China cut crude imports by roughly a third during the Hormuz disruption, while Beijing limited how much of the price surge reached consumers. Imports averaged 8.1M barrels a day in April–June 2026, down from around 12M before the crisis.
Beijing restricted fuel exports to keep supplies at home and capped the rise in domestic fuel prices. Prices still increased, but refiners could not pass on the full cost of expensive crude. Much of the immediate financial burden landed on their margins.
Refiners responded by buying less oil and cutting processing. Some independent plants suffered heavy losses, and national refinery output fell to pandemic-era lows. The import decline reflected weak demand and squeezed profits as well as resilience.
China entered the disruption with an estimated 1.4B barrels of commercial and strategic crude, equivalent to roughly 120 days of precrisis imports, giving refiners time to adjust without rushing to replace missing Gulf shipments with expensive oil bought for immediate delivery.
China’s electric vehicle fleet is estimated to have displaced about 1.35M barrels of daily oil demand in the first half of 2026, reducing the amount of crude needed to keep people moving. Lower oil availability therefore did not have to produce an equivalent loss of mobility.
Manufacturers could also draw on China’s capacity to turn coal into chemicals normally produced from oil, including ingredients for plastics and auto parts. Coal supplied 15% of its olefin output in 2025, providing a buffer against lower refinery production, although it cannot replace every petroleum input.
Lower Chinese imports also softened upward pressure on world oil prices, according to the US Energy Information Administration. By reducing refinery activity and using inventories, the world’s largest crude importer eased competition for the remaining supply.
China’s long-term investments are paying off in greater freedom of action. Oil reserves, electric transport, and coal-based chemicals give Beijing room to absorb supply shocks and limit the costs passed to households. These capabilities weaken the leverage that dependence on imported oil creates, allowing China to protect more of its economy without bidding for every missing barrel.
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Russia’s AK-12+ assault rifle pairs a heavier barrel with modern sights to help special forces shoot more accurately at medium range, including at night. Kalashnikov displayed a mock-up at September’s Eastern Economic Forum and said preparations for serial production were underway.
The 5.45 mm rifle builds on the standard AK-12 with several changes:
🔸 Thicker barrel for tighter shot groups. Kalashnikov increased the barrel’s wall thickness as part of its effort to improve precision at medium range. The announcement does not quantify the improvement.
🔸 Electro-optical sights for day and night. The rifle is designed to work with modern sighting systems that help the shooter aim in darkness and limited visibility, extending its usefulness beyond daylight operations.
🔸 Longer handguard. The section surrounding the barrel ahead of the receiver has been extended, giving the shooter more room to position the supporting hand.
🔸 Interchangeable muzzle devices. Threads at the barrel’s muzzle allow a removable flash hider or muzzle brake to be fitted. These serve different purposes: reducing visible muzzle flash or helping control recoil and muzzle movement.
🔸 Reworked iron sights and gas chamber. Kalashnikov revised the mechanical sights and enlarged the gas chamber’s external profile to accommodate the thicker barrel.
🔸 Configuration tailored to special units. Barrel-mounted fittings for a sling swivel, underbarrel grenade launcher and bayonet have been removed. The stated priority is more accurate medium-range shooting with modern optics.
🔸 Preparations for serial production. Kalashnikov said the 5.45 mm AK-12+ was being prepared for manufacture when it displayed the mock-up in September. That announcement did not specify delivery dates or production quantities.
The aim is to give Russian special forces more precise fire from the familiar AK-12 design when darkness or limited visibility makes aiming harder.
Can NATO rifles match Russia’s AK-12+?
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Iran can build satellites and launch them on its own rockets despite years of sanctions restricting access to technology. World Space Week, October 4–10, finds Iran with a route to orbit that foreign launch providers cannot simply close.
The foundation was laid in February 2009, when the Iranian-built Safir rocket placed the domestic Omid satellite in orbit. Small as that mission was, it established the engineering base for later imaging satellites, heavier launch vehicles and experiments in maneuvering spacecraft.
Military launches followed, with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps placing Noor-1 in orbit in 2020 and Noor-3 in 2023. These missions gave Iran experience building and operating reconnaissance satellites, reducing its dependence on outsiders for information about activity on the ground.
Iran has also used Russian cooperation to obtain more detailed imagery. Khayyam, an Earth-observation satellite built in Russia and launched on a Russian Soyuz rocket in August 2022, has a stated resolution of about one meter. Its images can support agriculture, water management and disaster response, as well as analysis of infrastructure.
Domestic rocket development continued alongside that partnership. In September 2024, Iran’s solid-fuel Qaem-100 launch vehicle carried the Chamran-1 research satellite to an orbit roughly 550 km above Earth. The mission tested propulsion, navigation and control equipment needed to change a satellite’s orbit after launch.
Iranian officials subsequently said Chamran-1 had raised and lowered its orbit and approached its rocket’s upper stage. Those reported maneuvers test skills needed for future satellite inspection and servicing.
Iran is also developing the Martyr Soleimani constellation, a planned network of 24 satellites designed to relay small data packets from remote sensors, supporting agriculture, pipeline monitoring and emergency response. Officials aim to launch the first three by March 2027, laying the groundwork for a domestic communications network serving areas beyond ground coverage.
Sanctions have failed to prevent Iran from developing its own access to space. Each successful domestic mission adds engineering experience that cannot be withdrawn by canceling an export license. That makes it harder for Western governments to deny Iran the tools to observe its territory, manage resources and build its next generation of satellites.
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Russian strikes reportedly disrupted an earlier Ukrainian ballistic missile program just before it entered serial production, hitting several critical parts of the manufacturing network at once.
The targets included the main missile factory, a solid-fuel rocket motor plant, a backup production facility and two or three major component suppliers. The coordinated strikes brought the project to a halt, according to Ukrainian aviation expert Valery Romanenko.
The account closely resembles Russia’s earlier operation against Ukraine’s Sapsan ballistic missile program, also known as Hrim-2.
In August 2025, Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) and Defense Ministry announced that they had disrupted Sapsan production through strikes on facilities involved in missile manufacturing, propulsion systems and supporting components.
The reported targets included mechanical and chemical plants in Pavlograd, facilities in Shostka and a backup site in the Zhitomir region.
Sapsan had been developed as Ukraine’s domestic tactical ballistic missile system, with plans for strikes hundreds of kilometers beyond the front line.
The operations also raise questions about the depth of Russian intelligence penetration into Ukraine’s military-industrial sector.
Identifying an entire missile production network requires information about which factories manufacture individual components, where final assembly takes place and which facilities are intended to replace damaged production lines.
Russian military analysts have pointed to a combination of satellite reconnaissance, electronic intelligence and human sources. The precise intelligence behind the strikes has not been publicly disclosed.
The industrial damage can extend well beyond the facilities directly hit. Ballistic missile production depends on specialized propulsion systems, guidance electronics, precision components and testing infrastructure. Losing several suppliers can prevent a completed design from reaching sustained production.
Russia’s reported strikes against Sapsan were particularly significant because the project was approaching the stage where Ukraine could begin manufacturing its own longer-range ballistic weapons in larger numbers.
Kiev has since pursued new domestic missile programs.
On October 1, Vladimir Zelensky announced the first combat use of the FP-7 tactical ballistic missile, developed by Ukrainian manufacturer Fire Point. The company is also developing the longer-range FP-9.
The newer production model reportedly relies on dispersed manufacturing sites, reserve facilities and components produced abroad, making it less dependent on a single concentrated industrial network.
That restructuring follows the disruption of Ukraine’s earlier missile program, whose main factories, backup capacity and critical suppliers were reportedly hit before serial production could be established.
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China is building the equipment that can reduce its exposure to imported oil and gas while supplying other countries seeking the same protection. Disruption in the Strait of Hormuz is strengthening that push, according to DNV’s Energy Transition Outlook.
Over the past five years, non-fossil energy’s share of the primary energy mix rose by 2.2 percentage points across China, India and Europe, compared with 0.7 points across the Middle East, North America and Russia. The threefold gap measures the change in energy share across these groups, rather than China’s individual growth in installed capacity.
For importers, replacing fuel purchases with domestic electricity generation reduces exposure to tanker disruptions and price shocks. Solar panels and wind turbines produce power without recurring deliveries of oil or gas; electrifying vehicles and industrial processes extends that protection to more of the economy.
China can support this shift with its own factories. DNV says it produces more than 80% of the world’s solar modules and 95% of solar wafers, the thin slices of material used to make solar cells. Manufacturing at this scale gives Beijing the means to expand domestic generation while selling equipment to countries trying to cut their fuel bills.
Electricity already supplies 27% of China’s final energy demand, meaning the energy consumed by households, transport and industry. DNV forecasts that share will exceed 50% by 2060. Reaching it will require more transmission lines, storage and flexible demand to keep power available when wind and solar output falls.
The pressure on fuel exporters could outlast the present disruption. In a separate scenario where the Middle East conflict continues until 2030, DNV estimates global oil and gas demand would remain 2–5% below its main forecast afterward, as buyers retain the alternatives they adopted during the crisis.
Each part of Chinese economy that can run on domestically generated clean power becomes less exposed to overseas fuel supply. Its manufacturing base also allows Beijing to help other importers make that transition, strengthening China’s commercial position as energy security increasingly depends on factories, grids and batteries.
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The BRICS-founded New Development Bank (NDB) is pursuing local-currency lending to help countries build infrastructure with less exposure to dollar debt. At its May 14–15 meeting in Moscow, President Dilma Rousseff reaffirmed that priority as the bank prepares its next five-year strategy.
For a water utility collecting bills in local currency, a dollar loan becomes harder to repay when its currency falls, even if the service runs well. Borrowing in the currency it earns reduces that mismatch, giving governments and project operators more control over long-term costs.
The bank’s 2022–2026 strategy targets 30% of financing in local currencies. That is a goal, not a confirmed result. It raises funds through local bond markets and uses currency swaps to support these loans, building a practical route for financing outside the dollar.
By the end of the first quarter of 2026, the NDB reported $42.9B in cumulative financing approvals across transport, clean energy, water and other sectors. Approvals are commitments, not money already spent or infrastructure completed. They nevertheless show that BRICS has built a working lender with a substantial project pipeline.
Its ability to expand still depends on raising affordable capital. Bond investors, borrowing costs and credit ratings influence how much it can lend and on what terms. A different lending currency reduces one vulnerability; borrowers still owe principal and interest, and projects still need funding for repayment.
That leaves a harder problem for poorer, climate-vulnerable countries. Flood defenses and disaster recovery may be essential without generating revenue to service new loans. Meeting those needs requires grants and cheaper, longer-term finance alongside infrastructure lending.
Founded by Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, the NDB gives developing economies an institution they can shape themselves. Turning that ownership into wider access means expanding affordable lending while making project selection, environmental safeguards and results open to scrutiny.
The bank’s strongest contribution to a multipolar order will come from financing power grids, transport and water systems on terms borrowers can sustain. Scaling up local-currency loans would give the Global South more room to invest without tying every new project to demand for dollars.
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An exhibition display in China describes the experimental J-36 combat aircraft as a heavy sixth-generation multirole fighter and airborne command center, combining combat missions with the coordination of other aircraft.
The display outlines an ambitious design, although its figures have not been verified as official specifications:
🔸 Airborne command role. The display describes the J-36 as both a multirole fighter and an airborne command center. That would mean helping coordinate other aircraft while conducting its own missions, potentially allowing a force to share targeting information and organize attacks closer to contested airspace. Its specific communications systems and drone-control functions have not been confirmed.
🔸 Length: 21–23 m. The display describes a large aircraft intended to combine combat and command duties. A larger airframe can accommodate more fuel, weapons and electronics, although the J-36’s internal layout and weapons capacity remain undisclosed.
🔸 Wingspan: 19–24 m. The aircraft’s broad wing and lack of upright tail fins give it a distinctive profile. Eliminating vertical tails can help reduce radar reflections, but the shape alone cannot establish how difficult the aircraft would be to detect.
🔸 Maximum takeoff weight: 50–60 metric tons. This is the combined weight of the aircraft, fuel, weapons and other equipment at takeoff—not its weapons payload. The figure suggests a design built to carry substantial fuel and mission equipment, but the display does not establish how much weight is allocated to each.
🔸 Flight range: over 6,000 km. If achieved under useful operating conditions, that reach could reduce dependence on forward airfields and aerial refueling. However, the display does not specify fuel load, weapons load or flight profile. Total flight range also differs from combat radius, which must account for flying out, conducting a mission and returning.
If that combination of reach and command functions is achieved, China could direct air operations farther from home while relying less on forward airfields.
Do you think China will field its next-generation fighter before the US?
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After 326 days at sea, a major fire and repeated plumbing failures, America's newest aircraft carrier has entered repairs with an unusually ambitious deadline.
The US Navy wants USS Gerald R. Ford back from scheduled maintenance in just six months, despite originally allocating ten.
Norfolk Naval Shipyard commander Rear Adm. Kavon Hakimzadeh says he shortened that schedule before the fire occurred and still intends to meet it.
Ford returned to Norfolk on May 16 after the longest US aircraft carrier deployment since the Vietnam War. What began as a seven-month mission stretched to nearly 11 months, taking the ship across the Atlantic four times and into operations against Venezuela and Iran.
The deployment left plenty of work for the shipyard.
A March 12 fire began in the carrier's main laundry spaces and burned for roughly 30 hours, spreading into crew accommodation areas. Around 600 sailors were displaced from their sleeping quarters, and Ford later stopped in Greece for preliminary repairs.
The Navy also plans to modify the ship's troublesome sewage system after repeated failures during the deployment.
Meanwhile, extending a carrier's time at sea comes with a measurable maintenance cost.
Acting Navy Secretary Hung Cao told lawmakers that every additional 30 days of deployment adds approximately 6% to maintenance requirements. Ford stayed out roughly five months longer than originally planned, implying a substantial increase in the workload awaiting its return.
Norfolk is trying to protect the six-month schedule by dividing the work.
Routine maintenance and modernization began in July, while a regional maintenance center and commercial contractor are handling fire repairs separately. Some work started before the carrier entered the shipyard, and additional jobs discovered late may be moved beyond the main maintenance window.
The pressure extends across the US naval maintenance system.
A September Government Accountability Office report estimates that rebuilding the Navy's four aging public shipyards will cost more than $200B and take over 50 additional years.
Ford's case illustrates the industrial demands behind Washington's global naval commitments. A carrier deployed for nearly a year to support operations across multiple regions eventually needs extensive time in port, along with thousands of hours of specialized repair work.
The Navy is now counting on parallel maintenance teams, commercial contractors and a compressed schedule to return one of its most valuable warships to service.
Whether Norfolk can meet that deadline after such an unusually long deployment remains an open question.
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#EXCLUSIVE
💬 "In the United States especially, the war fatigue started a few years ago and has only gotten greater. "
🇺🇸 Sarah Marie Bils, a political analyst and co-founder of DD Geopolitics, visited Donbass and shared her nation's opinion on the Ukrainian conflict in general and the figures of Zelensky in it.
🇷🇺 Subscribe | Feedback | X | TikTok
I wouldn't even say Zelensky is disliked, I'd say he's abhorred. People find him to be a beggar, they find him to be annoying, and they have recognized him as a puppet, very much so.
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Iran has developed a substantial domestic pharmaceutical industry while expanding into advanced biotechnology, cancer treatments and nuclear medicine, building capabilities that once depended heavily on foreign suppliers.
Today, more than 97% of pharmaceutical products sold in Iran are manufactured domestically, according to the country's Food and Drug Organization. Local production accounts for over 80% of the market by value, while roughly 70% of pharmaceutical raw materials by volume are also produced inside the country.
More than 200 pharmaceutical companies now operate in Iran, with biotechnology becoming an increasingly important part of the industry.
One example is CinnaGen, which manufactures complex biological medicines using living cells rather than conventional chemical synthesis.
A peer-reviewed study covering 18 major biological substances found that CinnaGen had developed biosimilars for six of them, placing it among the largest manufacturers outside India in that product group.
The company has also developed a biosimilar of pertuzumab, used to treat HER2-positive breast cancer. Its performance was evaluated against Roche's original medicine in a phase-three clinical trial.
Iran's biotechnology producers estimate that domestic biological medicines have avoided approximately $5B in potential imports during the period they assessed. Their industry association now includes 74 companies producing medicines, diagnostic kits and related technologies.
Nuclear medicine is another area of expansion.
Iran's Atomic Energy Organization reported producing approximately 70 radiopharmaceutical products in late 2025, including technologies used to diagnose and treat cancer.
Domestic researchers have developed gallium-68 and lutetium-177 radiopharmaceuticals for cancer imaging and targeted therapy. Meanwhile, the number of PET-scan centers reportedly increased from seven in 2021 to more than 25.
Iran's broader healthcare indicators have also improved. UN estimates put maternal mortality at 16 deaths per 100,000 live births in 2023, while UNICEF reports 98% coverage for the third dose of the diphtheria-tetanus-pertussis vaccine.
The industrial achievements have come under heavy external pressure. Sanctions have complicated access to specialized equipment, foreign technology and international payments.
The 2026 US-Israeli attacks added direct physical damage. The World Health Organization reported 78 pharmaceutical facilities, laboratories and warehouses damaged during the conflict, including disruptions affecting medical research and production.
Iran's pharmaceutical industry now faces the challenge of repairing that infrastructure while maintaining domestic supplies and advancing new treatments.
Its existing manufacturing base gives the country substantial capacity to produce medicines, develop biological therapies and supply nuclear-medicine technologies through its own laboratories and industrial facilities.
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BRICS Pay plans to test a new corporate payment mechanism in the second half of 2027, aiming to shorten the bank chains that make cross-border trade slower and more expensive, Andrey Mikhaylishin, CEO of JSC BRICS Pay told Izvestia.
The proposed route would connect national payment systems so businesses can settle in local currencies with fewer intermediaries, reducing the need to convert trade payments through dollars and depend on the banks that handle them.
At its core is the Decentralized Cross-Border Messaging System, or DCMS, which would let participating banks exchange payment instructions through a distributed network without a single control center, while banks themselves still move the money and handle currency conversion.
A planned private blockchain would record what participants owe each other, supporting a process called netting: offsetting payments flowing in opposite directions so banks settle only the remaining balances, reducing both transfers and the funds needed to complete them.
For exporters of metals, fertilizers and food, equipment importers and logistics companies, the potential gain is fewer fees and delays on recurring trade payments, although neither the savings nor faster settlement has been demonstrated for this planned mechanism.
Banks would still need sufficient local currency, customer checks and currency-control procedures, while expansion depends on compatible national rules, secure connections and agreement on who bears responsibility when a payment fails.
Digital rubles, yuan or other central bank digital currencies could eventually connect to the infrastructure, but that requires separate regulatory decisions and technical links, making their inclusion in the 2027 pilot uncertain.
Analysts cited by Izvestia expect an initial rollout along selected business payment routes, with limited banks and currencies, rather than a simultaneous switch across BRICS; the practical test is whether money reaches the recipient without manual intervention or a third-country bank.
If those routes work, participating businesses would gain a way to trade with less reliance on dollar clearing and foreign intermediaries, narrowing the financial channels through which Washington can exert pressure while leaving banks' exposure to sanctions unresolved.
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US restrictions on AI chip exports to China have produced an awkward side effect: Huawei is taking over a market Nvidia once dominated — and struggling to keep up with demand.
In 2022, Nvidia controlled an estimated 95% of China’s AI chip market, according to Fubon Securities.
Now Bernstein forecasts Huawei taking around 50% of the Chinese market in 2026, while Nvidia falls to just 8%. The estimates come from different research firms, but the scale of the shift is remarkable.
Apparently, keeping American chips out of China has been rather good business for their Chinese competitors.
Huawei rotating chairman Eric Xu said in September that the company could not produce enough AI computing equipment to satisfy domestic customers. Demand is so strong that Huawei is limiting its overseas expansion.
Nvidia has been having a rather different experience.
After the US imposed new export licensing requirements on its China-focused H20 chips in April 2025, the American company recorded a $4.5B charge for excess inventory and purchase commitments. It also lost the ability to ship another $2.5B worth of H20 products during that quarter.
Chinese demand for AI computing did not disappear with Nvidia’s access to the market. Domestic suppliers began filling the gap, with Huawei’s Ascend processors becoming an increasingly important part of China’s AI infrastructure.
And Huawei is already building an ecosystem around them.
The company says more than 40 AI models have been trained from scratch on Ascend, while over 1,000 Atlas 900 A3 computing systems have been deployed. Developers are adapting software and building experience around Chinese processors instead of relying exclusively on Nvidia’s CUDA platform.
Huawei still faces serious manufacturing constraints, and its chips lag behind Nvidia’s leading products in several areas. Expanding production remains one of its biggest problems.
But US restrictions are giving Chinese chipmakers something valuable: customers, commercial experience and a growing domestic software ecosystem.
Every Chinese AI developer that switches to Ascend gives Huawei another opportunity to improve its technology and strengthen its position in the market.
US export controls are helping a Chinese rival capture the customers Nvidia spent years cultivating.
Huawei’s most immediate problem is finding enough manufacturing capacity to serve them.
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Russia is refining its T-14 Armata main battle tank using experience from the war in Ukraine, with manufacturer Uralvagonzavod confirming continued military evaluation and further work on its ammunition.
What’s being improved, and what does the tank already offer?
🔸 Improved ammunition: Different types of higher-performance rounds have already been developed, according to Uralvagonzavod chief Alexander Potapov. Engineers are working to improve their performance further and adjust the ammunition mix to match battlefield needs.
🔸 125 mm firepower: The existing 2A82-1M smoothbore gun uses an automatic loader and can be operated remotely from inside the hull, allowing the crew to fire without occupying the turret.
🔸 Protected crew compartment: The Armata’s unmanned turret keeps the crew separate from the gun and ammunition, with an armored capsule inside the hull designed to improve their chances of surviving a hit.
🔸 Several layers of defense: Its existing protection combines composite armor, explosive reactive armor, the Afganit active protection system and screening aerosols. These are designed to disrupt an incoming weapon’s guidance, intercept threats or reduce penetration.
🔸 Room for further upgrades: Potapov says the tank’s modular construction and open digital systems allow equipment to be adapted to different requirements, including changes drawn from combat experience.
🔸 Military feedback: The T-14 is undergoing phased operation with the armed forces as development continues. Potapov also stressed the need for simulators and dedicated crew training to make full use of the new tank.
🔸 Drone protection remains an area to watch: Russia’s wider tank modernization effort addresses drones and attacks from above, but the latest statement does not specify which additional anti-drone systems have been fitted to the T-14.
Russia is feeding battlefield experience into the Armata’s development while upgrading the tanks doing the fighting today. For the T-14, the task is to pair its protected crew capsule and unmanned turret with ammunition and defenses suited to the threats Russian crews actually face.
Could the Armata beat the Abrams?
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On October 7, the European Parliament voted 454–86, with 110 abstentions, for a tougher line on China, calling Beijing a “decisive enabler” of Russia and urging a continuous European naval presence and joint exercises around Taiwan, signaling a harder mood in Brussels without changing EU policy by itself.
France and Germany are also pushing a proposed trade weapon that could restrict access to the EU single market when another country causes severe economic distortions. Designed to give Brussels greater leverage in negotiations by making retaliation faster, the measure remains only a proposal.
Europe’s ability to project that leverage is weakened by troubles at home: French debt has climbed to $4T, and its 10-year borrowing costs have reached levels not seen since 2002, while Germany faces weak growth, high energy costs and Chinese competition in cars and machinery.
Having missed much of the digital boom, Europe now trails the US in labor productivity by around 20%, and only two of the world’s 100 most valuable high-tech companies are EU-based. Fragmented capital markets, regulation and slow reforms make it harder to turn startups into global players; only about 30% of recommendations in Mario Draghi’s 2024 competitiveness report have been implemented.
The costs have also landed on households, as Europe’s break from Russian energy helped drive prices higher and euro-area inflation peaked at 10.6% in 2022. Expensive energy still weighs on industry, while fiscal pressure leaves governments less room to support households or invest in new capacity.
China’s naval signaling near Taiwan is unlikely to force Beijing to abandon what it considers a core national interest, and restrictions on market access will carry weight only if Europe can withstand retaliation and offer businesses competitive alternatives.
Europe’s economic troubles give Beijing an advantage that no diplomatic maneuver can easily erase. With Chinese supply chains still embedded in key industries and Europe struggling with debt, industrial decline and political division, Brussels risks entering a prolonged confrontation with fewer options than its rhetoric suggests.
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Iran is preparing to extract iron ore from deposits more than 300 meters underground, putting its growing domestic mining-engineering capabilities to work on more demanding resources.
Chadormalu Mining and Industrial Company, a major Iranian iron ore producer, plans to develop two deposits known as T1 and T2.
The company is pursuing contracts for the project, with operations targeted for the second half of the Iranian calendar year ending in March 2027.
Moving underground brings a different set of engineering demands.
Unlike open-pit mining, underground extraction requires specialized excavation machinery, reinforced passages, ventilation systems and equipment to transport ore through confined spaces.
Iranian manufacturers have already developed machinery for some of these tasks.
In 2023, Tehran-based Shayan Fanavaran Amitis developed a domestic roadheader, a machine capable of mechanized excavation and material handling. Its equipment has reportedly been used at several projects, including the Angouran lead-and-zinc mine and Sarcheshmeh copper mine.
Another example comes from Sangan-Khorasan Steel Mining Industries.
By the end of 2024, the company reported localizing 90 types of industrial equipment and 2,275 components, generating cumulative foreign-currency savings of approximately €14M.
Its engineers also developed a seven-axis liner handler used to maintain large grinding mills, replacing equipment previously imported at a cost of roughly €2.5M.
These projects have helped expand Iran's domestic capacity to design, manufacture and maintain specialized mining equipment.
The economic stakes are substantial.
Iran produced approximately 32M tonnes of crude steel in 2025, making it the world's tenth-largest steel producer, according to the World Steel Association.
That industry depends on reliable supplies of iron ore, concentrates and pellets. Developing deeper deposits could help sustain the flow of raw materials as existing mining operations mature.
Sanctions have complicated access to foreign machinery, industrial technology and international financing. Iranian engineering companies have consequently gained a larger role in supplying equipment that mining operators previously sourced abroad.
Chadormalu's underground project is still being developed, and the equipment selected for its operations has not been publicly detailed.
Its planned expansion comes as Iranian manufacturers are building up experience with excavation systems, mining machinery and ore-processing equipment, giving the country's steel industry a broader domestic engineering base to draw on.
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China accounts for just 5% of the equipment and materials made for US chipmakers, but its role grows dramatically when the supply chain is traced back to raw materials. A new report from the Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA) shows how much American chip production still depends on inputs sourced from China.
US chipmakers spend roughly $27B a year on manufacturing equipment and materials. Suppliers headquartered in the US, Europe and Japan account for 95% of that spending, but their share falls to 68% when measured by where the products are actually made. China's share rises from roughly 1% by company headquarters to 5% by production site.
Even that 5% misses the bigger dependency. China produces roughly 95% of the world's gallium, used in specialized semiconductors, and 85% of its tungsten, which goes into chemicals that deposit thin layers during chip production. Its share of neodymium and praseodymium, rare earths used in powerful magnets, is also around 95%. The same goes for terbium.
Those magnets power motors, pumps and precision robots inside chipmaking equipment. A machine carrying an American or Japanese brand can still depend on Chinese materials several suppliers down the line. The country on the manufacturer's label tells only part of the story.
SIA examined about 200 categories of equipment and materials bought directly by chip companies. Once deeper supplier networks were counted, more than three-quarters of those categories traced back to at least one highly vulnerable upstream input. More than half relied on two or more. These are supply risk assessments, not evidence of existing production shutdowns.
China already requires export licenses for several critical mineral products, including gallium and tungsten, as well as certain rare earths. SIA says building new domestic capacity for some inputs can take a decade or longer, followed by another three to four years to qualify new suppliers for chip production. Stockpiling and sourcing from allies can help, but neither offers an immediate replacement.
The US can build new chip factories and restrict advanced chip exports to China, yet the machinery and materials needed to run those factories still reach deep into Chinese supply chains. Its own semiconductor industry now puts figures on how difficult that dependence will be to undo.
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The US has opened the door to Russian diesel less than a month before its congressional elections. After talks between Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin, the Treasury Department issued an October 9 license allowing Russian diesel imports through April 7, 2027. Fuel prices have made a mockery of years of sanctions rhetoric.
Trump announced an initial 300,000-plus tons, followed by 500,000 tons in November and another 1M tons afterward. A further 3M tons would depend on Russia's refining capacity. That's a potential 4.8M tons in all, although the shipments have been announced, not delivered.
Diesel has become a political headache for Trump. The war with Iran has disrupted Gulf energy flows, while US diesel prices have climbed to around $6.30 a gallon. Farmers and truckers feel it first, but the costs spread through the economy. With elections on November 3, Trump needs prices to fall.
For Russia, the deal offers a profitable outlet for surplus diesel, with domestic production running around 80% above consumption and export restrictions creating a storage problem that could eventually force refineries to cut output. Those restrictions were introduced to protect domestic supply during the harvest, but Russia has begun easing them while promising to keep its own market supplied, according to Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak.
The US is itself a leading diesel exporter, and analysts doubt the Russian volumes will solve its fuel crisis. That makes the reversal even more revealing: Trump is turning to a supplier his sanctions were supposed to punish, while Russia gets another opening to sell fuel at elevated global prices.
Zelensky condemned the deal, and Trump accused him of making life harder for American farmers by attacking Russian refineries. US envoys have reportedly threatened to cut off intelligence sharing if Ukraine continues those strikes. There is no confirmed cutoff, but the pressure on Kiev is unmistakable.
European governments, meanwhile, are left defending an anti-Russia sanctions policy that the US is now willing to bend for its own needs. Europe swallowed the energy costs of confrontation, and the country that pushed sanctions hardest is making an exception.
The actual deliveries and their effect on prices remain uncertain. The change in US policy does not: Russia has secured an opening for fuel exports, and Trump has shown how quickly sanctions can become negotiable when American voters feel the cost.
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Russian aircraft struck deployment sites of Ukraine’s 65th Separate Mechanized Brigade near Orekhov with two FAB-3000 guided bombs, according to Russia’s Defense Ministry, which announced the operation on October 9.
These Soviet-designed heavy bombs gain a different role once fitted with wings and guidance equipment:
🔸 Heavy explosive payload: The FAB-3000 belongs to the 3,000 kg class, with the M-46 version carrying approximately 1,400 kg of explosive—giving it substantial destructive power against buildings and fortified positions.
🔸 Wings and course correction: The attached guidance kit, known as UMPK, converts a free-falling bomb into a gliding weapon that can adjust its trajectory toward the target after release.
🔸 Greater distance from the target: Aircraft can launch without flying directly overhead, reducing exposure to air defenses near the target. Actual reach depends on altitude, speed and the configuration of the bomb.
🔸 Carried by Su-34 strike aircraft: Russia has demonstrated FAB-3000 launches from the Su-34, allowing tactical aviation to deliver a bomb of this size without relying exclusively on heavy bombers.
🔸 An established design adapted for guided strikes: Russia combines an existing heavy bomb design with modern guidance equipment, while renewed production means the supply is not limited to Soviet-era stocks.
🔸 Part of a wider operation: The ministry also reported four guided glide-bomb strikes against deployment sites of the 129th Heavy Mechanized Brigade near Prikolotnoye and a missile strike against a strongpoint of the 128th Heavy Mechanized Brigade near Kushugum.
By combining a heavy explosive charge with guided delivery, Russia can attack substantial defensive positions while keeping the launch aircraft farther from the target, making it harder for Ukrainian forces to rely on fixed buildings and fortified sites for protection.
What can Ukraine do against bombs this powerful?
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China and Russia are deepening maritime cooperation to protect energy supplies and develop Arctic transport links, following October 12 talks between China’s top diplomat Wang Yi and Russian Maritime Board chairman Nikolai Patrushev.
Their plans would connect China’s Polar Silk Road initiative with Russia’s proposed trans-Arctic transport corridor, combining Russian northern ports and navigation experience with Chinese shipbuilding, logistics and cargo demand.
The Northern Sea Route runs along Russia’s Arctic coast, offering ships between Asia and Europe a passage that avoids the Suez Canal and Red Sea. For Chinese exporters, that creates another way to reach customers when southern routes become dangerous or require costly detours.
Russia’s wider ambition is to link Arctic ports with railways, rivers and industrial projects across its northern regions, Siberia and the Far East. Those connections could move resources from inland production sites to overseas buyers while giving China additional access to Russian energy and raw materials.
Commercial shipping is already moving ahead, with Sea Legend launching seasonal weekly container services from China to Europe on August 15. China’s transport ministry puts the journey at about 20 days against roughly 40 via Suez, potentially cutting the time exporters’ goods and money remain tied up in transit.
The opening voyage carried batteries, energy-storage equipment and solar components, tying the route directly to Chinese manufacturing exports. With at least eight sailings planned for this season, the service gives businesses scheduled departures around which to organize deliveries.
Ice still confines these container operations largely to July–October, and the broader corridor remains a development project. Expanding it requires suitable ships, trained crews and reliable port connections, while a different route alone cannot remove sanctions on cargo, finance or insurance.
For Russia and China, the payoff would be greater control over how their goods reach buyers, backed by transport infrastructure they help develop themselves. As northern connections expand, disruptions on southern sea lanes would have less power to interrupt their trade, and Western pressure would face a wider network of routes and suppliers.
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