Forwarded from Phil Wilson
You can kinda see why Ray Dillinger has kept quiet all these years
Interview with Ray Dillinger
Posted on October 1, 2018
[Note: the 10th anniversary of the Bitcoin whitepaper is this month. Below is a detailed interview with one of the first individuals to have interacted with Satoshi both in public and private: Ray Dillinger.

All of the written responses are directly from Ray with no contributions from others.]
https://www.ofnumbers.com/2018/10/01/interview-with-ray-dillinger/
Forwarded from Deleted Account
people like hal finney and ray dillinger came along later and helped when it was already nearly complete
Re: Bitcoin P2P e-cash paper
November 17, 2008 by bitcoincash

Ray Dillinger wrote:
> One way to do this would be
> to have the person recieving the coin generate an asymmetric
> key pair, and then have half of it published with the
> transaction. In order to spend the coin later, s/he must
> demonstrate posession of the other half of the asymmetric
> key pair, probably by using it to sign the key provided by
> the new seller.

https://nakamotostudies.org/emails/re-bitcoin-p2p-e-cash-paper-12/
Acabo de traducir otro artículo de los que considero, "reliquias" de la comunidad, esta vez de Ray Dillinger, un total desconocido para mí, hasta hoy, pero de una importantísima labor en los primeros momentos de la creación del software de Bitcoin, trabajando de la mano con Satoshi Nakamoto y Hal Finney a finales del 2008.

Me complace ver que no solo tenía los conocimientos, como para contribuir en el proyecto, sino los valores que siempre le he reconocido a los pioneros de la comunidad.

Como ya va siendo costumbre lo dejo en la blockchain por si acaso, je je je

Si hubiera sabido lo que estábamos empezando.
Publicado el 20 de septiembre de 2017
Ray Dillinger

https://www.bitpaste.app/tx/028b2d8183d8bcf4662974dbe1c7eadf5c4700b339c3429e8aaae77256382cbe
On p. 7 they write:

By the time he released the paper, he had already coded the entire system. In his own words, “I had to write all the code before I could convince myself that I could solve every problem, then I wrote the paper.” Based on historical estimates, Satoshi likely started formalizing the Bitcoin concept sometime in late 2006 and started coding around May 2007.

Worth pointing out that Hal Finney and Ray Dillinger — and likely several others – helped audit the code and paper before any of it was publicly released. https://www.ofnumbers.com/category/bitcoin/
Quién es Ray Dillinger?


Mi experiencia se basa en encontrar mejores formas de abordar los problemas. Rediseñé los procesos y encontré formas de inferir información faltante o transmitirla desde otros puntos del proceso donde esté disponible. Encuentro métodos empíricos para calcular cosas previamente incalculables. Esta experiencia ha sido reconocida por muchos, incluido Satoshi Nakamoto, quien me eligió como una de las primeras personas en revisar el código fuente de Bitcoin. También he sido reconocido en muchas publicaciones y en muchos medios de comunicación, incluida la BBC.

https://www.linkedin.com/in/ray-dillinger/

--------------------------------------------------
Acabo de traducir otro artículo de los que considero, "reliquias" de la comunidad, esta vez de Ray Dillinger, un total desconocido para mí, hasta hoy, pero de una importantísima labor en los primeros momentos de la creación del software de Bitcoin, trabajando de la mano con Satoshi Nakamoto y Hal Finney a finales del 2008.
Me complace ver que no solo tenía los conocimientos, como para contribuir en el proyecto, sino los valores que siempre les he reconocido a los pioneros de la comunidad.

Si hubiera sabido lo que estábamos empezando.
Publicado el 20 de septiembre de 2017
Ray Dillinger

https://www.bitpaste.app/tx/028b2d8183d8bcf4662974dbe1c7eadf5c4700b339c3429e8aaae77256382cbe


------------------------------------------------

Interview with Ray Dillinger
Posted on October 1, 2018
[Note: the 10th anniversary of the Bitcoin whitepaper is this month. Below is a detailed interview with one of the first individuals to have interacted with Satoshi both in public and private: Ray Dillinger.

All of the written responses are directly from Ray with no contributions from others.]
https://www.ofnumbers.com/2018/10/01/interview-with-ray-dillinger/


---------------------------------------------------------

Who created Bitcoin?
Craig Wright reveals alleged contributors for the first time
| Full Interview
Crypto Finder
Publicado el 27 abr. 2019
https://youtu.be/8_SoIXUBIhw


44:30 How Hal Finney & Ray Dillinger helped
1 Mayo 2019, Acabo de traducir otro artículo de los que considero, "reliquias" de la comunidad, esta vez de Ray Dillinger, un total desconocido para mí, hasta hoy, pero de una importantísima labor en los primeros momentos de la creación del software de Bitcoin, trabajando de la mano con Satoshi Nakamoto a finales del 2008 y tambien con Hal Finney.

Me complace ver que no solo tenía los conocimientos, como para contribuir en el proyecto, sino los valores que siempre les he reconocido a los pioneros de la comunidad.

"En noviembre de 2008, realicé una revisión de código y una auditoría de seguridad para la parte de la cadena de bloques del código fuente de Bitcoin. El fallecido Hal Finney realizó la revisión del código y la auditoría del lenguaje de scripting, y ambos examinamos el código contable. Satoshi Nakamoto, el arquitecto seudónimo y autor del código, alternó entre responder preguntas y formularlas."

Si hubiera sabido lo que estábamos empezando.
Publicado el 20 de septiembre de 2017
Ray Dillinger

https://www.bitpaste.app/tx/028b2d8183d8bcf4662974dbe1c7eadf5c4700b339c3429e8aaae77256382cbe
Channel name was changed to «Cypher Ray Dillinger - Bear»
“Both Satoshi and I objected that [Bitcoin] wouldn't scale at 1MB. Hal was concerned about a potential DoS attack though, and after discussion, Satoshi agreed... But all 3 of us agreed that 1MB had to be temporary because it would never scale.”

-Ray Dillinger

https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=946236.msg10388435#msg10388435
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From bear at sonic.net Fri Jan 30 16:47:23 2009
From: bear at sonic.net (Ray Dillinger)
Date: Fri, 30 Jan 2009 13:47:23 -0800
Subject: UCE - a simpler approach using just digital signing?
In-Reply-To: <1b587cab0901291832kd132e29uc7a58c4abbc5e7d@mail.gmail.com>
References: <CHILKAT-MID-fe8337f6-2f9d-265e-4a2c-9535ff0028cb@server123>
<200901252240.n0PMejwU002817@new.toad.com>
<1b587cab0901291832kd132e29uc7a58c4abbc5e7d@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <1233352043.28107.143.camel@localhost>

I have a disgustingly simple proposal. It seems to me that one
of the primary reasons why UCE-limiting systems fail is the
astonishing complexity of having a trust infrastructure
maintained by trusted third parties or shared by more than
one user. Indeed, "trusted third party" and "trust shared by
multiple users" may be oxymorons here. Trust, by nature, is
not really knowable by any third party, not the same for any
set of more than one user, and in fact the people most willing
to pay for it at least where UCE is concerned, experience shows
to be usually the _least_ trustworthy parties.

So why hasn't anybody tried direct implementation of user-
managed digital signatures yet?

A key list maintained by individual recipients for themselves
alone could be astonishingly simpler in practice, probably
to the point of actually being practical.

In fact, it is _necessary_ to eliminate third parties and
shared infrastructure almost entirely in order to allow mail
recipients to have the kind of fine-grained control that
they actually need to address the problem by creating
social and business feedback loops that promote good security.

As matters stand today, there is no protection from UCE.
If I know there is a user account named 'fred' on the host
'example.com', then I have an email address and I can send
all the UCE I want. And poor fred has the same email address
he gives everybody, so he gets spam from people who've gotten
his address and he has no idea where they got it. All his
legitimate correspondents are using the same email address,
so he can't abandon it without abandoning *all* of them,
and he doesn't know which of them gave his address to the
spammers. What if email accounts weren't that simple?

Consider the implications of a third field, or "trust token,"
which works like a "password" to fred's mail box. Your
mailer's copy of fred's email address would look like
"fred#token at example.com" where "token" was a field that
was your own personal password to fred's mailbox. Your
system would still send mail to "fred at example.com" but
it would include a "Trust:" header based on the token.

The simplest solution I can think of would be a direct
application of digital signatures; the trust token would
be (used as) a cryptographic key, and the headers of any
message would have to include a "Trust" field containing a
digital signature (a keyed cryptographic hash of the message,
generated by that key). Messages to multiple recipients
would need to contain one "Trust" field per recipient.

Its use would follow simple rules:

Each time Fred gives out his email address to a new sender,
he creates a trust token for that sender. They must use it
when they send him mail. So fred gives his bank a key when
he gives them his email address. If fred were willing to
recieve mail from strangers, he could publish a trust token
on his webpage or on usenet or whatever - it would be painless
to revoke it later, so why not? If fred trusted someone to
give out his email address, he could give that person multiple
trust tokens to pass along to others. Again, an error in
judgement would be painless to revoke later.