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Bypassing Google's big anti-adblock update
Article, Comments

After a lot of time looking into the C++ code, I found exactly one vulnerable thing:
the opt_webViewInstanceId parameter. This was set for Chrome platform apps, in order to let them manage their embedded websites (WebViews). Among other things, it let them use web request blocking to control navigation. Basically, if an event had a WebView ID, the permission check for webRequestBlocking would be skipped. The issue was that the browser never verified that an event with a WebView ID actually belonged to a platform app. So an extension could spoof it, skip the check, and use the blocking feature.

let WebRequestEvent = chrome.webRequest.onBeforeRequest.constructor // opt_webViewInstanceId is the 5th argument let fakeEvent = new WebRequestEvent("webRequest.onBeforeRequest", 0, 0, 0, 1337) fakeEvent.addListener(() => { return { cancel: true } }, { urls: ['*://*.example.com/*'] }, ['blocking'])


Maybe I should note that platform apps were deprecated in 2020. I found this bug in 2023, and the code to handle opt_webViewInstanceId still exists in 2025. Goes to show how ancient code leads to bugs.
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The #Tor Project Just Gaslit Their Entire User Base

https://youtu.be/3wlNemFwbwE
FBI was investigating 36 young girls Epstein raped and trafficked UNTIL Epstein agreed to rat out Wall St hedge fund execs for laundering money. Then Feds agreed to bury the federal charges. Here, FBI admits Epstein is their informant.
Hardware Security Threats Against #Bluetooth #Mesh Networks

https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8433184/authors#authors

Security risks of Bluetooth

Man-in-the-middle attacks (#MITM):
Bluetooth connections can be susceptible to eavesdropping attacks if strong encryption is not used. Older Bluetooth versions (before 4.2) are particularly risky.

#Bluejacking & #bluesnarfing:
Attackers could try to send unwanted messages (bluejacking) or even steal data from devices (bluesnarfing).

Traceability:
Bluetooth devices often send unique #MAC addresses, which makes users traceable.

Weak standard pairing methods:
Many devices still use simple PINs or confirm connections without verification (e.g. "Just Works" mode with Bluetooth LE).

Risks specific to Bluetooth mesh networks

Mesh networks increase the attack surface:
Each device in the mesh acts as a relay, which means that a compromised device could influence the entire data traffic.

Lack of end-to-end encryption:
If the app/software does not implement additional encryption, messages can be forwarded in plain text.

Decentralized management:
Without centralized control, it is difficult to identify and remove malicious nodes.
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#911 - #Passport vs #BlackBoxπŸ€”

"And now you know why they are called black boxes..."