#QuestionAnswerSLG with Gleb Bazov
Nikolaos: What is your opinion about the fate of Odessa? What are the possible scenarios for Odessa you have in mind? I live for the day to see Odessa under Russian control but anyway, if after the end of the SMO it remains under ukrainian control will the there be at least care from the Russian state for for pre - russian population of Odessa? Thank you in advance. All Odessites are very worried for our city.
As Odessites should be. One is not a true Odessite if one can leave Odessa behind—no matter how some Odessites try to portray themselves as unattached and cosmopolitan citizens of the world. It works about as well as any Russian trying to live in a foreign land. We do well, we integrate, we blend in, but there is a yearning, a near-sickness, best described by some of Russia’s most famous émigré authors—a Russian’s wish to return to his Motherland.
This is why—not national pride, not ethnic belonging, not some nationalist ambition—Russians of all creeds, ethnicities, and colours yearn for Russia to be made whole. The notion of Russia as a single entity, whether as the USSR, or, for some, as the Empire (though I think that even this “Empire” is something very different than what an empire has always been understood to be in the West), is paramount to a Russian mind.
It may date to something as basic as faith and religion. The foundational and core deity of the Russian Slavic religion was always the Motherland—the Earth herself—which encompassed all those who lived on the vast stretches the ancient Russian Slavs saw as their homeland. The deity of the Slavs was always of the inclusive kind.
This brings me to Odessa. What will happen to it? Odessa has suffered enough. She cannot be allowed to remain in the hands of the Nazi Ukrainian regime. We must never forget or forgive what happened 8 years, 5 months, and 26 days ago. The modern-day Khatyn that took place in Odessa on May 2, 2014 was, like the fate of Donbass, the catalyst for the Russian intervention in Ukraine.
Russia did not have enough muscle to accomplish the liberation of Odessa. This is now changing. Some commentators believe that Putin’s speech at Valdai signalled that the liberation of Odessa is on the table, and may come earlier than expected, with a new plan to cut Ukraine off from all Western supplies by accomplishing a twin offensive in Western Ukraine and along the southern coast, toward Odessa and Pridnestrovye.
More will need to happen before this can take place. Russia will need to call up at least another wave of the mobilized before an operation in the direction of Odessa can become possible—or Ukraine would have to collapse in the interim.
There is the unlikely possibility that the liberation of Odessa would have to wait for the next leg of the military conflict, after a temporary ceasefire. I do not think this is likely. The present conflict will run until Russian victory—because no one in the world will allow Russia to slow down until she rescues her children.
In terms of prognosis, Odessa will not be liberated until at the earliest the second half of 2022. However, as Russia has shown with Kherson and other places, all those from Odessa who wish to be with Russia will be welcomed, saved, helped. Russia has been bringing the horror of what was done to Odessa to the attention of the world community for years. This will not change.
However long it takes to liberate Odessa, I expect that Russian programs to enable Ukrainian nationals to settle in Russia and obtain Russian citizenship—programs that began almost as early as the SMO itself—will continue and expand. I want more—for Odessites to leave safely in the own homecity—but this basic minimum will never go away.
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Nikolaos: What is your opinion about the fate of Odessa? What are the possible scenarios for Odessa you have in mind? I live for the day to see Odessa under Russian control but anyway, if after the end of the SMO it remains under ukrainian control will the there be at least care from the Russian state for for pre - russian population of Odessa? Thank you in advance. All Odessites are very worried for our city.
As Odessites should be. One is not a true Odessite if one can leave Odessa behind—no matter how some Odessites try to portray themselves as unattached and cosmopolitan citizens of the world. It works about as well as any Russian trying to live in a foreign land. We do well, we integrate, we blend in, but there is a yearning, a near-sickness, best described by some of Russia’s most famous émigré authors—a Russian’s wish to return to his Motherland.
This is why—not national pride, not ethnic belonging, not some nationalist ambition—Russians of all creeds, ethnicities, and colours yearn for Russia to be made whole. The notion of Russia as a single entity, whether as the USSR, or, for some, as the Empire (though I think that even this “Empire” is something very different than what an empire has always been understood to be in the West), is paramount to a Russian mind.
It may date to something as basic as faith and religion. The foundational and core deity of the Russian Slavic religion was always the Motherland—the Earth herself—which encompassed all those who lived on the vast stretches the ancient Russian Slavs saw as their homeland. The deity of the Slavs was always of the inclusive kind.
This brings me to Odessa. What will happen to it? Odessa has suffered enough. She cannot be allowed to remain in the hands of the Nazi Ukrainian regime. We must never forget or forgive what happened 8 years, 5 months, and 26 days ago. The modern-day Khatyn that took place in Odessa on May 2, 2014 was, like the fate of Donbass, the catalyst for the Russian intervention in Ukraine.
Russia did not have enough muscle to accomplish the liberation of Odessa. This is now changing. Some commentators believe that Putin’s speech at Valdai signalled that the liberation of Odessa is on the table, and may come earlier than expected, with a new plan to cut Ukraine off from all Western supplies by accomplishing a twin offensive in Western Ukraine and along the southern coast, toward Odessa and Pridnestrovye.
More will need to happen before this can take place. Russia will need to call up at least another wave of the mobilized before an operation in the direction of Odessa can become possible—or Ukraine would have to collapse in the interim.
There is the unlikely possibility that the liberation of Odessa would have to wait for the next leg of the military conflict, after a temporary ceasefire. I do not think this is likely. The present conflict will run until Russian victory—because no one in the world will allow Russia to slow down until she rescues her children.
In terms of prognosis, Odessa will not be liberated until at the earliest the second half of 2022. However, as Russia has shown with Kherson and other places, all those from Odessa who wish to be with Russia will be welcomed, saved, helped. Russia has been bringing the horror of what was done to Odessa to the attention of the world community for years. This will not change.
However long it takes to liberate Odessa, I expect that Russian programs to enable Ukrainian nationals to settle in Russia and obtain Russian citizenship—programs that began almost as early as the SMO itself—will continue and expand. I want more—for Odessites to leave safely in the own homecity—but this basic minimum will never go away.
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#QuestionAnswerSLG with Gleb Bazov
Szzk: Hello. I want to ask about mobilization and future of Russia's current and next generation's will to defend the country. This below is the headline of a long post from Miroslav of Slavyangard on Cctober 9. He talks about the dilemma of mobilization decision’s timeless hit to youth, which is unprepared ideologically.
"Intelligentsia Consensus To Depoliticize the Youth Resulted In A Social Shock Upon Mobilisation: A Weekend Sermon Dedicated to The Mobilized"
I've read some columns in Russian media from people who have an influence on the Russian left accordingly to translator. They wrote about how liberalism and selfishness have taken over society ideologically through 2000's. And how is that notion's road opened by the hands of govs. And how this affects mobilization now.
Now war is going in favor of Russia. And looks like it will end so.
My question is that: Next war(s) will be huge, against bigger enemies, NATO obviously, may last long years, may need bigger sacrifices. Will Russia be able to provide their generations-society with patriotism, along with ammunitions and else like Soviets has been able to do in Great Patriotic War?
I ask this question even though I consider in war you learn very quickly.
There is a large layer of the youth and young people in Russia that is not visible from the surface. The youth and young people who join volunteer organizations, who organize collection drives to buy supplies for the Russian Army, who write and fight for the right to express their patriotism and their antifascism.
A number of stories have come across my desk in the past months. A story of a journalism student at the Moscow State University—a liberal capitalist hellhole dominated by comprador intellectuals and the spawn of sellout elites—he was castigated and marginalized. But he never gave up, and his plight evoked the support of patriotic forces in the Russian society. He stuck through the worst of it.
There are student organizations currently reaching out to the students of Kherson, Zaporozhye, and Donbass to establish ties and exchange programs with them. There are young people who write in support of the antifascist and patriotic goals of the Russian campaign in Ukraine on Telegram, in blogs, in articles, and so forth.
The problem is that the most visible young people in Russia (particularly to those outside of Russia)—as elsewhere—are those who are in it for themselves. Those who enjoy the profit opportunities the nihilism of our digital world offers. Also the apathetic ones, the ones who were converted by the Western liberal model that the Russian education system had adopted.
Those are the people most visible. The ones who put the interests of others first work in the background, and shy away from self-promotion. For better, or, more likely, for worse. All of us with loftier goals would do well to think of self-promotion from time to time. Every revolutionary is a self-promoter. How successful a revolutionary is often depends on the quality of that self-promotion.
The society as a whole had also dived deep into the consumerist Western model. That will change, with time, as Russia is forced to contend with the fact that the West does not like to share its models.
However, all of this will be hard. It will take years. The journey has just begun. The war will not affect the young people—the mobilization does not include them. However, the mobilization of the economy around them will. And the mobilization of the political system will be key. If the political elites promote the patriotic young people to positions of power, this will change everything. If they do not, then Russia has lost the war from the inside. I don’t believe it has.
The potential is there. It is up to Russia to make sure that it is exploited the way it should be.
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Szzk: Hello. I want to ask about mobilization and future of Russia's current and next generation's will to defend the country. This below is the headline of a long post from Miroslav of Slavyangard on Cctober 9. He talks about the dilemma of mobilization decision’s timeless hit to youth, which is unprepared ideologically.
"Intelligentsia Consensus To Depoliticize the Youth Resulted In A Social Shock Upon Mobilisation: A Weekend Sermon Dedicated to The Mobilized"
I've read some columns in Russian media from people who have an influence on the Russian left accordingly to translator. They wrote about how liberalism and selfishness have taken over society ideologically through 2000's. And how is that notion's road opened by the hands of govs. And how this affects mobilization now.
Now war is going in favor of Russia. And looks like it will end so.
My question is that: Next war(s) will be huge, against bigger enemies, NATO obviously, may last long years, may need bigger sacrifices. Will Russia be able to provide their generations-society with patriotism, along with ammunitions and else like Soviets has been able to do in Great Patriotic War?
I ask this question even though I consider in war you learn very quickly.
There is a large layer of the youth and young people in Russia that is not visible from the surface. The youth and young people who join volunteer organizations, who organize collection drives to buy supplies for the Russian Army, who write and fight for the right to express their patriotism and their antifascism.
A number of stories have come across my desk in the past months. A story of a journalism student at the Moscow State University—a liberal capitalist hellhole dominated by comprador intellectuals and the spawn of sellout elites—he was castigated and marginalized. But he never gave up, and his plight evoked the support of patriotic forces in the Russian society. He stuck through the worst of it.
There are student organizations currently reaching out to the students of Kherson, Zaporozhye, and Donbass to establish ties and exchange programs with them. There are young people who write in support of the antifascist and patriotic goals of the Russian campaign in Ukraine on Telegram, in blogs, in articles, and so forth.
The problem is that the most visible young people in Russia (particularly to those outside of Russia)—as elsewhere—are those who are in it for themselves. Those who enjoy the profit opportunities the nihilism of our digital world offers. Also the apathetic ones, the ones who were converted by the Western liberal model that the Russian education system had adopted.
Those are the people most visible. The ones who put the interests of others first work in the background, and shy away from self-promotion. For better, or, more likely, for worse. All of us with loftier goals would do well to think of self-promotion from time to time. Every revolutionary is a self-promoter. How successful a revolutionary is often depends on the quality of that self-promotion.
The society as a whole had also dived deep into the consumerist Western model. That will change, with time, as Russia is forced to contend with the fact that the West does not like to share its models.
However, all of this will be hard. It will take years. The journey has just begun. The war will not affect the young people—the mobilization does not include them. However, the mobilization of the economy around them will. And the mobilization of the political system will be key. If the political elites promote the patriotic young people to positions of power, this will change everything. If they do not, then Russia has lost the war from the inside. I don’t believe it has.
The potential is there. It is up to Russia to make sure that it is exploited the way it should be.
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#QuestionAnswerSLG with Gleb Bazov
Lucky Strike: Do you believe that with the arrival of the mobilized men, Russia will go to the offensive? Would it do it in Winter, or next year?
(Photo: Germans vs. "General Frost")
I expect Russia to engage in partial and limited counter-offensive operations by mid-November. By that point, the larger part of the mobilized force will have been deployed to the Ukrainian conflict zone and will have freed up the active front-line troops for other tasks. Depending on whether troops in specific areas need R&R, the counter-offensive operations in these areas will either begin around mid-November or in December.
I do not believe that the Russian counter-offensive actions will be in any way delayed by the coming winter. The Russian Army is used to fighting in winter. It is mid-late fall and late spring that are the most difficult periods in the former USSR, because of weather and terrain limitations.
Full-fledged counter-offensive operations, in my opinion, will depend on two elements: sufficiency of troops and Ukraine’s problems. If Ukraine finds itself with a depleted force due to idiotic attacks on Russian reinforced positions, and Russia manages to deploy enough mobilized troops before the end of the year, then we may see more robust counter-offensive action.
However, if Ukraine pulls back now and manages to finish its latest mobilization drive, and if Russia delays with mass deployment of reserves, then we may see a stalemate until early 2023. Frankly, as things stand now, neither side has the capacity to attack. However, Russia at least has the capacity to mount enough troops for an attack, I don’t think Ukraine does.
So, in conclusion, limited counter-offensive operations by mid-November. With luck and success, full-fledged counter-offensive by end of 2022 or late winter 2023. If Russia conducts another mobilization wave soon, then everything changes and the schedule speeds up a lot.
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Lucky Strike: Do you believe that with the arrival of the mobilized men, Russia will go to the offensive? Would it do it in Winter, or next year?
(Photo: Germans vs. "General Frost")
I expect Russia to engage in partial and limited counter-offensive operations by mid-November. By that point, the larger part of the mobilized force will have been deployed to the Ukrainian conflict zone and will have freed up the active front-line troops for other tasks. Depending on whether troops in specific areas need R&R, the counter-offensive operations in these areas will either begin around mid-November or in December.
I do not believe that the Russian counter-offensive actions will be in any way delayed by the coming winter. The Russian Army is used to fighting in winter. It is mid-late fall and late spring that are the most difficult periods in the former USSR, because of weather and terrain limitations.
Full-fledged counter-offensive operations, in my opinion, will depend on two elements: sufficiency of troops and Ukraine’s problems. If Ukraine finds itself with a depleted force due to idiotic attacks on Russian reinforced positions, and Russia manages to deploy enough mobilized troops before the end of the year, then we may see more robust counter-offensive action.
However, if Ukraine pulls back now and manages to finish its latest mobilization drive, and if Russia delays with mass deployment of reserves, then we may see a stalemate until early 2023. Frankly, as things stand now, neither side has the capacity to attack. However, Russia at least has the capacity to mount enough troops for an attack, I don’t think Ukraine does.
So, in conclusion, limited counter-offensive operations by mid-November. With luck and success, full-fledged counter-offensive by end of 2022 or late winter 2023. If Russia conducts another mobilization wave soon, then everything changes and the schedule speeds up a lot.
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#QuestionAnswerSLG with Gleb Bazov
Dirty-minded Harry: Can we expect an intensification of attacks on Hohol infrastructure?
Not as much an intensification, as maintenance of the same level of intensity. The Russian Army is starting to run out of electrical grid targets to hit. Eventually, cascade failures will start taking care of the grid by themselves, without the need for any additional munitions.
Once that level is reached, the next stage would be ensuring that the Ukrainians are unable to repair the grid. As it stands, it would take Ukraine 3-4 months to restore (with enough funding and parts) what has been lost. One does not need to throw the entire nation into the stone age—only make it so unbearable for the people on a day-to-day basis that they reject Zelensky’s regime’s attempt to ration electricity for common people in favour of feeding the available energy to transportation and industry. And, if no one objects, keep hitting until they do.
Even now, Ukraine is already transferring its rail transportation to internal combustion locomotives. Ukraine has very few of those. Only about 15% of Ukraine’s regular transportation was done using ICE locomotives—the rest was electric-powered (hey, betcha all did not know the USSR cared for the environment, did you?). Now this ICE system is going to be strained beyond its ability to sustain necessary deliveries.
Even now, Ukraine’s efforts in the Kherson front are significantly hampered by lack of shells, missiles, and equipment—because of the destruction wrought by Russia on Ukraine’s electric-powered transportation system. This is part of what keep Kherson safe.
Russia, as it continues to run out of viable infrastructure targets will, hopefully, remember that other targets, such as fuel depots and major industries, as well as bridges, exist. I do not expect intensification of the strikes. I do expect that they need to be continued at the present level, for another 2-3 weeks for the effect to be mostly permanent.
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Dirty-minded Harry: Can we expect an intensification of attacks on Hohol infrastructure?
Not as much an intensification, as maintenance of the same level of intensity. The Russian Army is starting to run out of electrical grid targets to hit. Eventually, cascade failures will start taking care of the grid by themselves, without the need for any additional munitions.
Once that level is reached, the next stage would be ensuring that the Ukrainians are unable to repair the grid. As it stands, it would take Ukraine 3-4 months to restore (with enough funding and parts) what has been lost. One does not need to throw the entire nation into the stone age—only make it so unbearable for the people on a day-to-day basis that they reject Zelensky’s regime’s attempt to ration electricity for common people in favour of feeding the available energy to transportation and industry. And, if no one objects, keep hitting until they do.
Even now, Ukraine is already transferring its rail transportation to internal combustion locomotives. Ukraine has very few of those. Only about 15% of Ukraine’s regular transportation was done using ICE locomotives—the rest was electric-powered (hey, betcha all did not know the USSR cared for the environment, did you?). Now this ICE system is going to be strained beyond its ability to sustain necessary deliveries.
Even now, Ukraine’s efforts in the Kherson front are significantly hampered by lack of shells, missiles, and equipment—because of the destruction wrought by Russia on Ukraine’s electric-powered transportation system. This is part of what keep Kherson safe.
Russia, as it continues to run out of viable infrastructure targets will, hopefully, remember that other targets, such as fuel depots and major industries, as well as bridges, exist. I do not expect intensification of the strikes. I do expect that they need to be continued at the present level, for another 2-3 weeks for the effect to be mostly permanent.
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#QuestionAnswerSLG
Adrian: From the 300.000 mobilised, approximately how many will go to the front to effective fight? Thank you!
The specific numbers are known only to the Russian Ministry of Defence. I would hope that most of of the mobilized are inserted into the units that require replenishing. However, this would delay any combat or offensive operations by these units, if the proportion of the mobilized is high enough. Accordingly, there is a temptation to reorganized the front-line units and put the mobilized at the back, in rearguard and defensive operations. This is not an ideal situation. What is required, according to the people at the front, is for the mobilized to be inserted in limited numbers into all units that require restaffing.
One way or another, all the mobilized will eventually see action. Some earlier, others—later. Even with 300-380k currently incoming to the conflict zone, the Russian Army will still be barely match the Ukrainian numbers (after many successive mobilization waves). Accordingly, rotation and battlefield exigencies will likely force all of the mobilized into the fight.
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Adrian: From the 300.000 mobilised, approximately how many will go to the front to effective fight? Thank you!
The specific numbers are known only to the Russian Ministry of Defence. I would hope that most of of the mobilized are inserted into the units that require replenishing. However, this would delay any combat or offensive operations by these units, if the proportion of the mobilized is high enough. Accordingly, there is a temptation to reorganized the front-line units and put the mobilized at the back, in rearguard and defensive operations. This is not an ideal situation. What is required, according to the people at the front, is for the mobilized to be inserted in limited numbers into all units that require restaffing.
One way or another, all the mobilized will eventually see action. Some earlier, others—later. Even with 300-380k currently incoming to the conflict zone, the Russian Army will still be barely match the Ukrainian numbers (after many successive mobilization waves). Accordingly, rotation and battlefield exigencies will likely force all of the mobilized into the fight.
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#QuestionAnswerSLG
—What do you expect from this war Gleb? Will Ukraine will be destroyed? What about Europe?
—What will happen if Russia only take those liberated lands? Is that defeat, if Zelensky stays in power and Ukraine join NATO?
In the event of complete Russian success, Ukraine will likely be left as a rump state, built around one of the regional centres west of Kiev. Putin and the Russian elites have made it patently clear that they have no interest in completely dismantling the Ukrainian state, and they are unlikely to. If so, the rump Ukraine will be a state friendly to Russian interest. If Russia is least successful, then we will see the reconstruction of Novorossiya, with most likely outcome of Novorossiya being a constituent part of Russia.
Europe, on the other hand, will likely experience an implosion. With Poland actively attempting to sabotage the EU from within, the future of the association is in doubt. It may be that the EU will roll back to the boundaries of the original French-German economic unions, or perhaps even suffer a more dramatic collapse, if France goes the way of England. Europe's economic fortunes were built directly on cheap Russian hydrocarbons, and by instigating the current conflict, the US has undermined its primary and key economic opponent in the fight for the domination of the Western block (EU was never viable political or military opposition to the US).
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—What do you expect from this war Gleb? Will Ukraine will be destroyed? What about Europe?
—What will happen if Russia only take those liberated lands? Is that defeat, if Zelensky stays in power and Ukraine join NATO?
In the event of complete Russian success, Ukraine will likely be left as a rump state, built around one of the regional centres west of Kiev. Putin and the Russian elites have made it patently clear that they have no interest in completely dismantling the Ukrainian state, and they are unlikely to. If so, the rump Ukraine will be a state friendly to Russian interest. If Russia is least successful, then we will see the reconstruction of Novorossiya, with most likely outcome of Novorossiya being a constituent part of Russia.
Europe, on the other hand, will likely experience an implosion. With Poland actively attempting to sabotage the EU from within, the future of the association is in doubt. It may be that the EU will roll back to the boundaries of the original French-German economic unions, or perhaps even suffer a more dramatic collapse, if France goes the way of England. Europe's economic fortunes were built directly on cheap Russian hydrocarbons, and by instigating the current conflict, the US has undermined its primary and key economic opponent in the fight for the domination of the Western block (EU was never viable political or military opposition to the US).
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#QuestionAnswerSLG
Tony Z: The TOS heavy flamer is very effective against entrenched troops. The combination of assault troops after a TOS fire shower against a fortified site has been documented sparsely. The pictures of Peski caught my interest. Why is the TOS used so little is it because of expensive missiles or are there few carriers? It is a very terrifying weapon if you are an Ukrainian soldier hiding in a trench. Why don't the RF don't use it more often especially around Andreivka.??
The most likely reason, just as with Terminator tank support vehicles, is that there are not enough of them. These are advanced weapons. They are in limited quantity. Many are being kept in reserve in Russia, to counteract other external threats. As Russian military production ramps up, we should see more of them in the conflict.
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Tony Z: The TOS heavy flamer is very effective against entrenched troops. The combination of assault troops after a TOS fire shower against a fortified site has been documented sparsely. The pictures of Peski caught my interest. Why is the TOS used so little is it because of expensive missiles or are there few carriers? It is a very terrifying weapon if you are an Ukrainian soldier hiding in a trench. Why don't the RF don't use it more often especially around Andreivka.??
The most likely reason, just as with Terminator tank support vehicles, is that there are not enough of them. These are advanced weapons. They are in limited quantity. Many are being kept in reserve in Russia, to counteract other external threats. As Russian military production ramps up, we should see more of them in the conflict.
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#QuestionAnswerSLG 11/11/22 #1
Question From So: Can this SMO can still be won military speaking?
The conflict can indeed be resolved in Russia's favour, provided the changes that have been initiated continue and gather pace.
Command of the military operations has to be centralized in a dedicated apparatus, like the Stavka of the Great Patriotic War. In my opinion, it should be under the direction of General Surovikin, rather than the civilian authorities, and Surovikin, rather than the Ministry of Defence, has to report to the Commander-in-Chief and be responsible for managing the endeavour. I am not aware of a better candidate than Surovikin, but I do not profess to have any better insight than others into the subject of staffing the renewed Stavka. Underperforming career generals and commanders should be sidelined or dismissed and lower-ranking officers, particularly ones with experience in the field of the Ukrainian war, have to be promoted in their stead. All control over the operation should be concentrated in the new command structure.
Russia will need at least two more waves of mobilization, bringing the overall manpower at the front to at least 1.6 million men to successfully prosecute the war across Ukraine and secure victory. No victory for Russia will be possible without taking the fight all the way to the westernmost frontiers of Ukraine. Any partial outcome less than that will simply guarantee that the conflict will remain a simmering cauldron that intermittently explodes. In any event, neither the West, nor the Ukrainian regime will agree to any real armistice, and any ceasefire will be used to rearm Ukraine and prepare to continue the fight—all the way until the Ukrainian state ultimately collapses, by which point NATO countries, Poland, in particular, may choose to become involved.
Russia will need to continue sourcing weaponry from other states, such as Iran, in areas where her own offerings are too expensive, complicated, or insufficient for a general war, rather than an expeditionary conflict. She will need to continue, at the same time, developing her own industrial capacities to substitute this supply, which can never be completely relied on, just as the geopolitical climate and the stability of Russia's partners can never be guaranteed. Russia will need to mobilize industry as well as personnel, meaning that command economy elements will have to be reintroduced and certain parts of the production chains—nationalized.
The Kremlin will need to stop sending conflicting messages to the Russian people, the military, and its friends and allies. In other words, negotiations can be had only from a position of power, when your opponent has all but given up, not when your enemy is eyeing your carotid artery. All diplomacy in relation to this conflict—that in any way touches on this war—must be conducted from the standpoint of military strength, and, if military strength is lacking at any given point, not to be conducted at all until it has been brought back to the necessary level. Diplomacy has to be coordinated directly with the renewed Stavka and Surovikin's staff. This is an existential war, and a war in which the West seeks to destroy Russia. There is no point in negotiating until Russia's survival has been ensured.
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Question From So: Can this SMO can still be won military speaking?
The conflict can indeed be resolved in Russia's favour, provided the changes that have been initiated continue and gather pace.
Command of the military operations has to be centralized in a dedicated apparatus, like the Stavka of the Great Patriotic War. In my opinion, it should be under the direction of General Surovikin, rather than the civilian authorities, and Surovikin, rather than the Ministry of Defence, has to report to the Commander-in-Chief and be responsible for managing the endeavour. I am not aware of a better candidate than Surovikin, but I do not profess to have any better insight than others into the subject of staffing the renewed Stavka. Underperforming career generals and commanders should be sidelined or dismissed and lower-ranking officers, particularly ones with experience in the field of the Ukrainian war, have to be promoted in their stead. All control over the operation should be concentrated in the new command structure.
Russia will need at least two more waves of mobilization, bringing the overall manpower at the front to at least 1.6 million men to successfully prosecute the war across Ukraine and secure victory. No victory for Russia will be possible without taking the fight all the way to the westernmost frontiers of Ukraine. Any partial outcome less than that will simply guarantee that the conflict will remain a simmering cauldron that intermittently explodes. In any event, neither the West, nor the Ukrainian regime will agree to any real armistice, and any ceasefire will be used to rearm Ukraine and prepare to continue the fight—all the way until the Ukrainian state ultimately collapses, by which point NATO countries, Poland, in particular, may choose to become involved.
Russia will need to continue sourcing weaponry from other states, such as Iran, in areas where her own offerings are too expensive, complicated, or insufficient for a general war, rather than an expeditionary conflict. She will need to continue, at the same time, developing her own industrial capacities to substitute this supply, which can never be completely relied on, just as the geopolitical climate and the stability of Russia's partners can never be guaranteed. Russia will need to mobilize industry as well as personnel, meaning that command economy elements will have to be reintroduced and certain parts of the production chains—nationalized.
The Kremlin will need to stop sending conflicting messages to the Russian people, the military, and its friends and allies. In other words, negotiations can be had only from a position of power, when your opponent has all but given up, not when your enemy is eyeing your carotid artery. All diplomacy in relation to this conflict—that in any way touches on this war—must be conducted from the standpoint of military strength, and, if military strength is lacking at any given point, not to be conducted at all until it has been brought back to the necessary level. Diplomacy has to be coordinated directly with the renewed Stavka and Surovikin's staff. This is an existential war, and a war in which the West seeks to destroy Russia. There is no point in negotiating until Russia's survival has been ensured.
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#QuestionAnswerSLG 11/11/22, #2
Question From So: What about Odessa? Can Odessa be taken at this stage?
As for Odessa, for now, the topic is closed. It was always a very long shot to go to Odessa from Kherson. Attempting to take Nikolayev—particularly with the insufficient force that Russia had in the theatre—would have not only failed, but exposed the flank of the Russian grouping to strikes from deep inside Ukrainian territory, where logistics and communications are ever tighter and more compact that they currently are for Ukraine. Russia's supply lines are enormously stretched (along the Crimean "land corridor" and all the way to the Belgorod region), whereas Ukraine can move much quicker because its paths to front lines radiate from the core of the country and are connected amongst themselves as well. Russia, on the other hand, supplies the south from Crimea, the north from Belgorod, and Donbass—from Rostov.
Going for Nikolayev would have exposed the flank of the Russian grouping to a strike from the core of Ukraine, and trying to go further to Odessa from Nikolayev would then have potentially led to a cauldron if the link through Nikolayev were severed. How do you supply the Odessa grouping if the Nikolayev path is cut? Over the sea. Russia has not shown the capacity to conduct such supply operations. It is for that reason as well that Russia would unlikely have been able to mount a naval landing in the Odessa region. It does not appear that the capacity is there—because most of the Russian fleet is cut off by the Dardanelles. Only the Black Sea fleet is active.
So, as before, any offensive toward Odessa would need Kiev, Cherkassy, Kirovograd dealt with. In other words, an offensive from the north is required, to both lay a path toward Odessa and to cut off Western supplies to the core of Ukraine. Simultaneously, a push through Dnepropetrovsk, Zaporozhye, and then Krivoy Rog, onwards to Nikolayev, would secure the path to Odessa. Nothing has changed with the loss of Kherson. Offensives from the north and through the centre were always, in retrospect, necessary for an Odessa operation. Odessa cannot be taken now, but Russia inevitably will have to take Odessa to win this war.
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Question From So: What about Odessa? Can Odessa be taken at this stage?
As for Odessa, for now, the topic is closed. It was always a very long shot to go to Odessa from Kherson. Attempting to take Nikolayev—particularly with the insufficient force that Russia had in the theatre—would have not only failed, but exposed the flank of the Russian grouping to strikes from deep inside Ukrainian territory, where logistics and communications are ever tighter and more compact that they currently are for Ukraine. Russia's supply lines are enormously stretched (along the Crimean "land corridor" and all the way to the Belgorod region), whereas Ukraine can move much quicker because its paths to front lines radiate from the core of the country and are connected amongst themselves as well. Russia, on the other hand, supplies the south from Crimea, the north from Belgorod, and Donbass—from Rostov.
Going for Nikolayev would have exposed the flank of the Russian grouping to a strike from the core of Ukraine, and trying to go further to Odessa from Nikolayev would then have potentially led to a cauldron if the link through Nikolayev were severed. How do you supply the Odessa grouping if the Nikolayev path is cut? Over the sea. Russia has not shown the capacity to conduct such supply operations. It is for that reason as well that Russia would unlikely have been able to mount a naval landing in the Odessa region. It does not appear that the capacity is there—because most of the Russian fleet is cut off by the Dardanelles. Only the Black Sea fleet is active.
So, as before, any offensive toward Odessa would need Kiev, Cherkassy, Kirovograd dealt with. In other words, an offensive from the north is required, to both lay a path toward Odessa and to cut off Western supplies to the core of Ukraine. Simultaneously, a push through Dnepropetrovsk, Zaporozhye, and then Krivoy Rog, onwards to Nikolayev, would secure the path to Odessa. Nothing has changed with the loss of Kherson. Offensives from the north and through the centre were always, in retrospect, necessary for an Odessa operation. Odessa cannot be taken now, but Russia inevitably will have to take Odessa to win this war.
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#QuestionAnswerSLG 11/11/22 #3
Question from Kostas: Hello my friend from Greece continue the good work :the results of retreat of kherson ok is correct but the messages that gives for me :trust has been lost in the local population of the regions, they consider the Russians temporary and now no help to him 2 To the Heroes Russian soldiers does harm to their psychology and morale.3 Why should one go with conscription to the battlefield, when he loses confidence in the leadership, that with the first difficulties the leadership will decide to leave
Response: The leadership has to start correcting the mistakes that were made. The acknowledgement of mistakes came with the appointment of Surovikin and the mounting of the first wave of mobilization. Surovikin's actions in Kherson started correcting the mistakes that made the situation on the right bank of the Dnepr irreparable by as early as June-July. Mobilization should have been ordered then and, had the front been moved back to Nikolayev and Krivoy Rog, the attacks on the logistics and the Dnepr bridges would have had much less effect. They would have been bearable and addressable. Then Russia would have had the ability to plan its northwards operations.
The trust of the local population has been severely damaged. There is no denying that. Nonetheless, it is future actions that can restore this trust. The past is the past. What happens now is what matters. If Kherson is the turning point of the conflict in the south, with first defensive, and then offensive operations successfully following in the Zaporozhye Oblast, then the tide will be turned. In the end, people feel a sense of belonging to their culture, their language, their people. That cannot be taken away. If Russian leadership is able to successfully adapt to the new realities, a lot can be forgiven.
The morale of the troops depends only on what follows next. Continue retreating, especially if the command is weak and uncertain, and disaster follows. Surovikin does not strike me like someone who will dither. He has had to make a very painful decision already, correcting the mistakes of his predecessors. He has a plan, by all appearances and accounts, and the only choice is to follow it. Time will tell. The morale of the army is decimated by failure, but rejuvenated by victory. Give them the chance to win, and the war is yours.
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Question from Kostas: Hello my friend from Greece continue the good work :the results of retreat of kherson ok is correct but the messages that gives for me :trust has been lost in the local population of the regions, they consider the Russians temporary and now no help to him 2 To the Heroes Russian soldiers does harm to their psychology and morale.3 Why should one go with conscription to the battlefield, when he loses confidence in the leadership, that with the first difficulties the leadership will decide to leave
Response: The leadership has to start correcting the mistakes that were made. The acknowledgement of mistakes came with the appointment of Surovikin and the mounting of the first wave of mobilization. Surovikin's actions in Kherson started correcting the mistakes that made the situation on the right bank of the Dnepr irreparable by as early as June-July. Mobilization should have been ordered then and, had the front been moved back to Nikolayev and Krivoy Rog, the attacks on the logistics and the Dnepr bridges would have had much less effect. They would have been bearable and addressable. Then Russia would have had the ability to plan its northwards operations.
The trust of the local population has been severely damaged. There is no denying that. Nonetheless, it is future actions that can restore this trust. The past is the past. What happens now is what matters. If Kherson is the turning point of the conflict in the south, with first defensive, and then offensive operations successfully following in the Zaporozhye Oblast, then the tide will be turned. In the end, people feel a sense of belonging to their culture, their language, their people. That cannot be taken away. If Russian leadership is able to successfully adapt to the new realities, a lot can be forgiven.
The morale of the troops depends only on what follows next. Continue retreating, especially if the command is weak and uncertain, and disaster follows. Surovikin does not strike me like someone who will dither. He has had to make a very painful decision already, correcting the mistakes of his predecessors. He has a plan, by all appearances and accounts, and the only choice is to follow it. Time will tell. The morale of the army is decimated by failure, but rejuvenated by victory. Give them the chance to win, and the war is yours.
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#QuestionAnswerSLG 11/11/22 #4
Question from sadwerkl: What is your opinion on how the conflict will develop in the near future? Will we eventually see a full Russian mobilization and war economy if Russia cannot achieve its aims otherwise?
Response: I see no option for Russia but to continue mobilizing—both her people and her economy. Russia cannot achieve her aims with the limited expeditionary strategy that the Russian military has been employing to date. This is a war. Wars—wars on a country's doorsteps—are fought at the breaking point of concentration and exertion. It is then that they are won. They cannot be won half-heartedly. Expeditionary conflicts, far away from the core, should never be started—they can never be successfully won in the long term, only short-term gains may be secured. Existential conflicts are won by putting everything on the line.
The conflict will now proceeds into a slow phase until the weather freezes the ground. Russia will continue mobilizing, accumulating drones, weapons, heavy equipment, people. Already now the Russian leadership should be concerned with nationalizing and mobilizing parts of the economy required for the war effort. At least partial command economy measures will have to be introduced. The troops—and I expect at least 1.6 million of them will be required—need to be fed, clothed, armed, even entertained. Just days ago I read about a Russian opera singer who was mobilized, but was ultimately transferred to the equivalent of the Army Choir. Troops will need to feel alive while they are at the front. Even elements like this need to be considered.
Considering that Russia faces off with the entire West that's arming Ukraine, Moscow would do well by starting the inevitable—moving the economy to military rails—now. There is no turning back. Just as Strelkov was right when he said that mobilization was inevitable—and might as well do it earlier, before you are forced to by circumstances—so do other types of mobilization have to be considered now. Wartime mobilization does not have to be an economic disaster—it can always be turned, with time, into a boon. Russia can work on developing the industries and professions it has lost over the past decades.
We will continue seeing probing offensives by the Russian army in the Ugledar area. Concentration of troops will be increased along the Zaporozhye line of conflict—by both sides. This is where the next, perhaps decisive battle will be fought. No one in Ukraine cares a damn about Donbass. The positions and fortifications there are defensive—to stall the Russian advance, not to conduct offensive operations. The Ukrainian target will be the Azov coast and Crimea. I expected the Zaporozhye strike earlier (and so did Strelkov), but Ukrainian command decided that it would be satisfied with the more modest Kherson gain. A safer bet. Had they risked it all, we might have been in a much worse situation now. As it stands, Ukraine and the West played it safe—the West because they are playing a longer-term game, Ukraine because of lack of confidence (just consider how long it took them to work up the nerve to enter the abandoned Kherson)—and this may be the decisive advantage that Russia has now.
Time has been gained. Russia will use it wisely.
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Question from sadwerkl: What is your opinion on how the conflict will develop in the near future? Will we eventually see a full Russian mobilization and war economy if Russia cannot achieve its aims otherwise?
Response: I see no option for Russia but to continue mobilizing—both her people and her economy. Russia cannot achieve her aims with the limited expeditionary strategy that the Russian military has been employing to date. This is a war. Wars—wars on a country's doorsteps—are fought at the breaking point of concentration and exertion. It is then that they are won. They cannot be won half-heartedly. Expeditionary conflicts, far away from the core, should never be started—they can never be successfully won in the long term, only short-term gains may be secured. Existential conflicts are won by putting everything on the line.
The conflict will now proceeds into a slow phase until the weather freezes the ground. Russia will continue mobilizing, accumulating drones, weapons, heavy equipment, people. Already now the Russian leadership should be concerned with nationalizing and mobilizing parts of the economy required for the war effort. At least partial command economy measures will have to be introduced. The troops—and I expect at least 1.6 million of them will be required—need to be fed, clothed, armed, even entertained. Just days ago I read about a Russian opera singer who was mobilized, but was ultimately transferred to the equivalent of the Army Choir. Troops will need to feel alive while they are at the front. Even elements like this need to be considered.
Considering that Russia faces off with the entire West that's arming Ukraine, Moscow would do well by starting the inevitable—moving the economy to military rails—now. There is no turning back. Just as Strelkov was right when he said that mobilization was inevitable—and might as well do it earlier, before you are forced to by circumstances—so do other types of mobilization have to be considered now. Wartime mobilization does not have to be an economic disaster—it can always be turned, with time, into a boon. Russia can work on developing the industries and professions it has lost over the past decades.
We will continue seeing probing offensives by the Russian army in the Ugledar area. Concentration of troops will be increased along the Zaporozhye line of conflict—by both sides. This is where the next, perhaps decisive battle will be fought. No one in Ukraine cares a damn about Donbass. The positions and fortifications there are defensive—to stall the Russian advance, not to conduct offensive operations. The Ukrainian target will be the Azov coast and Crimea. I expected the Zaporozhye strike earlier (and so did Strelkov), but Ukrainian command decided that it would be satisfied with the more modest Kherson gain. A safer bet. Had they risked it all, we might have been in a much worse situation now. As it stands, Ukraine and the West played it safe—the West because they are playing a longer-term game, Ukraine because of lack of confidence (just consider how long it took them to work up the nerve to enter the abandoned Kherson)—and this may be the decisive advantage that Russia has now.
Time has been gained. Russia will use it wisely.
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#QuestionAnswerSLG 11/11/22 #5
Question from Freedom_974: Hi, so my question is even if I understand decision to retreat [from Kherson] how do they plan to cross the river, bridge is out of use and of course as Russian army is retreating nazis are coming closer isn't crossing river be very dangerous and difficult, so question is what do you think how they will do it without any high loses, thanks?
Response: The way they do it—the way they did it—is by telegraphing conflicting messages, all the while continuing the gradual withdrawal. Leave shielding units in place, while the bulk of the force traversed the river over a period of days (two weeks?)), creating the illusion to the Ukrainians—an illusion they clearly believed nearly to the end—that the retreat was a trap.
State the truth and plainly as obviously as you can—and your enemy will never believe it.
Most of the equipment and the majority of the personnel were transferred to the left bank days before the official retreat. The operation proceeded in complete secrecy, and, even now, we have very sparse information as to what exactly took place. The disruption to electricity and the internet in Kherson in the three days preceding the final withdrawal served the same purpose—not allowing information to leak out. Days before the Russian army retreated, locals were reporting that the police had already left. There were marauders on the scene, there was looting, there was criminal activity.
The ones that remained to guard the withdrawal—the Russian paratroopers, airborne assault troops, the VDV—are some of the best of the Russian troops. Discipline and secrecy was well maintained. Equipment was withdrawn, apart from maybe 18 vehicles (at most) that were left behind. We have seen little evidence of Russian equipment left behind from the always-recording Ukrainian troops. No videos of bodies or POWs. The withdrawal was masterfully executed. The Antonov bridge was destroyed. Pontoon bridges and ferries were used. Everything worked nearly like clockwork.
There will be plenty written on the withdrawal in the days to come, so I will just give a few dry numbers: over 30,000 troops and 5,000 pieces of equipment were withdrawn from the Kherson bridgehead by the Russian Army. A monumental operation nearly flawlessly performed. Other than, of course, those civilians who did not or could not leave. I hope that the vast majority of those who wanted left. The weight of what is happening to the rest will remain with me forever, just like the memory of Odessa.
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Question from Freedom_974: Hi, so my question is even if I understand decision to retreat [from Kherson] how do they plan to cross the river, bridge is out of use and of course as Russian army is retreating nazis are coming closer isn't crossing river be very dangerous and difficult, so question is what do you think how they will do it without any high loses, thanks?
Response: The way they do it—the way they did it—is by telegraphing conflicting messages, all the while continuing the gradual withdrawal. Leave shielding units in place, while the bulk of the force traversed the river over a period of days (two weeks?)), creating the illusion to the Ukrainians—an illusion they clearly believed nearly to the end—that the retreat was a trap.
State the truth and plainly as obviously as you can—and your enemy will never believe it.
Most of the equipment and the majority of the personnel were transferred to the left bank days before the official retreat. The operation proceeded in complete secrecy, and, even now, we have very sparse information as to what exactly took place. The disruption to electricity and the internet in Kherson in the three days preceding the final withdrawal served the same purpose—not allowing information to leak out. Days before the Russian army retreated, locals were reporting that the police had already left. There were marauders on the scene, there was looting, there was criminal activity.
The ones that remained to guard the withdrawal—the Russian paratroopers, airborne assault troops, the VDV—are some of the best of the Russian troops. Discipline and secrecy was well maintained. Equipment was withdrawn, apart from maybe 18 vehicles (at most) that were left behind. We have seen little evidence of Russian equipment left behind from the always-recording Ukrainian troops. No videos of bodies or POWs. The withdrawal was masterfully executed. The Antonov bridge was destroyed. Pontoon bridges and ferries were used. Everything worked nearly like clockwork.
There will be plenty written on the withdrawal in the days to come, so I will just give a few dry numbers: over 30,000 troops and 5,000 pieces of equipment were withdrawn from the Kherson bridgehead by the Russian Army. A monumental operation nearly flawlessly performed. Other than, of course, those civilians who did not or could not leave. I hope that the vast majority of those who wanted left. The weight of what is happening to the rest will remain with me forever, just like the memory of Odessa.
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#QuestionAnswerSLG 11/11/22 #6
Question from Л М: Greetings, Gleb. My question is this: If the situation were to demand that Russia goes all-in i.e. announce general mobilization (the kind Ukraine already underwent), how would the Russian people react to it? Thanks in advance.
Response: It is my belief that the Russian people have already mobilized—they are way ahead of their government. Those men who wanted—very few—fled to Kazakhstan and neighbouring states, and it has been a disaster for them there. The rest are prepared to fight for their survival. Even the State Duma deputies have formed a unit that is already fighting at the front. They were exempt from mobilization.
When the Russian leadership explains the reasons and the need for a general mobilization, the Russian people will understand. This will not cause a revolt or an uprising. On the contrary, the longer the Russian leadership drags out this explanation, the worse the misunderstanding and distaste felt by the Russian people.
At the moment, thousands of volunteers are working on collecting funds, buying supplies, knitting camouflage nets, sewing thermal underwear, and so forth. Hundreds of thousands of Russian women are doing what they can for their sons, fathers, husbands either already in the conflict zone or those who were recently mobilized. There is tremendous energy and movement that I see every I look (read). It is fatalistic, rather than exuberant energy, but that has always been characteristic of the Russian people at war.
As Comrade Zhuchkovsky put it: "What is needed is a healthy fatalism and conscientious work by everyone in their place. If we die, good, if we don't die, even better. With God's help, we will manage."
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Question from Л М: Greetings, Gleb. My question is this: If the situation were to demand that Russia goes all-in i.e. announce general mobilization (the kind Ukraine already underwent), how would the Russian people react to it? Thanks in advance.
Response: It is my belief that the Russian people have already mobilized—they are way ahead of their government. Those men who wanted—very few—fled to Kazakhstan and neighbouring states, and it has been a disaster for them there. The rest are prepared to fight for their survival. Even the State Duma deputies have formed a unit that is already fighting at the front. They were exempt from mobilization.
When the Russian leadership explains the reasons and the need for a general mobilization, the Russian people will understand. This will not cause a revolt or an uprising. On the contrary, the longer the Russian leadership drags out this explanation, the worse the misunderstanding and distaste felt by the Russian people.
At the moment, thousands of volunteers are working on collecting funds, buying supplies, knitting camouflage nets, sewing thermal underwear, and so forth. Hundreds of thousands of Russian women are doing what they can for their sons, fathers, husbands either already in the conflict zone or those who were recently mobilized. There is tremendous energy and movement that I see every I look (read). It is fatalistic, rather than exuberant energy, but that has always been characteristic of the Russian people at war.
As Comrade Zhuchkovsky put it: "What is needed is a healthy fatalism and conscientious work by everyone in their place. If we die, good, if we don't die, even better. With God's help, we will manage."
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GB: In my own very small way, I could sign my name to every word Aleksandr writes below.
I have no emotions at all. I lived through Slavyansk, Minsk-1 and Minsk-2, the murders of almost all our leaders and commanders. I wrote two books about it. With the…
I have no emotions at all. I lived through Slavyansk, Minsk-1 and Minsk-2, the murders of almost all our leaders and commanders. I wrote two books about it. With the…
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#QuestionAnswerSLG 11/11/22 #7
Question from Leon: What are the chances of a winter campaign or new largescale Russian offensive and if yes then by when it may take place?
Response: Comrade Leon, I believe Russia will continue conducting probing attacks along the northern parts of the frontline and will continue the grinding effort around Donetsk and down the Ugledar-Velikaya Novoselka line.
Along the Zaporozhye line, Vasiliyevka-Orekhov-Guliay Pole-Velikaya Novoselka, both sides will concentrate troops and see if the other one blinks. Ukraine has the greater urgency to start an offensive here, as the results of the Russian mobilization will soon show up on the battlefield.
Along the Svatovo-Kremennaya line, I believe we may see a Russian push to retake the Zherebets defensive perimeter. Further north, near Kupyansk, Russia will attempt to push the front down to imperil the Krasny Liman grouping of the forces from the flank, while containing the threat from Kupyansk to Svatovo.
In Bakhmut and Soledar, Wagner PMC troops are fighting their own private war, and they will eventually take that city. This particular engagement does not depend on weather conditions.
Avdeevka will be imperilled within the next month. The DPR gains at Vodyanoye, Opytnoye, and Pervomaisk are directly aimed at cutting off the Avdeevka-Orlovka-Konstantinovka supply line—the only one that remains for the Nazis in the Avdeevka stronghold. Once Orlovka falls or is cut off, Avdeevka is right next after it.
Russia is planning something in Belarus and north of Chernigov and Sumy. This is covered by the fog of war.
There will be no major Russian offensive until the new year at the earliest (minor probing attacks will continue). I would argue that it would be prudent for any new offensive to rely on at least one more wave of mobilization, but this choice is not mine. Ukraine will try something before the end of the year. If not, then sometime in January. All these are mere predictions.
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Question from Leon: What are the chances of a winter campaign or new largescale Russian offensive and if yes then by when it may take place?
Response: Comrade Leon, I believe Russia will continue conducting probing attacks along the northern parts of the frontline and will continue the grinding effort around Donetsk and down the Ugledar-Velikaya Novoselka line.
Along the Zaporozhye line, Vasiliyevka-Orekhov-Guliay Pole-Velikaya Novoselka, both sides will concentrate troops and see if the other one blinks. Ukraine has the greater urgency to start an offensive here, as the results of the Russian mobilization will soon show up on the battlefield.
Along the Svatovo-Kremennaya line, I believe we may see a Russian push to retake the Zherebets defensive perimeter. Further north, near Kupyansk, Russia will attempt to push the front down to imperil the Krasny Liman grouping of the forces from the flank, while containing the threat from Kupyansk to Svatovo.
In Bakhmut and Soledar, Wagner PMC troops are fighting their own private war, and they will eventually take that city. This particular engagement does not depend on weather conditions.
Avdeevka will be imperilled within the next month. The DPR gains at Vodyanoye, Opytnoye, and Pervomaisk are directly aimed at cutting off the Avdeevka-Orlovka-Konstantinovka supply line—the only one that remains for the Nazis in the Avdeevka stronghold. Once Orlovka falls or is cut off, Avdeevka is right next after it.
Russia is planning something in Belarus and north of Chernigov and Sumy. This is covered by the fog of war.
There will be no major Russian offensive until the new year at the earliest (minor probing attacks will continue). I would argue that it would be prudent for any new offensive to rely on at least one more wave of mobilization, but this choice is not mine. Ukraine will try something before the end of the year. If not, then sometime in January. All these are mere predictions.
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#QuestionAnswerSLG 11/11/22 #8
Question from Your_Dad: Will Russia stop after taking donestk, Luhansk, zaphorizhzhia and let's say even Kharkiv, then War will be over, will russia stop and or expand more? I mean if Ukrainan never agreed to surrender for very very long time!! If not which one is possible area of attack? Remaining kherson or any other oblast??
Response: There is no end to war until the Ukrainian regime collapses. That's Russia's only option. Anything else, and you have a continuing simmering conflict. Or you have Ukraine barricade itself and prepare to join NATO, forcing the conflict once again. To neutralize the threat, Russia will have to go all the way. Now, I have no idea what the Russian leadership may do. They may be satisfied with and prepared to stop the war after Donbass and Zaporozhye are liberated and then erect a permanent front line along the Dnepr river in the south, and then along the Donbass and Kharkov line in the north. Or, perhaps, Kharkov would be included in the furthest advance. This I do not believe this would end the conflict.
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Question from Your_Dad: Will Russia stop after taking donestk, Luhansk, zaphorizhzhia and let's say even Kharkiv, then War will be over, will russia stop and or expand more? I mean if Ukrainan never agreed to surrender for very very long time!! If not which one is possible area of attack? Remaining kherson or any other oblast??
Response: There is no end to war until the Ukrainian regime collapses. That's Russia's only option. Anything else, and you have a continuing simmering conflict. Or you have Ukraine barricade itself and prepare to join NATO, forcing the conflict once again. To neutralize the threat, Russia will have to go all the way. Now, I have no idea what the Russian leadership may do. They may be satisfied with and prepared to stop the war after Donbass and Zaporozhye are liberated and then erect a permanent front line along the Dnepr river in the south, and then along the Donbass and Kharkov line in the north. Or, perhaps, Kharkov would be included in the furthest advance. This I do not believe this would end the conflict.
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#QuestionAnswerSLG 11/11/22 #9
Question from Lino: Do you think Kherson and Berislav raions (districts) can be recaptured and if so by when?
Response: Recapturing these areas would involve something akin to what the Soviet Union did during the Great Patriotic War. A push through Zaporozhye and Krivoy Rog, with a corresponding advance across the Kherson part of the Dnepr river. This is a long-term prospect.
Question from Lino: Do you think Kherson and Berislav raions (districts) can be recaptured and if so by when?
Response: Recapturing these areas would involve something akin to what the Soviet Union did during the Great Patriotic War. A push through Zaporozhye and Krivoy Rog, with a corresponding advance across the Kherson part of the Dnepr river. This is a long-term prospect.
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#QuestionAnswerSLG 11/11/22 #10
Question from A702: Do you think Russia will try to take Odessa in winter to reach Transnistria and attack from south western parts of Belarus at the same time to encircle all of Ukraine except the western parts like Lvov and cut supply lines to Kiev and the rest of Ukraine specially from Poland?
Response: As I explained at length above, to reach Odessa and Transnistria, Russia will have to push through Kiev, Cherkassy, and Kirovograd. A renewed offensive from Belarus will be required for this effort. With this kind of offensive, the core of Ukraine will be cut off from western supplies and can be dealt with, provided an offensive is mounted through Zaporozhye and Dnepropetrovsk at the same time (to safeguard the Kiev offensive's flank). This is all a long-term prospect that will not be seen for months.
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Question from A702: Do you think Russia will try to take Odessa in winter to reach Transnistria and attack from south western parts of Belarus at the same time to encircle all of Ukraine except the western parts like Lvov and cut supply lines to Kiev and the rest of Ukraine specially from Poland?
Response: As I explained at length above, to reach Odessa and Transnistria, Russia will have to push through Kiev, Cherkassy, and Kirovograd. A renewed offensive from Belarus will be required for this effort. With this kind of offensive, the core of Ukraine will be cut off from western supplies and can be dealt with, provided an offensive is mounted through Zaporozhye and Dnepropetrovsk at the same time (to safeguard the Kiev offensive's flank). This is all a long-term prospect that will not be seen for months.
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#QuestionAnswerSLG 11/11/22, #2
Question From So: What about Odessa? Can Odessa be taken at this stage?
As for Odessa, for now, the topic is closed. It was always a very long shot to go to Odessa from Kherson. Attempting to take Nikolayev—particularly with…
Question From So: What about Odessa? Can Odessa be taken at this stage?
As for Odessa, for now, the topic is closed. It was always a very long shot to go to Odessa from Kherson. Attempting to take Nikolayev—particularly with…
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Dear Readers, this concludes our #QuestionAnswerSLG series for this week. Thank you to all those who submitted questions.
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10%
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11%
More translations, like the rest of the hardworking crew at SLG is doing—pull your weight already!
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#QuestionAnswerSLG in Review (GB) + The Hard Truth About Kherson (Grigori)
A compilation of answers to the readers' questions from GB and an original post on Kherson by Grigori
#1—Question From So: Can this SMO can still be won military speaking?
#2—Question From So: What about Odessa? Can Odessa be taken at this stage?
#3—Question from Kostas: Hello my friend from Greece continue the good work :the results of retreat of kherson ok is correct but the messages that gives for me :trust has been lost in the local population of the regions, they consider the Russians temporary and now no help to him 2 To the Heroes Russian soldiers does harm to their psychology and morale.3 Why should one go with conscription to the battlefield, when he loses confidence in the leadership, that with the first difficulties the leadership will decide to leave
#4—Question from sadwerkl: What is your opinion on how the conflict will develop in the near future? Will we eventually see a full Russian mobilization and war economy if Russia cannot achieve its aims otherwise?
#5—Question from Freedom_974: Hi, so my question is even if I understand decision to retreat [from Kherson] how do they plan to cross the river, bridge is out of use and of course as Russian army is retreating nazis are coming closer isn't crossing river be very dangerous and difficult, so question is what do you think how they will do it without any high loses, thanks?
#6—Question from Л М: Greetings, Gleb. My question is this: If the situation were to demand that Russia goes all-in i.e. announce general mobilization (the kind Ukraine already underwent), how would the Russian people react to it? Thanks in advance.
#7—Question from Leon: What are the chances of a winter campaign or new largescale Russian offensive and if yes then by when it may take place?
#8—Question from Your_Dad: Will Russia stop after taking donestk, Luhansk, zaphorizhzhia and let's say even Kharkiv, then War will be over, will russia stop and or expand more? I mean if Ukrainan never agreed to surrender for very very long time!! If not which one is possible area of attack? Remaining kherson or any other oblast??
#9—Question from Lino: Do you think Kherson and Berislav raions (districts) can be recaptured and if so by when?
#10—Question from A702: Do you think Russia will try to take Odessa in winter to reach Transnistria and attack from south western parts of Belarus at the same time to encircle all of Ukraine except the western parts like Lvov and cut supply lines to Kiev and the rest of Ukraine specially from Poland?
The Hard Truth About Kherson, by Grigori, Slavyangrad
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A compilation of answers to the readers' questions from GB and an original post on Kherson by Grigori
#1—Question From So: Can this SMO can still be won military speaking?
#2—Question From So: What about Odessa? Can Odessa be taken at this stage?
#3—Question from Kostas: Hello my friend from Greece continue the good work :the results of retreat of kherson ok is correct but the messages that gives for me :trust has been lost in the local population of the regions, they consider the Russians temporary and now no help to him 2 To the Heroes Russian soldiers does harm to their psychology and morale.3 Why should one go with conscription to the battlefield, when he loses confidence in the leadership, that with the first difficulties the leadership will decide to leave
#4—Question from sadwerkl: What is your opinion on how the conflict will develop in the near future? Will we eventually see a full Russian mobilization and war economy if Russia cannot achieve its aims otherwise?
#5—Question from Freedom_974: Hi, so my question is even if I understand decision to retreat [from Kherson] how do they plan to cross the river, bridge is out of use and of course as Russian army is retreating nazis are coming closer isn't crossing river be very dangerous and difficult, so question is what do you think how they will do it without any high loses, thanks?
#6—Question from Л М: Greetings, Gleb. My question is this: If the situation were to demand that Russia goes all-in i.e. announce general mobilization (the kind Ukraine already underwent), how would the Russian people react to it? Thanks in advance.
#7—Question from Leon: What are the chances of a winter campaign or new largescale Russian offensive and if yes then by when it may take place?
#8—Question from Your_Dad: Will Russia stop after taking donestk, Luhansk, zaphorizhzhia and let's say even Kharkiv, then War will be over, will russia stop and or expand more? I mean if Ukrainan never agreed to surrender for very very long time!! If not which one is possible area of attack? Remaining kherson or any other oblast??
#9—Question from Lino: Do you think Kherson and Berislav raions (districts) can be recaptured and if so by when?
#10—Question from A702: Do you think Russia will try to take Odessa in winter to reach Transnistria and attack from south western parts of Belarus at the same time to encircle all of Ukraine except the western parts like Lvov and cut supply lines to Kiev and the rest of Ukraine specially from Poland?
The Hard Truth About Kherson, by Grigori, Slavyangrad
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#QuestionAnswerSLG 11/11/22 #1
Question From So: Can this SMO can still be won military speaking?
The conflict can indeed be resolved in Russia's favour, provided the changes that have been initiated continue and gather pace.
Command of the military operations…
Question From So: Can this SMO can still be won military speaking?
The conflict can indeed be resolved in Russia's favour, provided the changes that have been initiated continue and gather pace.
Command of the military operations…
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