Código Abierto: Necesidad Criptográfica en Blockchain (Craig S. Wright)
( 11:24 Min.) https://notebooklm.google.com/notebook/6f91cf04-671e-4139-b5e6-e72451502e56/audio
El texto, titulado "La necesidad del código abierto en blockchain" por Craig S. Wright, argumenta que el código abierto es fundamental para la seguridad e integridad de los sistemas blockchain, particularmente Bitcoin SV y Teranode. A diferencia de la filosofía del movimiento de código abierto GNU, que enfatiza la propiedad comunitaria, la apertura en Bitcoin se basa en la necesidad criptográfica de verificación independiente por los usuarios. El artículo destaca que la transparencia del código permite auditar transacciones y prevenir la manipulación, contrastándolo con los fracasos históricos de blockchains y sistemas financieros de código cerrado donde la falta de verificación llevó a fraudes...
fuente.
https://es.ramonquesada.com/espanol-es/la-necesidad-del-codigo-abierto-en-blockchain-por-craig-s-wright/

S. Tominaga AKA CSW
Mar 24, 2025
https://x.com/CsTominaga/status/1904055593704513806?t=M4fyB6hkvTTLOzwyqafNLA&s=19

https://t.me/S_Tominaga/2732

S. Tominaga AKA CSW
Mar 24, 2025
https://x.com/CsTominaga/status/1904055593704513806?t=M4fyB6hkvTTLOzwyqafNLA&s=19

https://t.me/S_Tominaga/2732

You throw around "false dichotomy" like it's some fancy shield that'll stop reality from punching you in the face—but calling BTC a failed "store of value" isn't a false dilemma, it isn't forcing some imaginary choice.

This is stating the cold, hard truth: BTC swings up and down like a drunk staggering home at dawn, can't hold steady value worth a damn.

There's no fallacy there, just brutal fact—BTC doesn't meet the economic requirement of stability. You might not like hearing it, but that doesn't make it any less true.

A false dichotomy, sometimes called a false dilemma, is a logical fallacy that occurs when someone wrongly claims there are only two possible outcomes or choices, ignoring any middle ground or additional alternatives. It's a simplistic black-and-white view used to manipulate arguments by pretending complexity doesn't exist, forcing a choice between two extremes while disregarding all rational nuance or intermediate options.

S. Tominaga AKA CSW
Mar 24, 2025
https://x.com/CsTominaga/status/1904055593704513806?t=M4fyB6hkvTTLOzwyqafNLA&s=19

https://t.me/S_Tominaga/2732

Hablas de "falsa dicotomía" como si fuera un escudo elegante que evitará que la realidad te golpee en la cara, pero llamar a BTC una "reserva de valor" fallida no es un falso dilema, no es forzar una elección imaginaria.

Esto es decir la cruda realidad: BTC fluctúa como un borracho que se tambalea al amanecer, no puede mantener un valor estable.

No hay ninguna falacia ahí, solo una realidad brutal: BTC no cumple con el requisito económico de estabilidad. Puede que no te guste oírlo, pero eso no lo hace menos cierto.

Una falsa dicotomía, a veces llamada falso dilema, es una falacia lógica que ocurre cuando alguien afirma erróneamente que solo hay dos resultados o opciones posibles, ignorando cualquier término medio o alternativas adicionales. Es una visión simplista y en blanco y negro que se utiliza para manipular argumentos fingiendo que la complejidad no existe, forzando una elección entre dos extremos mientras se ignoran todos los matices racionales o las opciones intermedias.

S. Tominaga también conocido como CSW
24 de marzo de 2025
https://x.com/CsTominaga/status/1904055593704513806?t=M4fyB6hkvTTLOzwyqafNLA&s=19

https://t.me/S_Tominaga/2732

S. Tominaga AKA CSW
Mar 24, 2025
https://x.com/CsTominaga/status/1904052697403441332?t=Q1aNBSSxEMnIMvkO73YIIg&s=19

https://t.me/S_Tominaga/2736

These BTC libertarians—they call themselves free thinkers, rugged individuals, yet they're nothing but another sad fucking herd.

Marching together, chanting the same stale slogans, parroting misquotes and tired clichés, unable to form one original thought.

Libertarian?

No—they're communists at heart, little obedient comrades lining up behind leaders like Stalin’s sheep, too blind or cowardly to see they're marching straight into another dead end. They trade reason for slogans, trade freedom for groupthink, hiding behind hyperbole, regurgitating the same worthless dogma again and again, all while pretending they're somehow different. But they're not different—they're exactly the same, empty-headed and dull-eyed, prisoners of their own pathetic echo chamber.

S. Tominaga AKA CSW
Mar 24, 2025
https://x.com/CsTominaga/status/1904052697403441332?t=Q1aNBSSxEMnIMvkO73YIIg&s=19

https://t.me/S_Tominaga/2736

Estos libertarios de BTC se hacen llamar librepensadores, individuos rudos, pero no son más que otro triste rebaño.

Marchando juntos, coreando las mismas consignas rancias, repitiendo citas erróneas y clichés trillados, incapaces de formar un pensamiento original.

¿Libertarios?

No, son comunistas de corazón, pequeños camaradas obedientes que se alinean tras líderes como ovejas de Stalin, demasiado ciegos o cobardes para ver que marchan directos hacia un callejón sin salida. Cambian la razón por consignas, la libertad por pensamiento colectivo, escudándose en la hipérbole, regurgitando el mismo dogma inútil una y otra vez, mientras fingen ser diferentes. Pero no son diferentes, son exactamente iguales, cabezas huecas y ojos apagados, prisioneros de su propia y patética cámara de resonancia.

S. Tominaga también conocido como CSW
24 de marzo de 2025
https://x.com/CsTominaga/status/1904052697403441332?t=Q1aNBSSxEMnIMvkO73YIIg&s=19

https://t.me/S_Tominaga/2736

S. Tominaga AKA CSW
Mar 24, 2025
https://x.com/CsTominaga/status/1904050673274282173?t=EtdamVdtxBQ3SdD7l1QZDw&s=19

https://t.me/S_Tominaga/2739

You're throwing around the term "strawman" without a clue what it actually means—typical empty bluster.

A strawman fallacy involves distorting someone's argument into something weaker or exaggerated to attack it easily—but what you're calling exaggeration isn't distortion, it's economic fact. A "store of value," in any serious financial definition, demands stability; volatility isn't some minor inconvenience you shrug off, it's a fundamental failure.

You say "resilience," but resilience isn't stability—it's just surviving the chaos you created yourself.

Quoting a 2022 HBR article (paid puff piece) on crypto asset dynamics doesn't change the economic reality that BTC's wild swings render it unfit for genuine, reliable storage of value.

And censorship resistance?

Another fantasy. Bitcoin’s ledger is public, open, entirely traceable—not exactly the hallmark of resistance. Calling out these factual failures isn't hyperbole, nor is it a logical fallacy; it's plain economic reasoning and common sense.

You've misused "strawman" because you can't face reality, can't handle your illusions stripped bare. There's your fallacy—not mine.

S. Tominaga AKA CSW
Mar 24, 2025
https://x.com/CsTominaga/status/1904050673274282173?t=EtdamVdtxBQ3SdD7l1QZDw&s=19

https://t.me/S_Tominaga/2739

Estás usando el término "hombre de paja" sin tener ni idea de su verdadero significado; una típica fanfarronería vacía.

Una falacia del hombre de paja implica distorsionar el argumento de alguien, debilitándolo o exagerándolo para atacarlo fácilmente; pero lo que llamas exageración no es distorsión, sino un hecho económico. Una "reserva de valor", en cualquier definición financiera seria, exige estabilidad; la volatilidad no es un inconveniente menor que se ignora, sino un fracaso fundamental.

Dices "resiliencia", pero resiliencia no es estabilidad; es simplemente sobrevivir al caos que uno mismo creó.

Citar un artículo de HBR de 2022 (un artículo publicitario pagado) sobre la dinámica de los criptoactivos no cambia la realidad económica de que las fuertes fluctuaciones de BTC lo hacen inadecuado para un almacenamiento de valor genuino y fiable.

¿Y la resistencia a la censura?

Otra fantasía. El libro de contabilidad de Bitcoin es público, abierto y totalmente rastreable; no es precisamente el sello distintivo de la resistencia. Señalar estos fallos factuales no es una hipérbole ni una falacia lógica; es puro razonamiento económico y sentido común.

Has usado mal el término "hombre de paja" porque no puedes afrontar la realidad, no puedes soportar tus ilusiones al descubierto. Ahí está tu falacia, no la mía.

S. Tominaga, alias CSW
24 de marzo de 2025
https://x.com/CsTominaga/status/1904050673274282173?t=EtdamVdtxBQ3SdD7l1QZDw&s=19

https://t.me/S_Tominaga/2739

S. Tominaga AKA CSW
Mar 24, 2025
https://x.com/CsTominaga/status/1904049679463231623?t=7L4coWtIuxoWoByLA7Di0A&s=19

https://t.me/S_Tominaga/2742

You keep talking about decentralisation like it's some kind of holy scripture—but here’s reality, raw and bitter as cheap gin: two big mining servers run nearly the whole damned show.

They dominate, they decide, they dance and you follow.

One single developer pool sets every rule, every change, every whim they fancy. Your precious "decentralisation" is nothing but a joke—two kings and one dictator, calling shots, laughing as you nod along blindly.

You've swallowed a pretty lie, a bedtime story, too weak or lazy to face the truth: Bitcoin was meant for honest cash, not this puppet theatre where everyone pretends they're free.

S. Tominaga AKA CSW
Mar 24, 2025
https://x.com/CsTominaga/status/1904049679463231623?t=7L4coWtIuxoWoByLA7Di0A&s=19

https://t.me/S_Tominaga/2742

Sigues hablando de descentralización como si fuera una escritura sagrada, pero aquí está la realidad, cruda y amarga como la ginebra barata: dos grandes servidores de minería controlan casi todo el maldito espectáculo.

Ellos dominan, deciden, bailan y tú los sigues.

Un solo grupo de desarrolladores establece todas las reglas, todos los cambios, todos los caprichos que se les ocurren. Tu preciada "descentralización" no es más que una broma: dos reyes y un dictador, tomando las riendas, riendo mientras asientes ciegamente.

Te has tragado una bonita mentira, un cuento para dormir, demasiado débil o perezoso para afrontar la verdad: Bitcoin se concibió para el dinero honesto, no para este teatro de marionetas donde todos fingen ser libres.

S. Tominaga también conocido como CSW
24 de marzo de 2025
https://x.com/CsTominaga/status/1904049679463231623?t=7L4coWtIuxoWoByLA7Di0A&s=19

https://t.me/S_Tominaga/2742

S. Tominaga AKA CSW
Mar 25, 2025
https://x.com/CsTominaga/status/1904474555357491685?t=o1JFCyMcKO1ruLRElFfkrw&s=19

https://t.me/S_Tominaga/2745

The constitutional frameworks debated in early America were not abstract exercises in governance but reflections of a fundamental tension: how to balance authority with individual sovereignty, how to create a government strong enough to function yet restrained enough to prevent tyranny. The proposals many have discussed recently (and reflected below) expose the ideological fault lines that shaped those early structures, and while some elements offer enduring value, others reflect the same flawed assumptions that have eroded constitutionalism over time.

Longer Senate terms, as proposed—eight to ten years—could provide stability, insulating legislators from the volatility of short-term political pressures. The Senate was never intended to be an extension of mass democracy but a deliberative body designed to temper legislative excess. Extending terms could reinforce this role, allowing senators to act with greater independence rather than governing with the frantic short-sightedness of perpetual reelection campaigns. But this model also presupposes an electorate capable of holding power to account over longer intervals, a condition that cannot be assumed. If an extended term isolates legislators from the consequences of their actions, it ceases to be a mechanism for stability and becomes a vehicle for entrenched corruption.

The notion of House members serving four-year terms instead of two is a more reasonable correction, eliminating the absurdity of representatives perpetually campaigning rather than governing. The House was meant to be the voice of the people, but representation is meaningless if it is dictated by the whims of continuous electoral cycles rather than substantive policymaking. However, the fundamental issue with the House has never been its term length—it is the lack of real constraints on its power. A term adjustment does nothing to solve the deeper issue of majoritarian excess, the tendency of legislative bodies to consolidate power under the guise of democratic legitimacy. If the House were still bound by a strict constitutional framework limiting its authority—rather than by the fiction that public will alone justifies legislative action—its term length would be almost incidental.

The proposal of a single-term presidency, however, is a blatant concession to the cynicism that views executive authority as inherently corrosive. While a limited term might seem like a check against political ambition, it ultimately neuters the position, transforming the executive into a transient figure incapable of executing any long-term vision. A presidency without continuity is not an office of leadership—it is a ceremonial function wrapped in bureaucratic inertia. If the executive must be limited, it is not by the artificial constraint of a single term but by constitutional strictures that prevent the accumulation of unchecked power. The true failure of modern executive authority is not its duration but its scope—the ability of the president to act outside constitutional bounds under the pretense of necessity. This is not a problem solved by term limits. It is a problem solved by a citizenry unwilling to tolerate executive overreach.

If I were drafting a constitutional framework today, I would begin not with term lengths but with an inviolable limitation of government’s role. There would be no endless sprawl of legislation, no assumption that the state exists to regulate the minutiae of human life. The legislative branch would be bound by strict enumerated powers, unable to expand its reach through judicial reinterpretation. The executive would be charged with enforcement and nothing more, barred from legislating through fiat or "emergency" powers. The judiciary would serve only to uphold contracts and protect against violations of individual rights, not as an instrument of social engineering.

1/2
S. Tominaga AKA CSW
Mar 25, 2025
https://x.com/CsTominaga/status/1904474555357491685?t=o1JFCyMcKO1ruLRElFfkrw&s=19

https://t.me/S_Tominaga/2745

The taxation system would be transparent, flat, and constitutionally constrained, eliminating the state’s ability to expand its power through economic coercion.

Most importantly, constitutional interpretation would not be ceded to an unelected class of legal scholars who twist the meaning of words to suit their ideological aims. The document would be written in explicit, unambiguous terms, invulnerable to creative reinterpretation. A government should not exist to rule but to secure rights, and it should be structured in a way that renders its expansion impossible. The tragedy of early American constitutionalism was not that it failed to anticipate threats—it was that it assumed future generations would remain vigilant in preserving its original intent. Any constitution that does not account for the inevitability of government seeking more power is already a failed document. The only framework worth implementing is one that acknowledges this tendency and neutralizes it before it begins.

2/2
S. Tominaga AKA CSW
Mar 25, 2025
https://x.com/CsTominaga/status/1904474555357491685?t=o1JFCyMcKO1ruLRElFfkrw&s=19

https://t.me/S_Tominaga/2745

Los marcos constitucionales debatidos en los primeros tiempos de Estados Unidos no eran ejercicios abstractos de gobernanza, sino reflejos de una tensión fundamental: cómo equilibrar la autoridad con la soberanía individual, cómo crear un gobierno lo suficientemente fuerte para funcionar, pero lo suficientemente moderado para evitar la tiranía. Las propuestas que muchos han debatido recientemente (y que se reflejan a continuación) exponen las fallas ideológicas que moldearon esas estructuras tempranas, y si bien algunos elementos ofrecen un valor perdurable, otros reflejan los mismos supuestos erróneos que han erosionado el constitucionalismo con el tiempo.

Los mandatos más largos del Senado, como se propone —de ocho a diez años—, podrían brindar estabilidad, aislando a los legisladores de la volatilidad de las presiones políticas a corto plazo. El Senado nunca se concibió como una extensión de la democracia de masas, sino como un órgano deliberativo diseñado para moderar los excesos legislativos. Extender los mandatos podría reforzar este papel, permitiendo a los senadores actuar con mayor independencia en lugar de gobernar con la frenética miopía de las campañas de reelección perpetuas. Pero este modelo también presupone un electorado capaz de exigir cuentas al poder durante períodos más largos, una condición que no se puede dar por sentado. Si un mandato prolongado aísla a los legisladores de las consecuencias de sus acciones, deja de ser un mecanismo de estabilidad y se convierte en un vehículo para la corrupción arraigada.

La idea de que los miembros de la Cámara cumplan mandatos de cuatro años en lugar de dos es una corrección más razonable, que elimina el absurdo de que los representantes estén constantemente en campaña en lugar de gobernar. La Cámara se concibió para ser la voz del pueblo, pero la representación carece de sentido si se rige por los caprichos de los continuos ciclos electorales en lugar de por la formulación de políticas sustanciales. Sin embargo, el problema fundamental de la Cámara nunca ha sido la duración de su mandato, sino la falta de restricciones reales a su poder. Un ajuste de mandatos no soluciona el problema más profundo del exceso mayoritario, la tendencia de los órganos legislativos a consolidar el poder bajo el pretexto de la legitimidad democrática. Si la Cámara aún estuviera sujeta a un estricto marco constitucional que limita su autoridad —en lugar de a la ficción de que la voluntad pública por sí sola justifica la acción legislativa—, la duración de su mandato sería casi incidental.

La propuesta de una presidencia de un solo mandato, sin embargo, es una concesión flagrante al cinismo que considera la autoridad ejecutiva como inherentemente corrosiva. Si bien un mandato limitado podría parecer un freno a la ambición política, en última instancia neutraliza el cargo, transformando al ejecutivo en una figura transitoria incapaz de ejecutar ninguna visión a largo plazo. Una presidencia sin continuidad no es un cargo de liderazgo; es una función ceremonial envuelta en la inercia burocrática. Si el ejecutivo debe ser limitado, no es por la restricción artificial de un solo mandato, sino por las restricciones constitucionales que impiden la acumulación de poder sin control. El verdadero fracaso de la autoridad ejecutiva moderna no es su duración, sino su alcance: la capacidad del presidente de actuar fuera de los límites constitucionales bajo el pretexto de la necesidad. Este no es un problema que se resuelva con límites de mandato. Es un problema que se resuelve por una ciudadanía que no está dispuesta a tolerar la extralimitación del ejecutivo.

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S. Tominaga, alias CSW
25 de marzo de 2025
https://x.com/CsTominaga/status/1904474555357491685?t=o1JFCyMcKO1ruLRElFfkrw&s=19

https://t.me/S_Tominaga/2745

Si hoy redactara un marco constitucional, comenzaría no por la duración de los mandatos, sino por una limitación inviolable del papel del gobierno. No habría una proliferación interminable de legislación, ni se asumiría que el Estado existe para regular las minucias de la vida humana. El poder legislativo estaría sujeto a poderes estrictamente enumerados, sin poder ampliar su alcance mediante la reinterpretación judicial.

El ejecutivo se encargaría de la aplicación de la ley y nada más, sin poder legislar por decreto o poderes de "emergencia". El poder judicial serviría únicamente para hacer cumplir los contratos y proteger contra las violaciones de los derechos individuales, no como un instrumento de ingeniería social.

El sistema tributario sería transparente, uniforme y constitucionalmente restringido, eliminando la capacidad del Estado para expandir su poder mediante la coerción económica.

Y lo más importante, la interpretación constitucional no se cedería a una clase de juristas no electos que distorsionan el significado de las palabras para adaptarlas a sus objetivos ideológicos. El documento se redactaría en términos explícitos e inequívocos, invulnerable a la reinterpretación creativa. Un gobierno no debería existir para gobernar, sino para garantizar derechos, y debería estar estructurado de forma que imposibilite su expansión. La tragedia del constitucionalismo estadounidense inicial no fue que no anticipara las amenazas, sino que asumió que las generaciones futuras se mantendrían vigilantes para preservar su propósito original. Cualquier constitución que no contemple la inevitabilidad de que el gobierno busque más poder ya es un documento fallido. El único marco que vale la pena implementar es aquel que reconoce esta tendencia y la neutraliza antes de que surja.

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S. Tominaga también conocido como CSW
25 de marzo de 2025
https://x.com/CsTominaga/status/1904474555357491685?t=o1JFCyMcKO1ruLRElFfkrw&s=19

https://t.me/S_Tominaga/2745

S. Tominaga AKA CSW
Mar 25, 2025
https://x.com/CsTominaga/status/1904472747948077233?t=JCdVhyhsJYPoqXur3qrvow&s=19

https://t.me/S_Tominaga/2750

The distinction between what I would argue in academic writing and what I would state outright is not an exercise in moderation but a recognition of the battlefield. The necessity of measured engagement with inferior arguments does not grant them legitimacy—it merely acknowledges the reality of the academic structure in which such ideas must be dismantled on their own terms.

Within those constraints, Ferguson, Rosenfeld, and Loughran must be taken seriously, their arguments addressed with precision and countered with the appropriate methodological rigor.

But outside those constraints, stripped of the formalities that require their positions to be entertained, it becomes evident that they do not misunderstand Common Sense so much as they actively evade its implications.

Ferguson’s focus on rhetorical construction reduces Common Sense to an aesthetic achievement, as though Paine’s words were significant not because they carried truth but because they were arranged efficiently. This is the evasiveness of those who would rather discuss the mechanics of an idea than the consequences of it. Paine’s work was powerful not because of its stylistic clarity but because of the fundamental truth it articulated—monarchy was indefensible, self-governance was necessary, and hesitation was a form of surrender. Ferguson, in treating Paine as a technician of language, diminishes the reality that the force of Common Sense lay in its recognition of self-evident principles.

Rosenfeld’s failure is of a different nature. She does not merely reframe Common Sense as a work of rhetorical manipulation—she strips it of meaning entirely. If, as she suggests, Paine’s invocation of “common sense” was not an assertion of truth but a strategic appeal to cultural instincts, then there is no distinction left between knowledge and persuasion, between reason and rhetoric. If all conviction is merely a linguistic device designed to manufacture agreement, then there is no such thing as truth—only the manipulation of perception. This is the academic tendency at its worst, the relativist impulse to dismantle every assertion until nothing remains but the claim that all ideas are constructs. Common Sense was not an exercise in framing. It was an argument, one that derived its strength not from its accessibility but from its correctness. Rosenfeld does not challenge Paine’s reasoning—she denies that reasoning matters at all.

Loughran’s argument, however, is the most egregious because it is not merely incorrect—it is self-negating. To argue that Common Sense mattered only because it was widely distributed, to claim that its significance was derived from its circulation rather than its content, is to erase the role of ideas in history entirely. Revolutions are not born from the printing press; they are born from the mind.

The ability to mass-produce a document does not imbue it with significance—its significance must precede its dissemination. Common Sense was not merely a widely read pamphlet. It was a text that transformed those who read it because it contained a truth they already knew but had not yet articulated for themselves. Loughran’s argument is not simply flawed; it is an attempt to remove the individual from history, to replace the conscious decision of men to act with the passive movement of text through a commercial network. But ideas are not passive. They do not simply spread—they compel, they demand, they insist. Common Sense did not succeed because it was printed.

It succeeded because it was undeniable.

Within the academic framework, these critiques must be addressed in the language of their respective methodologies, their flaws exposed through careful argumentation. But outside that framework, the reality is clear.

Common Sense was not merely a pamphlet—it was an intellectual weapon. It was not just widely read—it was understood. And its power did not come from its dissemination but from the truth that it carried.

The press may have printed it, but it was Paine’s mind that made it revolutionary.

CSW
https://t.me/S_Tominaga/2750