#سخنرانی #سخنرانی_آنلاین #ویدئو

✅ نخستین مواجهه‌ها با کپرنیک و داروین در ایران
👤 دکتر امیرمحمد گمینی(عضو هیئت علمی پژوهشکده تاریخ علم دانشگاه تهران)

❇️ جهت تماشای سخنرانی به لینک زیر مراجعه بفرمایید:
📎 https://www.aparat.com/v/Co6kw

———————
🆔: @philsharif

#سخنرانی #سخنرانی_آنلاین #ویدئو

✅ از بطلمیوس تا کپرنیک
🔰 نظریهٔ خورشیدمرکزی چگونه از نظریهٔ زمین‌مرکزی زاده شد؟
👤 دکتر امیرمحمد گمینی(عضو هیئت علمی پژوهشکده تاریخ علم دانشگاه تهران)

❇️ جهت تماشای سخنرانی به لینک زیر مراجعه بفرمایید:
📎 https://www.aparat.com/v/LjAul

———————
🆔: @philsharif

#سخنرانی_آنلاین

✅ گروه فلسفه علم دانشگاه صنعتی شریف برگزار می‌کند
🔰 عنوان:
Is Hope a Virtue? Hope as the Virtue of the Possible

👥 با حضور:
👤 Robert Stern (University of Sheffield)
👤 Beatrice Han-Pile (University of Essex)

❇️ جهت مطالعه چکیده به این لینک مراجعه بفرمایید.
🗓 ۶ مرداد ۱۴۰۰؛ ساعت ۱۸
🌐 این برنامه در کلاس مجازی گروه فلسفه علم به آدرس زیر برگزار می‌شود:
📎 https://b2n.ir/philsci

————————
🆔: @philsharif

#چکیده #سخنرانی_آنلاین

🔰 عنوان:
Is Hope a Virtue? Hope as the Virtue of the Possible

👥 با حضور:
👤 Robert Stern (University of Sheffield)
👤 Beatrice Han-Pile (University of Essex)

🖋 چکیده:
📝 Hope is frequently viewed with suspicion, for example as giving us false expectations, making us gullible, and deceiving us about the harshness of life. It is also not generally listed amongst the virtues. In this paper, we examine in more detail the case against hope as a virtue, focusing on three main criteria of what makes something a virtue: namely, it is good for its possessor; stands between two vices; and can be cultivated and exercised. The status of hope as a virtue can be questioned on each of these counts, but we aim to rebut these doubts, arguing that hope can and should be accorded this status after all. We will begin by briefly explaining what we take a virtue to be and so what it might mean to conceive of hope as a virtue, and then we will attempt to show how hope can meet each of the criteria of virtue outlined above, thereby defending this way of conceiving of hope as a virtue. Just as patience helps us to navigate the temporal, hope helps us to navigate the possible, and to flourish in situations of uncertainty.

🗓 ۶ مرداد ۱۴۰۰؛ ساعت ۱۸
❗️ این برنامه در کلاس مجازی گروه فلسفه علم به آدرس زیر برگزار می‌شود:
https://b2n.ir/philsci

————————
🆔: @philsharif

#چکیده #سخنرانی_آنلاین

🔰 عنوان:
Is Hope a Virtue? Hope as the Virtue of the Possible

👥 با حضور:
👤 Robert Stern (University of Sheffield)
👤 Beatrice Han-Pile (University of Essex)

🖋 چکیده:
📝 Hope is frequently viewed with suspicion, for example as giving us false expectations, making us gullible, and deceiving us about the harshness of life. It is also not generally listed amongst the virtues. In this paper, we examine in more detail the case against hope as a virtue, focusing on three main criteria of what makes something a virtue: namely, it is good for its possessor; stands between two vices; and can be cultivated and exercised. The status of hope as a virtue can be questioned on each of these counts, but we aim to rebut these doubts, arguing that hope can and should be accorded this status after all. We will begin by briefly explaining what we take a virtue to be and so what it might mean to conceive of hope as a virtue, and then we will attempt to show how hope can meet each of the criteria of virtue outlined above, thereby defending this way of conceiving of hope as a virtue. Just as patience helps us to navigate the temporal, hope helps us to navigate the possible, and to flourish in situations of uncertainty.

🗓 ۶ مرداد ۱۴۰۰؛ ساعت ۱۸
❗️ این برنامه در کلاس مجازی گروه فلسفه علم به آدرس زیر برگزار می‌شود:
https://b2n.ir/philsci

————————
🆔: @philsharif

#سخنرانی_آنلاین

❗️ این برنامه تا دقایقی دیگر آغاز خواهد شد.

🌐 لینک شرکت در برنامه:
📎 https://b2n.ir/philsci

————————
🆔: @philsharif

#سخنرانی_آنلاین

✅ گروه فلسفه علم دانشگاه صنعتی شریف برگزار می‌کند
🔰 عنوان:
The Epistemic Argument for Markets - and its Limits

👥 با حضور:
👤 Lisa Herzog (University of Groningen)

❇️ جهت مطالعه چکیده به این لینک مراجعه بفرمایید.
🗓 18 مرداد 1400؛ ساعت 17

🌐 این برنامه در کلاس مجازی گروه فلسفه علم به آدرس زیر برگزار می‌شود:
📎 https://b2n.ir/philsci

————————
🆔: @philsharif

#چکیده #سخنرانی_آنلاین

🔰 عنوان:
The Epistemic Argument for Markets - and its Limits

👥 با حضور:
👤 Lisa Herzog (University of Groningen)

🖋 چکیده:
📝 One of the arguments in favor of free markets, which stands at the core of many debates about efficiency and innovation, is their alleged ability to process knowledge through the signaling function of the price mechanism. This "epistemic argument" has been put forward in particular by F.A. von Hayek, who praised markets’ unique ability to deal with decentralized knowledge. In this talk, I start by presenting this argument, which has been accepted by many critics of markets as well. I defend the claim, however, that this argument is far more limited in scope than has often been assumed. For one thing, it only applies to certain forms of knowledge. For another, most markets rely on an "epistemic infrastructure" in which certain forms of knowledge are dealt with, so that the price mechanism can then play its role. Moreover, there is vicious circularity in the argument if the price mechanisms leads to the satisfaction of preferences that are not independently given, but created by markets. And last but not least, the epistemic argument fails if markets are not regulated for externalities, such as the costs of anthropogenic climate change - here, it almost seems fair to say that market prices lie to us. I conclude that properly understood, the epistemic argument for markets is one for careful market regulation, not one for introducing market mechanisms in all spheres of life.

————————

🗓 18 مرداد 1400؛ ساعت 17

🌐 این برنامه در کلاس مجازی گروه فلسفه علم به آدرس زیر برگزار می‌شود:
📎 https://b2n.ir/philsci

————————
🆔: @philsharif

#سخنرانی_آنلاین

✅ گروه فلسفه علم دانشگاه صنعتی شریف برگزار می‌کند
🔰 عنوان:
The Epistemic Argument for Markets - and its Limits

👥 با حضور:
👤 Lisa Herzog (University of Groningen)

❇️ جهت مطالعه چکیده به این لینک مراجعه بفرمایید.
🗓 18 مرداد 1400؛ ساعت 17

🌐 این برنامه در کلاس مجازی گروه فلسفه علم به آدرس زیر برگزار می‌شود:
📎 https://b2n.ir/philsci

————————
🆔: @philsharif

#چکیده #سخنرانی_آنلاین

🔰 عنوان:
The Epistemic Argument for Markets - and its Limits

👥 با حضور:
👤 Lisa Herzog (University of Groningen)

🖋 چکیده:
📝 One of the arguments in favor of free markets, which stands at the core of many debates about efficiency and innovation, is their alleged ability to process knowledge through the signaling function of the price mechanism. This "epistemic argument" has been put forward in particular by F.A. von Hayek, who praised markets’ unique ability to deal with decentralized knowledge. In this talk, I start by presenting this argument, which has been accepted by many critics of markets as well. I defend the claim, however, that this argument is far more limited in scope than has often been assumed. For one thing, it only applies to certain forms of knowledge. For another, most markets rely on an "epistemic infrastructure" in which certain forms of knowledge are dealt with, so that the price mechanism can then play its role. Moreover, there is vicious circularity in the argument if the price mechanisms leads to the satisfaction of preferences that are not independently given, but created by markets. And last but not least, the epistemic argument fails if markets are not regulated for externalities, such as the costs of anthropogenic climate change - here, it almost seems fair to say that market prices lie to us. I conclude that properly understood, the epistemic argument for markets is one for careful market regulation, not one for introducing market mechanisms in all spheres of life.

————————

🗓 18 مرداد 1400؛ ساعت 17

🌐 این برنامه در کلاس مجازی گروه فلسفه علم به آدرس زیر برگزار می‌شود:
📎 https://b2n.ir/philsci

————————
🆔: @philsharif