Scott Ritter
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An experienced military and geopolitical analyst with a proven track record of accuracy and integrity.

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I took the time to write an article about the passing of David Kay, a former IAEA inspector who later headed the CIA’s postwar investigation into Iraqi WMD. I then made a two minute topic video. And yet people still have the gall to denigrate the man, claiming he “lied” about Iraq’s WMD, and therefore is personally responsible for the deaths of millions of Iraqis.
This needs to stop.
Let me start with the following premise: if you weren’t an inspector with on the ground experience in Iraq, or an Iraqi personally involved in WMD programs, then simply put you don’t have a clue. Your best course of action would be to remain silent.
Many people believe that I resigned from the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) because I believed Iraq had a clean bill of health.
Wrong.
I resigned because of American interference in the inspection process necessary for making a final conclusion on Iraq’s disarmament status. I believed—rightly so—that there was work left to be done, and that the US was trying to avoid the conclusions a completed inspection process might reach and as such just wanted to skip the inspections and reach a conclusion based upon an incomplete investigation.
I wanted to inspect; the US stopped me. I resigned.
My goal was always to get inspectors back in Iraq. To finish the job.
I’ve written extensively on this particular history. My book Endgame provides an Annex drawn from a 1997 study I authored about what remained unaccounted for in terms of WMD.
My inspections were designed to account for that missing information/material.
Throughout my time as an inspector, I had to overcome Iraqi lies, concealment and intimidation.
These Iraqi tactics were not conducive to giving the Iraqis the benefit of the doubt.
The Security Council resolutions mandating our work called for 100% compliance—not 80%, not 90%, not 95%. 100%. It was nonnegotiable.
Iraq never achieved that 100% level. I assessed them at around 95-97%. My inspections were geared toward resolving the unaccounted for 3-5%.
This is the point I made to the US Senate and House of Representatives in September 1998.
What caused me to radically alter my position wasn’t new data about Iraqi WMD, but continued US interference that led to the December 1998 Desert Fox bombings, which included an assassination attempt on Saddam using intelligence my team had collected for legitimate disarmament purposes.
The Iraqis knew this too, and they terminated their relationship with UNSCOM.
With UNSCOM dead, I believed that the approach to disarming Iraq could shift from Quantitative accounting to Qualitative analysis—instead of hunting down every last scrap, assess whether what was unaccounted for constituted a meaningful WMD capability. I put this idea in writing, publishing an article in June 2000 in Arms Control Today.
I was very much an outlier on this issue. Even my colleagues, like David Kelly, believed Iraq should be held to the original 100% standard set down by law.
So did David Kay.
David Kay’s testimony was predicated on the 100% disarmed standard. He was right to point out that Iraq had not met that standard.
Later, when he headed up the CIA’s investigation, David Kay had to come to grips with the fact that the Qualitative standard was the right one. The report his team eventually prepared mirrored my June 2000 article.
There was nothing dishonorable about David Kay. For those who continue to make that argument, you are only highlighting your own ignorance and prejudices. Cease and desist.
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A blast from the past….

https://vimeo.com/702118361
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Episode 2
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Just a reminder: Mikhail Gorbachev has passed at the age of 91. Love him or hate him, he will go down in history as a man who made his mark on the world. My new book, Disarmament in the time of Perestroika, provides a first person account of life in the Soviet Union during the last three turbulent years of Gorbachev’s failed Perestroika “revolution.” Anyone interested in learning more about Perestroika and life in the Soviet Union under Gorbachev would do well to read this book.
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