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There is No Limit to Our Anger
V. M. Molotov
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On the video - Kuibyshevsky district of Donetsk at this moment. A residential building is on fire after a Ukrainian attack. Donetsk, Makeevka, Gorlovka were attacked by the Armed Forces of Ukraine, throughout the day. Armed Ukrainian formations inflict…
Consequences of Ukrainian attacks on the Kuibyshevsky district of Donetsk.

Two civilians were killed. There is an intensive shelling of the Kyiv and Petrovsky districts. They also hit Gorlovka and Makeevka.

-voenkorKotenok
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Destroyed armoured vehicles of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, after one of the arrivals of Russian missiles.


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To ‘blind’ the enemy: mobilised personnel train to operate unmanned aerial vehicles

◽️ Counter-drone training takes place at the Pacific Fleet’s training ground. The military personnel are coached to use jamming stations.

◽️ The training is focused on detection and elimination of drones.

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A banner with a Russophobic slogan was taken away from "Dynamo Kiev" fans during a football match against "AEK" in Cyprus.

Ukrainian sources came up with the version that allegedly the Russian mafia was present in the stands and he did not want to see such posters.😃

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Nazi units of the Ukrainian army are "cleaning up "the local population ,arresting and torturing civilians.Apparently the boy, whose hands they tied in their favorite way, posed a threat to the "territorial integrity of the criminal regime in Kiev".

Location📍: village of Podily in Kupyansky district

-Rustroyka
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Report on Kherson:

The Ukrainian Armed forces did not take active actions during the day, Russian artillery attacked the Ukrainian positions without interruption, rear areas and points of accumulations of reserves were destroyed.

The Aerospace Forces of the Russian Federation actively worked on the accumulation of equipment in the Andreevsky direction.

-Archangel of the Special Forces

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#QuestionAnswerSLG with Gleb Bazov

(
play the music below, while you read)

ConsulTimeout: Good afternoon. Do you believe the statement made by Shoigu was a wise decision? There have been occasional reports that the 300,000 figure has been surpassed. We have also heard news that certain regions were overzealous in handing out mobilization orders. Do you think the figure is actually around 300,000, or is it actually higher / lower? What happens if the mobilized troops are not sufficient to stabilize the front and reconquer the territories annexed by Russia (or any further territories, such as Kharkov, Nikolaev, Odessa). It is also worth noting that Ukraine is once again expanding conscription, and it is well documented that fighters from Western countries are actively participating in the conflict on the ground. What happens if Russia needs to mobilize more troops after announcing that mobilization is over? Would it not be better to just leave it as a vague, ongoing programme that 'goes on in the background'? Thanks in advance.

The statement made by Shoigu was a bureaucratic decision. A bureaucracy, as any other system, will prefer its own rules and dictates over the exigencies of the moment. Every bureaucracy and hierarchy requires accountability, but even the appearance of accountability will do.

Shoigu was reporting the completion of the task that was ordered by his superior—Putin. As it currently stands, roughly 78,000 mobilized men have been deployed to the front already. We have seen the consequence of this deployment in the stupor into which the Ukrainian offensive operations have fallen as of late. Following the Krasny Liman standoff and the Berislav (Krivoy Rog) direction “toad leap” by the Ukrainian forces, no other successes have been reported by the Ukrainian army. It has all been in a see-saw balance. This is what turns of the tide look like. The flow turns into an ebb, and vice-versa.

The reasons for the Russian success in defending the ever-more-desperate attacks by Ukraine—anywhere they can—have been the 78,000 mobilized men that have been arriving at the front. They are the heroes that have turned the tide. Praise be upon their names.

Apart from the 300,000 mobilized, a further over 80,000 volunteers have also signed up to fight in Ukraine. Among these is a number of actual military recruitment officers that oversaw the mobilization effort. Individuals that saw others being sent to the front have also voluntarily gone there. There are thousands of managers, government workers and officials, and a vast number of common folk that have gone to war. Because they believe in ridding the world of the scourge of fascism.

The actual figure of the mobilized is 300,000 and could likely be more. If the Russian bureaucracy is good at anything, it is good at exceeding the Plan, Stakhanov-style. It likes neither underperforming (and if it does, it hides it), nor performing at the exact level required. The extra 80,000 are on top and above. Some of those have joined volunteer or mercenary battalions, like Strelkov’s. Others are being allocated to the Russian army units that need them the most.

Russia will go through waves of mobilization over the coming year. There will be at least two more, bringing the overall number of Russian servicemen to nearly 1,000,000. The will not happen only if the unthinkable happens: a (shameful) peace or a ceasefire. Neither one will be allowed by the West.The current mobilization effort—if stretched—might be enough to complete the liberation of Donbass and the taking of Nikolayev, although the latter is speculative and would only happen if serious mistakes are made by the Ukrainian General Staff in the Kherson theatre. But the 380k+ will be enough to turn the tide. Catastrophic mistakes by Ukraine aside, the current additionally-mobilized force would not be enough to take Zaporozhye (in addition to Nikolayev and Donbass), and, for that reason at least, mobilization would have to continue.

(continued in the next post)

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(continued from previous post)

Would it have been better to leave the mobilization open? No. Russia is not a place where these kinds of decisions will be hidden. It is better to be honest with everyone about the demands of the war. I am categorically against the fact that this mobilization was called “partial.” I believe it should have been declared honestly as the mobilization that will be required to finish this war with victory. That means repeating it as necessary. Characterizing it as partial was a bureaucratic decision that paid heed to the need to segment government action into workable chunks.

Victory, on the other hand, cannot be segmented. It will need to be taken whole. Announcing that new waves of mobilization are necessary is fine, so long as the previous waves lead to success. There is no need to make it a long-term murky program. Honesty is key—if the Russian people are given the explanation for why new mobilization is necessary, they will accept its importance.

The average lifespan of a Ukrainian mobilized recruit now is approximately 10 days—from the time he is grabbed off the street to the time he falls on the battlefield. Foreign mercenaries—which by and large have become regular Polish and Romanian (and other NATO countries’) troops masquerading as “volunteers”—loath the idea of being used as cannon fodder and behave as regular colonial expeditionary forces. I am not concerned—just like I was never, and still am not concerned with HIMARS and the like—with these. The only reason for the reversal of fortunes for the Russian Army has been the lack of troops, of infantry. This is Russia’s war to lose, and to win.

With the arrival of new mobilized men at the front, the key aspect of the equation has changed. Let’s see the outcome within a month.

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Military expert Boris Rozhin on the highlights of Russia's special military operation in Ukraine as of 22.54 Moscow time on 28.10.2022 specifically for Voenkor Kotenok Z @voenkorKotenok channel:

1. Donetsk direction.

The fighting for Pervomayskoye continues. The pace of advancement is low. Attempts of enemy counterattacks near DAP and Vremyevka are repulsed.
There is no change in the area of Marinka. Basically here prevail purely positional trends. The enemy also continues to shell the Donetsk agglomeration.

2. Artemivsk direction.

Fighting for the fortification in Opytne continues. The settlement itself is under the AFU control.
Fighting continues in the industrial zone on the eastern outskirts of Artemivsk. An asphalt plant near Veselyaya Dolina is controlled by the Wagner PMC.
The enemy has undertaken limited counterattacks in the Kurdyumovka area using reserves amassed in Chasov Yar. Changes to the front line are minimal here.

3. Soledar-Siversk.

The front in this location had completely turned to positional warfare. The pace of advancement in Soledar is low. The enemy periodically counterattacks north of Soledar.
Our forces are pressing on Belogorovka.
There are positional battles near Sporny.
The AFU has not yet given up hope of attempting to break through to the Lisichansk refinery and Novodruzhsk.

4. Svatovo-Kreminnaya.

In the Krasnoliman direction there is fighting in the area of Terny and Torskoye. The enemy has strengthened its grouping here.
Torskoye is under the control of AFU.
The enemy has not abandoned its plans to move towards the Svatovo-Kreminnaya route. To the west and north-west, fighting continues. In some areas our troops slightly displaced the AFU, but in general the main task there consists in stabilize the front line so far, as the enemy continues trying to break through the front to the north-west of Svatovo using the available reserves.

5. Kherson direction.

The enemy launched a number of attacks in the Krivoy Rog and Nikopol directions, had no success and suffered losses. Overall, the situation on the front line is still quite stable, despite rumours of a possible withdrawal of Russian troops behind the Dnieper River.
The AFU command claims that Russia, on the contrary, is preparing Kherson for defence.

-voenkorKotenok
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#QuestionAnswerSLG with Gleb Bazov

rasputin robson
: I’m British but I've studied Russia for nearly 20 years, it started with my love of military aircraft & I've always found the Russian aircraft to be a mixture of beauty & very practical for their given job. This snowballed into learning about the Russian military. The many cultures & areas of Russia. Of course, this led me to be totally aware of my government who I have never had any time for & the other western nations’ attitude toward Russia. I was well aware of the actions in the West leading up to Maidan. Like anyone else with any morals, I've been disgusted at the western countries actions & to be honest its embarrassing being British today. I'd like to ask you, do you realise the amount of support Russia has amongst the civilian populations in the west?

Thank you, brother. I will be frank. It is hard to conceive of the Western public’s support for Russia—even though there is no doubt that this support is vast—because the support has been forced underground. Russians do not see it. Fear has driven expression of individual (and group) opinion into hiding in Western societies—societies that are self-avowed advocates of the freedom of expression. This is not a question of democracy—majority rule is inherently in line with the suppression of minority opinion—it is a matter of hypocrisy that is even more fundamental. The societies that have purported to carry the “European man’s burden” of enlightenment to the rest of the world are the ones where the notion of freedom of thought is disappearing most rapidly.

As a Communist, I am not fussed over these details—this is to be expected, the capitalist system has no other fate than fascism. However, you ask me whether Russians are aware of the support they have in the West. They no longer are. They feel betrayed: After years of trying to work with societies that have now turned on them; after decades of sponsoring the European economic miracle with cheap hydrocarbons; after an eternity of hearing that they are welcome—they no longer are.

Those who support Russia and the Russian people—the Russian people who, like me, were brought up in Soviet times on the ideal of brotherhood and sistership with every other common person of the world—must rise up and show that support. Organization, education, change. Mass change. If Russia’s supporters do not make this—relatively minor—sacrifice of actually making an effort to express their views and opinions (freedom of expression purportedly being the fundamental right of a Western individual), then the Russian peoples will not turn back to them. The sacrifice can only go so far.

I speak as a Russian person in the West, and my fate is far lighter than those who face the brunt of Western aggression in Russia proper. What you may hear from them may be even less conciliatory.

rasputin robson: I know this support doesn't mean much to the brave men fighting the fascists. But it must be good to know, western compulsive lying politicians repeating "the whole world is against Russia" is complete fantasy & the real truth of the matter is the opposite & the whole world is with Russia. It says a lot when not a single western politician dare try & get their citizens views on giving aid to the fascists. Thanks for taking the time for doing this it's much appreciated. ,The truthful & morally correct side. Russia has become the champion of the citizens of the world. Russia has become something in the hearts & minds of the citizens of the world.

It is. This support means a great deal. Everything. Write to the soldiers. Post on forums. Organize, educate, change the tide. You all—Russia’s support in the West—are our family, just like the rest of the world, the world that supports Russia, the world that will be with Russia and the human community in the world to come. It is the West’s choice now whether they wish to join. Please do. Russia and Russians welcome you into that future. Just like we welcome every other people in this world.

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#QuestionAnswerSLG with Gleb Bazov

ioan
: Hello, is the Russian military able to destroy Starlink satellites?

Thank you for the question. I will start with some physics: The closer the object is to Earth—the closer its orbit—the faster the required orbital velocity. It simply moves quicker and is harder to hit.

Now, on the one hand, this may be irrelevant, because any projectile that has to reach a satellite in orbit may have to course-correct, depending on the exigencies of the launch sequence (though, usually, course-correction is not required).

On the other hand, the closer the object is to Earth, the more it behaves as a rapidly-moving target rather than as a predictable satellite the trajectory of which can be calculated with precision and intercepted with ease. Think of it this way: If intercepting satellites were an impossible task, then deploying satellites to a specific orbit would have been a priori impossible.

So, we have very fast moving objects. Does this actually matter, in the end? Military satellites are usually anywhere between 950 and 2000 km above the Earth surface. The orbital velocity of a Starlink satellite, at 340 km above sea level (at the lowest), is as much as 7.70 km/s. The orbital velocity of a military satellite at 950 km above sea level is approximately 7.40 km/s, climbing down to approximately 6.90 km/s at the orbit of 2000 km. Significant changes for an Earth-bound observer, but inconsequential for a targeting and missile strike system.

The disadvantage of most satellites is the inability to change direction. Unlike hypersonic warheads and missiles now possessed by Russia—which can change direction at hypersonic velocities—satellites generally do and need to stick to a specific orbit. Deviate from that orbit and the observation window assigned to that satellite is gone. The satellite is useless. Some satellites may be able to return to their trajectory after course-correction but doing it more than once would likely exhaust the energy reserves for a repeat performance. Satellites simply do not carry enough energy potential to conduct the complicated and repeated course adjustments necessary to avoid being shot down.

So, the fact that the Starlink satellites move faster does not make them immune. If Russia has the capability of striking down orbital targets, it does not matter whether Starlink or regular military satellites are involved. What is Starlink’s advantage?

Numerousness. Starlink satellites operate as a swarm. It is the major complaint that astronomers have against them—they simply pollute the skies. Destroying one or several would not destroy the swarm. And that is their biggest advantage. Given Russia’s advanced air defence technology, such as S-400 and S-500, and the upcoming S-600 and S-700 (neither of which is simply a prototype any longer), the fact that Russia can bring down satellites is not in question. Bringing down swarms of satellites, however—swarms of Starlinks—may be considerably harder. New (or well-forgotten-old) types of warheads may be necessary, incorporating shrapnel or fast-moving fragments to attack entire swarms of satellites at once. The difficulty, of course, is that shrapnel in orbit is a very unfortunate thing…

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#QuestionAnswerSLG with Gleb Bazov ioan: Hello, is the Russian military able to destroy Starlink satellites? Thank you for the question. I will start with some physics: The closer the object is to Earth—the closer its orbit—the faster the required orbital…
And further to the answer above, there is no laser in existence—in my opinion and to my knowledge—that can disable a satellite in orbit. Neither Russia, nor anyone else has such a device. Peresvet, if the rumours thereof are true, and if it can target and affect satellites, is likely a device capable of dazzling, but not blinding them. In other words, the difference is between temporarily blinding a spy satellite and disabling its optical systems altogether. The latter possibility remains very speculative.

Even in targeting UAVs and drones, laser systems remain highly sensitive to atmospheric conditions. Fog, rain, snow, cloud cover, etc. drastically reduce their effectiveness. In addition, merely consider the distances: A laser beam generated on Earth would hit the Moon's area of approximately 6.5 kilometers in diametre. In other words, the intensity of a laser beam is reduced drastically with distance. Now, at 340km, the intensity and the focus of the laser beam—provided the atmospheric conditions permit—remains a lot more consistent.

So, perhaps, if Peresvet is real, then Starlink satellites may well be the perfect target for the system. However, the sheer number of Starlink satellites—and the fact that each satellite is unlikely to be disabled, though it may be rendered ineffective temporarily—may be the answer to any such threat.

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"Anti-Satellite Sattellites will happen at some point."

Absolutely. In fact, Russia is already rumoured to have such devices, and has been rumoured to have them for a number of decades, dating back to Soviet Union. Whatever they are, however, these devices remain too few, for the moment, to mount a serious rebuttal to the entire satellite network currently in space.

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May I ask for a moment of silence. I am going to silence the Slavyangrad Chat for 5 minutes.

Alex is Slavayngrad’s comrade since 2016. His death is an incredible loss. Please keep this Hero of Donbass in your prayers.

Peace be Unto You, Alex.

Via con Dios, Alexis Castillo.

Gleb, Gracchus, Nahia
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#QuestionAnswerSLG with Gleb Bazov

Nikolaos
: What is your opinion about the fate of Odessa? What are the possible scenarios for Odessa you have in mind? I live for the day to see Odessa under Russian control but anyway, if after the end of the SMO it remains under ukrainian control will the there be at least care from the Russian state for for pre - russian population of Odessa? Thank you in advance. All Odessites are very worried for our city.

As Odessites should be. One is not a true Odessite if one can leave Odessa behind—no matter how some Odessites try to portray themselves as unattached and cosmopolitan citizens of the world. It works about as well as any Russian trying to live in a foreign land. We do well, we integrate, we blend in, but there is a yearning, a near-sickness, best described by some of Russia’s most famous émigré authors—a Russian’s wish to return to his Motherland.

This is why—not national pride, not ethnic belonging, not some nationalist ambition—Russians of all creeds, ethnicities, and colours yearn for Russia to be made whole. The notion of Russia as a single entity, whether as the USSR, or, for some, as the Empire (though I think that even this “Empire” is something very different than what an empire has always been understood to be in the West), is paramount to a Russian mind.

It may date to something as basic as faith and religion. The foundational and core deity of the Russian Slavic religion was always the Motherland—the Earth herself—which encompassed all those who lived on the vast stretches the ancient Russian Slavs saw as their homeland. The deity of the Slavs was always of the inclusive kind.

This brings me to Odessa. What will happen to it? Odessa has suffered enough. She cannot be allowed to remain in the hands of the Nazi Ukrainian regime. We must never forget or forgive what happened 8 years, 5 months, and 26 days ago. The modern-day Khatyn that took place in Odessa on May 2, 2014 was, like the fate of Donbass, the catalyst for the Russian intervention in Ukraine.

Russia did not have enough muscle to accomplish the liberation of Odessa. This is now changing. Some commentators believe that Putin’s speech at Valdai signalled that the liberation of Odessa is on the table, and may come earlier than expected, with a new plan to cut Ukraine off from all Western supplies by accomplishing a twin offensive in Western Ukraine and along the southern coast, toward Odessa and Pridnestrovye.

More will need to happen before this can take place. Russia will need to call up at least another wave of the mobilized before an operation in the direction of Odessa can become possible—or Ukraine would have to collapse in the interim.

There is the unlikely possibility that the liberation of Odessa would have to wait for the next leg of the military conflict, after a temporary ceasefire. I do not think this is likely. The present conflict will run until Russian victory—because no one in the world will allow Russia to slow down until she rescues her children.

In terms of prognosis, Odessa will not be liberated until at the earliest the second half of 2022. However, as Russia has shown with Kherson and other places, all those from Odessa who wish to be with Russia will be welcomed, saved, helped. Russia has been bringing the horror of what was done to Odessa to the attention of the world community for years. This will not change.

However long it takes to liberate Odessa, I expect that Russian programs to enable Ukrainian nationals to settle in Russia and obtain Russian citizenship—programs that began almost as early as the SMO itself—will continue and expand. I want more—for Odessites to leave safely in the own homecity—but this basic minimum will never go away.

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#QuestionAnswerSLG with Gleb Bazov

Szzk
: Hello. I want to ask about mobilization and future of Russia's current and next generation's will to defend the country. This below is the headline of a long post from Miroslav of Slavyangard on Cctober 9. He talks about the dilemma of mobilization decision’s timeless hit to youth, which is unprepared ideologically.

"Intelligentsia Consensus To Depoliticize the Youth Resulted In A Social Shock Upon Mobilisation: A Weekend Sermon Dedicated to The Mobilized"

I've read some columns in Russian media from people who have an influence on the Russian left accordingly to translator. They wrote about how liberalism and selfishness have taken over society ideologically through 2000's. And how is that notion's road opened by the hands of govs. And how this affects mobilization now.

Now war is going in favor of Russia. And looks like it will end so.

My question is that: Next war(s) will be huge, against bigger enemies, NATO obviously, may last long years, may need bigger sacrifices. Will Russia be able to provide their generations-society with patriotism, along with ammunitions and else like Soviets has been able to do in Great Patriotic War?

I ask this question even though I consider in war you learn very quickly.

There is a large layer of the youth and young people in Russia that is not visible from the surface. The youth and young people who join volunteer organizations, who organize collection drives to buy supplies for the Russian Army, who write and fight for the right to express their patriotism and their antifascism.

A number of stories have come across my desk in the past months. A story of a journalism student at the Moscow State University—a liberal capitalist hellhole dominated by comprador intellectuals and the spawn of sellout elites—he was castigated and marginalized. But he never gave up, and his plight evoked the support of patriotic forces in the Russian society. He stuck through the worst of it.

There are student organizations currently reaching out to the students of Kherson, Zaporozhye, and Donbass to establish ties and exchange programs with them. There are young people who write in support of the antifascist and patriotic goals of the Russian campaign in Ukraine on Telegram, in blogs, in articles, and so forth.

The problem is that the most visible young people in Russia (particularly to those outside of Russia)—as elsewhere—are those who are in it for themselves. Those who enjoy the profit opportunities the nihilism of our digital world offers. Also the apathetic ones, the ones who were converted by the Western liberal model that the Russian education system had adopted.

Those are the people most visible. The ones who put the interests of others first work in the background, and shy away from self-promotion. For better, or, more likely, for worse. All of us with loftier goals would do well to think of self-promotion from time to time. Every revolutionary is a self-promoter. How successful a revolutionary is often depends on the quality of that self-promotion.

The society as a whole had also dived deep into the consumerist Western model. That will change, with time, as Russia is forced to contend with the fact that the West does not like to share its models.

However, all of this will be hard. It will take years. The journey has just begun. The war will not affect the young people—the mobilization does not include them. However, the mobilization of the economy around them will. And the mobilization of the political system will be key. If the political elites promote the patriotic young people to positions of power, this will change everything. If they do not, then Russia has lost the war from the inside. I don’t believe it has.

The potential is there. It is up to Russia to make sure that it is exploited the way it should be.

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#QuestionAnswerSLG with Gleb Bazov

Lucky Strike
: Do you believe that with the arrival of the mobilized men, Russia will go to the offensive? Would it do it in Winter, or next year?

(Photo: Germans vs. "General Frost")

I expect Russia to engage in partial and limited counter-offensive operations by mid-November. By that point, the larger part of the mobilized force will have been deployed to the Ukrainian conflict zone and will have freed up the active front-line troops for other tasks. Depending on whether troops in specific areas need R&R, the counter-offensive operations in these areas will either begin around mid-November or in December.

I do not believe that the Russian counter-offensive actions will be in any way delayed by the coming winter. The Russian Army is used to fighting in winter. It is mid-late fall and late spring that are the most difficult periods in the former USSR, because of weather and terrain limitations.

Full-fledged counter-offensive operations, in my opinion, will depend on two elements: sufficiency of troops and Ukraine’s problems. If Ukraine finds itself with a depleted force due to idiotic attacks on Russian reinforced positions, and Russia manages to deploy enough mobilized troops before the end of the year, then we may see more robust counter-offensive action.

However, if Ukraine pulls back now and manages to finish its latest mobilization drive, and if Russia delays with mass deployment of reserves, then we may see a stalemate until early 2023. Frankly, as things stand now, neither side has the capacity to attack. However, Russia at least has the capacity to mount enough troops for an attack, I don’t think Ukraine does.

So, in conclusion, limited counter-offensive operations by mid-November. With luck and success, full-fledged counter-offensive by end of 2022 or late winter 2023. If Russia conducts another mobilization wave soon, then everything changes and the schedule speeds up a lot.

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