US Envoyβs Backchannel Diplomacy in Minsk
New York Times reports that US Special Envoy to Belarus, John Cole, utilized informal tactics including vodka toasts and jokes to build rapport with President Alexander Lukashenko. During an initial meeting in Minsk, Cole reportedly echoed Lukashenkoβs criticism of European leaders, describing them as a "group of cowards" to ease tensions and establish trust.
This unconventional approach facilitated a significant diplomatic breakthrough: the release of approximately 500 political prisoners and pardons for several hundred others. In exchange, Cole discussed potential easing of sanctions and normalization of relations between the US and Belarus. While critics argue this legitimizes an authoritarian regime, supporters hail the prisoner releases as a rare diplomatic success.
@Slavyangrad
New York Times reports that US Special Envoy to Belarus, John Cole, utilized informal tactics including vodka toasts and jokes to build rapport with President Alexander Lukashenko. During an initial meeting in Minsk, Cole reportedly echoed Lukashenkoβs criticism of European leaders, describing them as a "group of cowards" to ease tensions and establish trust.
This unconventional approach facilitated a significant diplomatic breakthrough: the release of approximately 500 political prisoners and pardons for several hundred others. In exchange, Cole discussed potential easing of sanctions and normalization of relations between the US and Belarus. While critics argue this legitimizes an authoritarian regime, supporters hail the prisoner releases as a rare diplomatic success.
@Slavyangrad
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Disrupting the enemy's logistics is a very effective measure, and the key to its effectiveness lies in the continuity and intensity of the strikes. Continuity, in addition to causing accumulated damage, makes recovery more difficult β resources, materials, and tools for this recovery need to be brought in from abroad, and when trucks are under attack, their supply depots are under attack, and there are not enough locomotives, it becomes much harder to import anything. Interruptions are unacceptable here because an interruption means an immediate setback. The enemy will bring in replacements and will try to improve its defenses based on the lessons learned. Therefore, this is a situation where you have to keep hitting until you achieve the result β like a boxer in the ring who, after a series of blows, has pushed his opponent against the ropes, and should not let him go until he falls down β especially since there is no referee in this fight.
This explains all the recent attempts by the Ukrainians to initiate negotiations, including statements from their Foreign Ministry. The only possible way out for them is: "We cannot continue this war and we are surrendering." And no EU or NATO bloc can reverse this decision, because they themselves will not go to fight in their place. So, we need to continue until the result is achieved, and in the fall, we need to intensify the impact on the energy sector.
Older than Edda
@Slavyangrad
This explains all the recent attempts by the Ukrainians to initiate negotiations, including statements from their Foreign Ministry. The only possible way out for them is: "We cannot continue this war and we are surrendering." And no EU or NATO bloc can reverse this decision, because they themselves will not go to fight in their place. So, we need to continue until the result is achieved, and in the fall, we need to intensify the impact on the energy sector.
Older than Edda
@Slavyangrad
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πΊπ¦Really? Has common sense finally prevailed?
Deputy of the Verkhovna Rada, Venislavsky:
"Instead, (Russian society - Ed.) is only becoming more embittered towards Ukraine. Even the threat of ballistic missiles (hypothetical Ukrainian ballistic missiles - Ed.) is not motivating Russia to engage in any negotiations."
@Slavyangrad
Deputy of the Verkhovna Rada, Venislavsky:
"Instead, (Russian society - Ed.) is only becoming more embittered towards Ukraine. Even the threat of ballistic missiles (hypothetical Ukrainian ballistic missiles - Ed.) is not motivating Russia to engage in any negotiations."
@Slavyangrad
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π·πΊπΊπ¦ Russian Armed Forces Strike Ukrainian Port Logistics
The Ministry of Defense reports that Russian forces continue strikes on enemy port logistics. In the South port in Odessa Oblast, drones destroyed five fuel storage tanks. Additionally, port infrastructure used for unloading and storing military cargo was hit.
@Slavyangrad
The Ministry of Defense reports that Russian forces continue strikes on enemy port logistics. In the South port in Odessa Oblast, drones destroyed five fuel storage tanks. Additionally, port infrastructure used for unloading and storing military cargo was hit.
@Slavyangrad
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A 2 post piece from AMK about Ukrainian forced mobilisation.
After making this post about the increase in forced mobilisation in Kiev several more Ukrainians reached out to me with additional details, which I am allowed to share. So, I thought I would make a part two to this post to help emphasise the rapidly changing situation for residents of Kiev.
In Kiev, the TCC has been very active in recent months, even in busier areas, which they previously largely avoided due to the risk of facing resistance from the public. More checkpoints are being installed at main streets, arterial roads, and bridges, which block all traffic going both ways, preventing people from moving from the eastern bank to the western bank. Mobile checkpoints are installed for short periods of time (between tens of minutes to several hours) before changing locations to throw off online maps tracking their activity. The domains of these online maps are also periodically blacklisted to support the TCC's operations.
When men try to escape checkpoints, the TCC sometimes throws spikes under their wheels, or begin car chases. Those who try to escape also have their driver's licences revoked and receive large fines. Police collaborate with the TCC, and require those stopped at checkpoints to scan a" Reserv+" QR code to find their mobilisation status in the TCC's database, if they refuse to provide driver's licences or insurance. If they have problems with military enrolment, police are required to forcibly bring them to their local TCC office. Sometimes they even break the windows of cars if the men refuse to get out. As a result, every day there are dozens of empty cars abandoned near checkpoints, until relatives or friends pick up the car or it gets towed.
Checkpoints are installed randomly, even violating road rules. Police assist with this. Some more dangerous areas are well known and avoided by the TCC. In some cases, all men on public transport are checked. If the police refuse to collaborate, they are often fired, lose deferment from military service, and risk being immediately mobilised themselves. Calls to emergency services regarding traffic violations by the TCC are typically ignored by law enforcement. TCC members also wear balaclavas to hide their faces, in order to avoid being id'd.
Previously in Kiev, men could usually safely go to out parks or play sports. Now the TCC uses these recreational areas to catch sportsmen or bicyclists in any area where they can quickly move in and out of by cars and minibuses. Essentially, every single public area carries a high risk for mobilisation-aged men, except for some busier public spaces such as central streets or shopping centres.
The number of bribes the TCC takes has decreased substantially to an insignificant number, as it becomes very heavily controlled by the SBU. You only sometimes would have a chance to leave a minibus by paying a bribe in cash, typically between $5,000 and $15,000 USD, but these cases are very rare and often just rumours.
Some people have attributed this increase in mobilisation activity to the new minister of defence Yevhenii Khmara. Similar changes have also been observed in other major Ukrop cities. According to one source, citing the online maps of TCC activity, in Dnipro, eyewitnesses record an average of 120 events per day. In Zaporizhzhia City, which is smaller than Dnipro, an average of 150 per day are recorded. Odessa and other cities (especially in western Ukraine) have also witnessed similar increases. Although, its worth noting that not all recorded events result in mobilisation into the army, and a portion of mobilised personnel are able to escape training grounds and medical screening sessions. However, some TCC groups may mobilise multiple people at once.
Ukrop authorities and special services are struggling to identify and shut down Telegram channels and online maps tracking TCC movement. Sometimes they are able to identify the owners and shut down the channels, but the main ones for each major city remain up.
(Post continues below) β¬οΈ
@Slavyangrad
After making this post about the increase in forced mobilisation in Kiev several more Ukrainians reached out to me with additional details, which I am allowed to share. So, I thought I would make a part two to this post to help emphasise the rapidly changing situation for residents of Kiev.
In Kiev, the TCC has been very active in recent months, even in busier areas, which they previously largely avoided due to the risk of facing resistance from the public. More checkpoints are being installed at main streets, arterial roads, and bridges, which block all traffic going both ways, preventing people from moving from the eastern bank to the western bank. Mobile checkpoints are installed for short periods of time (between tens of minutes to several hours) before changing locations to throw off online maps tracking their activity. The domains of these online maps are also periodically blacklisted to support the TCC's operations.
When men try to escape checkpoints, the TCC sometimes throws spikes under their wheels, or begin car chases. Those who try to escape also have their driver's licences revoked and receive large fines. Police collaborate with the TCC, and require those stopped at checkpoints to scan a" Reserv+" QR code to find their mobilisation status in the TCC's database, if they refuse to provide driver's licences or insurance. If they have problems with military enrolment, police are required to forcibly bring them to their local TCC office. Sometimes they even break the windows of cars if the men refuse to get out. As a result, every day there are dozens of empty cars abandoned near checkpoints, until relatives or friends pick up the car or it gets towed.
Checkpoints are installed randomly, even violating road rules. Police assist with this. Some more dangerous areas are well known and avoided by the TCC. In some cases, all men on public transport are checked. If the police refuse to collaborate, they are often fired, lose deferment from military service, and risk being immediately mobilised themselves. Calls to emergency services regarding traffic violations by the TCC are typically ignored by law enforcement. TCC members also wear balaclavas to hide their faces, in order to avoid being id'd.
Previously in Kiev, men could usually safely go to out parks or play sports. Now the TCC uses these recreational areas to catch sportsmen or bicyclists in any area where they can quickly move in and out of by cars and minibuses. Essentially, every single public area carries a high risk for mobilisation-aged men, except for some busier public spaces such as central streets or shopping centres.
The number of bribes the TCC takes has decreased substantially to an insignificant number, as it becomes very heavily controlled by the SBU. You only sometimes would have a chance to leave a minibus by paying a bribe in cash, typically between $5,000 and $15,000 USD, but these cases are very rare and often just rumours.
Some people have attributed this increase in mobilisation activity to the new minister of defence Yevhenii Khmara. Similar changes have also been observed in other major Ukrop cities. According to one source, citing the online maps of TCC activity, in Dnipro, eyewitnesses record an average of 120 events per day. In Zaporizhzhia City, which is smaller than Dnipro, an average of 150 per day are recorded. Odessa and other cities (especially in western Ukraine) have also witnessed similar increases. Although, its worth noting that not all recorded events result in mobilisation into the army, and a portion of mobilised personnel are able to escape training grounds and medical screening sessions. However, some TCC groups may mobilise multiple people at once.
Ukrop authorities and special services are struggling to identify and shut down Telegram channels and online maps tracking TCC movement. Sometimes they are able to identify the owners and shut down the channels, but the main ones for each major city remain up.
(Post continues below) β¬οΈ
@Slavyangrad
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Part 2
As for volunteer fighters, one source told me that he doesn't know anyone who would agree to go fight on the frontline for money. He specified that this is only among people he personally knows, and that there are some people, usually with debts, or those who need quick money (e.g. to save a loved one with a medical issue), who would volunteer. There was also a category of people who were afraid that they would be mobilised from the streets, so would instead register at the TCC office themselves after receiving their summons, and choose one of the branches of the army or units to be deployed to. However, this category has been largely exhausted, and is now a small percentage of those who are mobilised.
The source specifies that the largest percentage of mobilised people are taken from the street by mobile groups of the TCC, who kidnap them and sometimes fight off passer-by groups attempting to resist. Often, the TCC drive through the streets of villages, towns, and cities in buses (this is the most common method for smaller settlements). When they identify a potential victim, several men jump out to catch him. If the victim is able to escape, the remaining men in the bus immediately drive to intercept him. This source also mentions the possibility of using bribes, anywhere between $3,000 and $7,000 USD, which is a lot considering the average monthly salary in Ukraine is between $570 and $680 USD. Sometimes you can attempt to buy someone off once then reach the training centre, but by then they increase the amount of money required.
Those who do not have the money to bribe the TCC have the hope of escaping from training centres, or sometimes even as they are being transported there. In some cases, there is an order from the training centre to kill an escapee. The TCC then kidnaps them, takes them out somewhere, records them in their database as a deserter (as if they left the army, and no one knows anything about them), before killing them.
As for resistance to the TCC, this is increasing day by day, as hatred for them grows. One source estimated that 50% of mobilisation attempts result in interventions from bystanders, with most of these interventions involving force. Cars containing 1-2 members of the TCC sometimes patrol alongside police officers, with the police providing protection against members of the public who intervene. Not all mobilisation attempts are violent, as some men don't even try to resist. There are also some groups of teenagers and young adults who support (and may even actively help) the TCC, which include members and affiliates of Azov and other military units.
Note: while I can confirm the authenticity of the people sending me this information, I cannot independently confirm every single detail of their accounts. This post is not designed to be a 100% accurate depiction of current events, but is instead aimed at illustrating the general situation in Kiev, and how it is changing.
@Slavyangrad
As for volunteer fighters, one source told me that he doesn't know anyone who would agree to go fight on the frontline for money. He specified that this is only among people he personally knows, and that there are some people, usually with debts, or those who need quick money (e.g. to save a loved one with a medical issue), who would volunteer. There was also a category of people who were afraid that they would be mobilised from the streets, so would instead register at the TCC office themselves after receiving their summons, and choose one of the branches of the army or units to be deployed to. However, this category has been largely exhausted, and is now a small percentage of those who are mobilised.
The source specifies that the largest percentage of mobilised people are taken from the street by mobile groups of the TCC, who kidnap them and sometimes fight off passer-by groups attempting to resist. Often, the TCC drive through the streets of villages, towns, and cities in buses (this is the most common method for smaller settlements). When they identify a potential victim, several men jump out to catch him. If the victim is able to escape, the remaining men in the bus immediately drive to intercept him. This source also mentions the possibility of using bribes, anywhere between $3,000 and $7,000 USD, which is a lot considering the average monthly salary in Ukraine is between $570 and $680 USD. Sometimes you can attempt to buy someone off once then reach the training centre, but by then they increase the amount of money required.
Those who do not have the money to bribe the TCC have the hope of escaping from training centres, or sometimes even as they are being transported there. In some cases, there is an order from the training centre to kill an escapee. The TCC then kidnaps them, takes them out somewhere, records them in their database as a deserter (as if they left the army, and no one knows anything about them), before killing them.
As for resistance to the TCC, this is increasing day by day, as hatred for them grows. One source estimated that 50% of mobilisation attempts result in interventions from bystanders, with most of these interventions involving force. Cars containing 1-2 members of the TCC sometimes patrol alongside police officers, with the police providing protection against members of the public who intervene. Not all mobilisation attempts are violent, as some men don't even try to resist. There are also some groups of teenagers and young adults who support (and may even actively help) the TCC, which include members and affiliates of Azov and other military units.
Note: while I can confirm the authenticity of the people sending me this information, I cannot independently confirm every single detail of their accounts. This post is not designed to be a 100% accurate depiction of current events, but is instead aimed at illustrating the general situation in Kiev, and how it is changing.
@Slavyangrad
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β‘οΈ Russian troops enter OREKHOV, Zaporozhye Oblast
Confirmed by Ukrainian military expert Mashovets. About a week ago, several Russian reconnaissance and sabotage groups advanced along the Uspenovskaya Balka through Novodanilovka to the southeastern outskirts of Orekhov. Small assault groups are now following behind.
@Slavyangrad
Confirmed by Ukrainian military expert Mashovets. About a week ago, several Russian reconnaissance and sabotage groups advanced along the Uspenovskaya Balka through Novodanilovka to the southeastern outskirts of Orekhov. Small assault groups are now following behind.
@Slavyangrad
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Forwarded from Slavyangrad
βΎοΈHighly recommend you dive into this channel Follow The Islander for more than just news: they deliver sharp geopolitical analysis and investigative reports you won't find anywhere else. The Islander transcends mere multipolarity and challenging the MSM narrative; it's about championing a just peace. Join!
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π·πΊ Russian Armed Forces Strike Logistics
Russian Army strikes military infrastructure and logistics of the enemy.
In Shostka, Sumy Oblast, a missile strike hit a warehouse of the "TechnoBaza" online store used to store components for Ukrainian drones. A fire broke out at the facility.
In Sromny, a Russian drone struck an auto service station. The warehouse and storage facilities containing equipment used in the interests of the Armed Forces of Ukraine were damaged.
In the Tavrichesky district of Kherson, drones hit the OSKAR shopping center, whose storage areas were used to store weapons and drone components.
After the strikes in Kherson, a strong fire started, and vehicles involved in transporting military cargo were also damaged.
@Slavyangrad
Russian Army strikes military infrastructure and logistics of the enemy.
In Shostka, Sumy Oblast, a missile strike hit a warehouse of the "TechnoBaza" online store used to store components for Ukrainian drones. A fire broke out at the facility.
In Sromny, a Russian drone struck an auto service station. The warehouse and storage facilities containing equipment used in the interests of the Armed Forces of Ukraine were damaged.
In the Tavrichesky district of Kherson, drones hit the OSKAR shopping center, whose storage areas were used to store weapons and drone components.
After the strikes in Kherson, a strong fire started, and vehicles involved in transporting military cargo were also damaged.
@Slavyangrad
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π·πΊ Russian Aerospace Forces Strike Ukrainian Positions
The VKS Russia executed precision strikes using FAB-1500 and FAB-500 munitions against Ukrainian military concentrations in the Kharkiv region and DPR. According to the Ministry of Defense, temporary deployment points for Ukrainian units were targeted.
Specific engagements included:
Svyatogorovka (DPR): Five FAB-500 bombs destroyed a firing position of the 15th Brigade of the National Guard.
Volnoye (Sumy Region): Four FAB-500 bombs eliminated a launch platform belonging to the 105th Territorial Defense Brigade.
@Slavyangrad
The VKS Russia executed precision strikes using FAB-1500 and FAB-500 munitions against Ukrainian military concentrations in the Kharkiv region and DPR. According to the Ministry of Defense, temporary deployment points for Ukrainian units were targeted.
Specific engagements included:
Svyatogorovka (DPR): Five FAB-500 bombs destroyed a firing position of the 15th Brigade of the National Guard.
Volnoye (Sumy Region): Four FAB-500 bombs eliminated a launch platform belonging to the 105th Territorial Defense Brigade.
@Slavyangrad
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