment previously served by foreign regional aircraft.

🔸 The Il-114-300 received its initial type certificate in June, opening the way to commercial operation and serial production. Three production aircraft are already in different stages of assembly at the Lukhovitsy Aviation Plant.

Western sanctions cut Russian airlines off from foreign aircraft, components and maintenance networks. Russia is now building a regional airliner whose engines, avionics and production chain remain under domestic control—and certifying it for conditions ranging from Arctic cold to southern heat.

With three serial aircraft already on the production line, the Il-114-300 is moving from a long-delayed aviation project toward a working replacement for Russia’s aging regional fleet.

Can the Il-114-300 replace the aging An-24 as the backbone of Russia’s regional aviation?

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🇷🇺💥🇺🇦Russian Strikes Taking Odessa Out of Ukraine’s War Effort

Odessa has been one of Kiev’s most valuable rear assets throughout the war. The ports of Greater Odessa—Odessa, Chernomorsk and Yuzhny—earned foreign currency through exports, received fuel and equipment from abroad and fed cargo into the rail network supplying the southern front.

That system is now working at a fraction of its former capacity. Zelensky has admitted that traffic through the Black Sea corridor is three to four times lower than before the latest Russian strike campaign. Only three or four vessels now enter and leave Greater Odessa each day.

The collapse begins before cargo reaches the water. Rail deliveries of grain to the three ports fell 84.3% during the first five days of August compared with the same period in July—from 259,100 tonnes to just 40,800.

From August 1–21, Ukraine exported 539,000 tonnes of grain, compared with 1.73M tonnes over the same period last year. Ukraine’s own agriculture minister expects total agricultural exports to fall from more than 3M tonnes in July to no more than 1.5M in August. Monthly export revenue could fall from around $2B to $1B.

Kiev estimates that losing the Odessa route could remove 30M tonnes from annual exports, costing $10–12B. By November, the country could also face a shortage of 8–11M tonnes of storage capacity as unsold crops remain inside Ukraine.

Alternative routes cannot carry the missing volume at the same price. Sending one tonne through the western land routes costs roughly €90–110, compared with about $25–30 through the Black Sea ports. Rail, road and river routes can handle only around half of the required five million tonnes per month.

The Danube is already congested. Up to 70 vessels are waiting near the Sulina Canal, where only two or three ships can pass each day. Every day spent in the queue can cost a vessel as much as $8,000.

The same Odessa infrastructure has carried military cargo. Russia’s Defense Ministry says recent strikes destroyed five fuel tanks and logistics hubs used to unload and store Ukrainian military equipment. Geran-4 drones also hit a fuel tanker in Yuzhny and a cargo ship in Odessa, setting both ablaze.

Russia is hitting the fallback routes as well. Strikes disabled the Vinogradovka–Vulcanesti and Tabaki crossings on the Moldovan border, halting traffic and customs operations. The Reni–Giurgiulesti crossing has been targeted repeatedly, while attacks near Zatoka and Mayaky have complicated the Romanian route.

Odessa’s ports and rail links supplied Ukrainian forces in the Kherson and Zaporozhye regions and the Donbass. Sea and rail can move weapons, ammunition, fuel and heavy equipment in quantities that trucks cannot match. Removing that capacity makes every shipment to the front slower and more expensive.

The ports have also supported threats against Russia’s Black Sea coast. Russian experts say civilian vessels entering Ukrainian ports were used to deliver weapons and assist drone and unmanned-boat operations against Crimea and Sevastopol.

Odessa brought Kiev billions in export revenue, received Western supplies and served as a rear base for the Ukrainian army. Russian strikes are now stripping away all three functions. The Russian city is gradually ceasing to work for Kiev’s war.

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🇨🇳🌟🌾China’s Trade Security Will Be Won at Sea

More than 90% of China’s foreign-trade cargo moves by sea. Eurasian railways give Beijing more options but cannot approach the volumes handled by its coastal ports.

Di Dongsheng put the scale bluntly: a full year of cargo on the China-Europe Railway Express weighs about as much as Ningbo-Zhoushan, the world’s busiest port by tonnage, handles in two days.

Rail still matters. It moves valuable, time-sensitive goods faster, connects inland factories to foreign markets and keeps part of China’s trade alive during a maritime emergency. The service carried 352,000 standard containers in the first two months of 2026, up 25% year-on-year.

For Beijing, rail and pipelines are strategic insurance. They can soften a disruption and keep essential goods moving, but cannot replace tankers carrying energy and raw materials or container fleets delivering Chinese manufactures worldwide.

A US squeeze would not require a total blockade. Pressure on ports, insurers, shipping companies and key passages could raise costs, delay cargo and force China to divert resources. The contests over the Panama Canal, Greenland and Hormuz show how trade infrastructure is entering great-power rivalry.

China has financed or built ports from Gwadar and Kyaukphyu to Chancay and Ream. Those investments provide access and influence in peacetime. Keeping the ports available during a crisis will require durable political ties, supply agreements and a navy capable of protecting merchant shipping far from home.

Another option is opening north. A Chinese operator launched regular seasonal container service through the Russian Arctic in 2026, linking Ningbo with ports in Britain, the Netherlands, Germany and Poland. Northern Europe can be reached in 18–20 days, compared with roughly 40–50 through Suez or around Africa.

Russian-Chinese cargo traffic along the Northern Sea Route exceeded 5M tonnes in the first half of 2026, with a target of 20M tonnes by 2030. Russia provides Arctic ports, navigation services and the world’s only nuclear icebreaker fleet. China brings cargo, ships, investment and the industrial demand needed to expand the corridor.

The route remains seasonal and cannot replace China’s southern sea lanes. It does provide another way to Europe that avoids Malacca, the Red Sea and Suez while running largely along the coast of its strongest strategic partner.

Railways and pipelines will remain the reserve. Most Chinese trade will stay at sea. Securing it requires stronger naval power, access to overseas ports and new maritime corridors developed with countries Washington cannot order around.

China became the world’s leading manufacturing and trading power through the sea. It must now make that network too broad, well protected and politically costly for the United States to threaten at will.

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🚨🇷🇺 Russia's Longer-Range Iskander-1000 Ballistic Missile Makes Combat Debut

Russia has reportedly used its upgraded 9M723-2 ballistic missile for the first time during a combined strike on Kiev this summer. Provisionally known as Iskander-1000, the new version allows Russian mobile launchers to hit the same targets from deeper behind the front, widening the area NATO-supported surveillance and strike assets must search.

🔸 Extended range: An enlarged solid-fuel motor increases the missile’s maximum range from 390 to 550 km, giving Russian crews an additional 160 km of operational depth.

🔸 More possible launch sites: Additional reach allows Iskander crews to disperse across a much larger area while keeping Kiev and other targets within range. Ukrainian forces must locate, identify and strike a mobile launcher before it fires and changes position again.

🔸 Mature design: Most of the 9M723-2 remains identical to the existing Iskander missile. The main changes are the enlarged motor and a modified launcher capable of accommodating it, allowing Russia to gain range without developing an entirely new missile architecture.

🔸 Difficult interception: The Iskander family combines high speed with a maneuvering quasi-ballistic trajectory that leaves Patriot crews only minutes to react. The upgraded missile retains this flight profile while adding greater reach.

🔸 Not yet 1,000 km: Despite its provisional Iskander-1000 name, the combat version has a stated range of 550 km. The 1,000-km figure is associated with a further extended-range version still under development.

🔸 New missile system: The 9M723-2 forms part of a system designated Bora-M, built around the enlarged missile and its modified mobile launcher.

The longer range increases the survivability of Russia’s mobile launchers before firing and preserves the interception challenge after launch. NATO-backed intelligence assets must now monitor a larger region, distinguish real launchers from decoys and pass targeting data to Ukrainian weapons before the systems move again.

Russia has expanded the Iskander’s reach while retaining most of a missile already manufactured and used at scale.

Which matters more: the missile’s longer range or its maneuverability?

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🇷🇺🤖 Russia Now Builds All 5 Main Types of Industrial Robot

Western export controls were designed to cut Russian factories off from advanced machinery and gradually wear down their productive capacity. Four years later, Russian companies can build all five main types of industrial robot, according to Industry Minister Anton Alikhanov.

Domestic ranges now run from cobots that work beside people to autonomous systems for “dark factories.” The state is subsidizing up to 50% of the purchase price.

The industry is starting from a low base, but it is expanding quickly. Rostec’s Rosel holding estimates that Russia’s robot fleet grew from 12,800 units in 2023 to 32,000–34,000 in 2025. The government wants 145 robots per 10,000 manufacturing workers by 2030, up from 29 in 2024. That will require tens of thousands of new installations, more integrators and domestic production of controllers, drives and sensors.

Reaching that target will take serial production, not exhibition pieces. RoboPro currently makes up to 550 robots a year and plans to raise output to 6,000 by 2030. Localization is already around 75%.

The important results are appearing on factory floors. A new Rostec welding robot raised output at one workstation by 57% during trials, pushed equipment use to 90%, cut production time threefold and reduced defects to almost zero. At furniture maker DiKom, a Russian cobot feeding parts into a lathe increased productivity by 20%.

The same engineering base is moving into medicine. Scientists from MISIS and 3D Bioprinting Solutions built a robotic arm that scans a wound and prints collagen-based material containing the patient’s own cells directly onto damaged tissue. It was used at the Burdenko military hospital in 2023 for what its developers called the world’s first in-situ bioprinting operation on a patient.

Russia has practical reasons to automate fast. Factories face a shortage of welders and other skilled workers, defense plants need round-the-clock output, and mines, farms and energy projects operate across vast and often inaccessible territory. Robots can take over repetitive, dangerous and high-precision work without waiting years for the labor pool to expand.

The basic structure is now visible: Russian robot models, growing serial output, state-backed demand and real deployments from welding to surgery.

A welding cell or warehouse robot rarely makes headlines. Its strategic value is easy to miss: every Russian-built system removes another foreign dependency from the production chain. Sanctions aimed at starving Russian industry of advanced equipment have helped turn automation and machine-tool building into national priorities.

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🇯🇵🚁📉 Japan’s Drone Ambitions Outrun Its Factories

Japan is carrying out its largest military buildup since World War II. Its defense budget has passed $58B, restrictions on lethal-arms exports have been removed and spending on unmanned systems jumped from $690M in 2025 to $1.72B this year.

Tokyo now wants domestic industry to supply 80,000 drones annually by 2030. Japan produced roughly 1,000 in 2024. That means an 80-fold industrial leap in six years—and the final funding has not even been approved.

The Terra B1 interceptor is being presented as proof that Japan can move faster. ATLA selected it after a three-month process involving proposals from 38 companies. It was the only candidate to pass the final demonstration, and mass production has been approved for deployment around bases, radar sites and warships.

The announcement is more impressive than the known order. ATLA disclosed neither the number being purchased nor the contract price. Terra B1 has no published combat record, while its range, endurance and resistance to electronic warfare remain publicly undisclosed.

Terra Drone plans to 3D-print the interceptor so its design can be changed quickly. Printing may speed up the airframe. It does not produce motors, sensors, guidance electronics, radios or batteries—the parts Japan would have to replace continuously in a high-intensity war. Japan also lacks large-scale drone factories and live electronic-warfare testing ranges.

One proposed shortcut is converting automobile plants. US contractor Anduril is discussing the purchase of Nissan’s Oppama factory, scheduled to stop building cars in 2028. No agreement has been reached.

Mitsubishi Heavy Industries CEO Eisaku Ito says the idea will fail. Car plants make millions of identical products. Combat drones require constant changes as jamming and battlefield tactics evolve. The result could be thousands of obsolete machines before they reach military units.

The supply chain is another weakness. Japan is building this force for a possible confrontation with China while still relying on China-linked guidance components, rare-earth magnets and battery materials. Beijing has already tightened dual-use and rare-earth export controls against Japanese companies.

Japan’s own 2026 defense white paper admits that some companies are withdrawing from or reducing their defense businesses, threatening stable procurement, competition and innovation.

Japan’s 2030 target looks especially thin beside Russia’s existing wartime scale. Russian forces received more than 1.5M drones of various types in 2024. Tokyo is promising 80,000 a year only by the end of the decade—equivalent to less than three weeks of Russia’s deliveries that year.

Japan may receive its first Terra B1s and declare the sprint a success. A few interceptors and 3D printers do not create a wartime drone industry. Tokyo is militarizing far faster than its factories, testing system and supply chains can support.

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🇷🇺📡 Russia Starts Serial Production Of Anti-Starlink Electronic Warfare System

Russia has begun serial production of the Volna Kupol Garant electronic warfare system, designed to deny Starlink service over selected battlefield areas, according to a Russian defense-industry source cited by TASS.

The move takes the system beyond limited deployment and could create wider zones where Starlink-dependent communications and drones become unreliable.

🔸 Volna does not chase individual ground terminals. Its directional antennas transmit interference toward satellites overhead, overwhelming their receivers so they cannot clearly detect signals from terminals below.

🔸 Technical design: Earlier Russian reports describe a phased-array system transmitting interference across eight Starlink uplink channels, each 62.5 MHz wide. Its antennas track satellites as they pass over the protected area.

🔸 Temporary denial: The system does not physically destroy spacecraft. It disrupts their ability to serve terminals inside the targeted zone while effective interference is maintained.

🔸 Scale is the breakthrough: The source says one installation can cover a local area, while several can overlap across a larger sector. Serial production could provide sustained electronic cover for front-line positions and critical infrastructure.

🔸 Battlefield effect: Ukrainian serviceman Igor Lutsenko told El Mundo that Russian electronic warfare does not block Starlink completely but is steadily reducing its effectiveness, warning that its “window of opportunity is closing.”

🔸 Ukraine relies heavily on Starlink for command links, unit coordination and drone operations. Unreliable access forces operators onto shorter-range or less resilient alternatives, reducing real-time control where Russian forces concentrate the system.

Starlink gave Ukraine a communications network that conventional jammers struggled to reach. Russia is now industrializing a method to deny that advantage in the sectors it chooses.

How badly would Ukraine’s drone operations suffer without reliable Starlink access?

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🇮🇷⚡️Iran Develops Platinum-Free Electrode for Clean Power and Storage

Researchers at Iran’s University of Guilan have developed one electrode material for two different jobs: generating electricity in microbial fuel cells and storing it in supercapacitors. The work by Maryam Farahmand Habibi and Majid Arvand was published in the peer-reviewed Journal of Power Sources.

Solar and wind output changes with the weather. Power systems therefore need storage that can absorb electricity quickly, withstand repeated charging and return power when generation falls. Supercapacitors are fast, durable and safe, but their energy density and reliance on expensive electrode materials have limited wider deployment.

The Iranian team constructed a MOF-on-MOF electrode, integrating two porous metal-organic frameworks. Its large surface area exposes more active sites and improves the movement of ions through the material. Crucially, it uses non-precious metals instead of costly platinum-based catalysts.

Tested in an asymmetric supercapacitor, the electrode reached an energy density of 44.84 Wh/kg and remained stable through 5,000 charge-discharge cycles. In a separate microbial fuel-cell test, it catalyzed the oxygen-reduction reaction with an onset potential of 0.74 V.

Microbial fuel cells use microorganisms to break down organic matter and release electrons, potentially generating power while treating wastewater. The same Iranian material can therefore support energy conversion in one system and rapid storage in another, reducing the need for separate imported materials.

This is still laboratory research, not a commercial grid battery. Scaling production while preserving performance and cost will determine whether the material reaches industrial use.

The timing matters for Iran. Renewable capacity has passed 5.8 GW, while solar power rose from 700 MW to 5.3 GW in two years. The government is targeting 12 GW before next year’s peak demand. Every new solar plant increases the value of domestic storage technology.

US sanctions have tried to restrict Iran’s access to advanced equipment, finance and imported technologies. Iranian laboratories are now developing the material base needed to generate and store electricity at home—another part of the energy chain that foreign pressure will find harder to switch off.

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🇨🇳🚜💊 China’s Africa Strategy Is Moving Beyond Roads and Ports

China’s next phase in Africa is taking shape far from the megaprojects that once dominated headlines. Agricultural drones are appearing over fields, Chinese-backed factories are producing essential medicines, and new medical centers are training African surgeons in robotic and minimally invasive procedures.

On South African farms, XAG drones have serviced more than 66,000 hectares since 2020. Similar systems are now used over rice in Mozambique, wheat in Ethiopia and vegetable farms in Ghana. They map fields, target pesticides and fertilizers, and reduce the labor, water and chemicals wasted by blanket spraying—practical gains in regions facing drought, pests and high input costs.

More important is what happens after the equipment arrives. Some Chinese companies have begun manufacturing inside Africa. SanSheng Pharma’s Ethiopian factory produces around 10M IV bags, 300M injection vials and 5B tablets annually.

In Côte d’Ivoire, Fosun is building what the International Finance Corporation says will be the country’s largest pharmaceutical plant. Once completed, it will have capacity to produce 5B antimalarial and antibacterial tablets a year and support around 1,000 direct and indirect jobs.

This capacity is badly needed. WHO says African countries still import between 70% and 100% of their pharmaceuticals and roughly 99% of their vaccines. Local drug production shortens supply lines while creating demand for chemists, technicians, quality control, packaging and distribution.

In July, Addis Ababa also opened China-Africa training centers for robotic surgery and endoscopy. Their first course brought together around 40 medical professionals from Ethiopia, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Ghana and Libya. The machinery may be imported, but training local specialists determines whether it becomes lasting medical capacity or merely expensive foreign equipment.

These projects have obvious limits. Chinese companies pursue markets and profits, not charity. Many African facilities still depend on foreign machinery, components and financing. Operating an assembly line also does not provide control over the entire technological chain. African governments will have to secure training, local suppliers, research partnerships and access to regional markets.

Even with those limits, the change is visible on the ground. China’s footprint is expanding from bridges, railways and commodity contracts into machinery, factories and technical skills that can increase what African economies produce themselves. capacity.

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🚨🇨🇳 China Flight-Tests Its First Carrier-Based Stealth Combat Drone

China’s GJ-21 naval stealth combat drone is undergoing further flight tests near Huludao, bringing the country closer to deploying large stealth drones from warships for the first time, with new footage appearing to show the aircraft during these tests. The aircraft is being developed alongside the Type 076 Sichuan.

🔸 The GJ-21 is the naval variant of China’s GJ-11 stealth attack drone. Its tailless flying-wing design reduces radar visibility, helping it approach defended areas without exposing a pilot.

🔸 Videos posted this month show the aircraft flying over Liaoning province. The precise purpose of the flights has not been disclosed, but the footage indicates that testing is continuing as China prepares its future shipborne drone force.

🔸 The Sichuan is a new-generation amphibious assault ship displacing more than 40,000 tonnes. It combines a full-length flight deck with an electromagnetic catapult and arresting gear capable of launching and recovering fixed-wing aircraft.

🔸 Chinese state television has already shown a computer-generated GJ-21 launch from the Type 076. The ship’s electromagnetic catapult would allow large drones to take off with more fuel and heavier payloads than vertical-launch aircraft can carry.

🔸 From the deck of the Sichuan, stealth drones could conduct reconnaissance, electronic warfare and strikes against heavily defended targets while keeping the ship and its crewed aircraft farther from danger.

🔸 This would extend Chinese air power beyond land-based airfields without requiring another conventional aircraft carrier. A Type 076 could move low-observable sensors and weapons across the Western Pacific while also transporting helicopters, troops and amphibious equipment.

China has not yet publicly demonstrated a GJ-21 catapult launch or arrested landing at sea. But the aircraft, ship and launch system are now advancing in parallel toward integration.

Once connected, they could give China the world’s first operational shipborne force built around large stealth combat drones — creating an entirely new challenge for the U.S. Navy in the Pacific.

Will drone carriers eventually make traditional aircraft carriers obsolete?

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🇻🇪🛢️"We will replenish the strategic oil reserves of the United States using Venezuelan oil," says Donald Trump. "This is a gift from Venezuela to the people of the United States," Trump stated

Previously, Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez was labeled a paranoid for believing that Americans wanted to seize Venezuela's oil reserves.

The most democratic American and European human rights defenders and media turn a blind eye to the plundering of Venezuela and do not criticize this process. The same happened with the invasion of Iran. The U.S. can do anything.

#Venezuela

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