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The truth revealed by ten years of fighting is that Saudi Arabia entered the war in 2015 not because it had a project for Yemen, but because it had lost its old network there.

The collapse of the “Special Committee” and its network after 2011 is what pushed Riyadh toward the fighter jets after it had previously been content with the "envelope". And whoever lacks a project cannot achieve victory, regardless of the size of his budget. This is the first secret of the war: it was not a war of one project against another. It was the war of a state trying to restore a tool of control it had lost.

The second secret is even more stark: Saudi Arabia wants a Yemen that is weak but not collapsed, stable but not strong. This is an impossible equation. The weak do not remain stable, and the collapsed cannot be controlled. Ten years of war were not a failure of implementation; they were a failure to define the objective. And we Yemenis paid the price for an equation that no one could fulfill.

We saw this contradiction clearly at the end of 2025, when Riyadh issued a public statement expressing regret over pressure by the UAE on the Southern Transitional Council to push its forces into Hadramawt and al-Mahra. It described the move as extremely dangerous and a threat to its national security, then followed the statement with a strike on a military shipment at the port of Mukalla.

Consider the scene carefully: an ally strikes an ally. Anyone who believes the anti-Houthi camp is a single camp should read that statement twice.

Today, as we are in September 2026, everything built since the Saudi initiative of 2021, the roadmap announced by the UN envoy in December 2023, and the Amman rounds last April has collapsed.

The bombing has returned, missiles have once again reached deep into Saudi territory, hundreds have been killed within weeks, and the Houthis have advanced toward Bab al-Mandab. Once again, we will be told that this is the beginning of a decisive resolution. I say with confidence: this is not the beginning of a resolution. It is a return to the point where we began, at a new cost.

And here lies the central point I want to make to my Yemeni reader without flattery. We oscillate between two interpretations, both of which absolve us of responsibility.

The first sees Saudi Arabia as a permanent conspiracy that has been plotting to fragment us since Taif. The second sees it as a benevolent sister awaiting good behavior from us so that it may rescue us. The first comforts us because it explains our failure through an external power we cannot resist. The second comforts us because it transfers the burden of finding a solution to someone else’s pocket. Both lead us to the same place: doing nothing.

The reality is simpler and harsher than either interpretation. Saudi Arabia is a state that protects its borders and acts according to calculations of its own self-interest, like any state. It has never been inherently more evil or more benevolent than that.

Yemen does not rank first or second among its priorities, and this fact alone explains Saudi Arabia’s fluctuations more than all conspiracy theories combined. When Riyadh pulled back from Yemen after 2022, it was not betrayal; it was calculation. And when it returned this year, it was not responding to us; it was defending Yanbu and Khamis Mushait.

The conclusion I want to put clearly before the reader is this: the true determinant of the relationship between Yemen and Saudi Arabia has never been Saudi intent, but Yemeni absence.

Whenever there was a state in Sanaa, the relationship was negotiable, and both sides spoke the language of interests. Whenever the state collapsed, Yemen was transformed from a neighbor into a file, and from a party into an arena.

Taif was not signed with an absent nation. It was signed with a defeated state, but a state that nevertheless existed. Today, however, we demand that our neighbor treat us as a state when we ourselves have not yet agreed on who represents us.

The question, then, is not: What does Saudi Arabia want from us?

Part 2/3

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1.08K viewsedited 04:36

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The question is: What do we want, and who has the authority to say it in our name?

Until we answer that question ourselves, everything we write about Riyadh will remain an explanation of our own incapacity, rather than an analysis of its policy.

- Written by Yemeni journalist and researcher Fahd Sultan - translated from Arabic.

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1.03K viewsedited 04:36

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What Does Saudi Arabia Want From Yemen?

Part 1:

https://t.me/WarfareAnalysis/213070

Part2:

https://t.me/WarfareAnalysis/213071

Part3:

https://t.me/WarfareAnalysis/213072

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1.08K viewsedited 04:56