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Saudi imams have started warning against traveling to Syria with the intention of fighting Israel if a war breaks out between Israel and Syria
Saudi Sheikh Suleiman al-Ruhaili:
Saudi Sheikh Suleiman al-Ruhaili:
“I issue this fatwa knowing what I am saying: It is not permissible for young men to leave their countries and go to Palestine or al-Sham (Syria) under the pretext of ‘jihad,’ because this does not fulfill the characteristics and conditions of jihad.”
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Our crews transported two children wounded by Israeli army gunfire in the Abu Hamid Roundabout area in Khan Younis to Nasser Medical Complex for treatment.
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The Israeli army shot and killed unarmed Palestinian civilian Sami Zawayda from Jenin refugee camp near Haddad military camp, claiming he had attempted to carry out a ramming attack. The Israeli army withheld his body.
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Hebrew media: Jewish settler Netanel Shukrun was killed in a shooting attack by a Palestinian near the Halamish settlement, west of Ramallah.
Video: Jewish settlers hide in fear following the shooting in Rammallah.
Video: Jewish settlers hide in fear following the shooting in Rammallah.
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Hebrew media: Jewish settler Netanel Shukrun was killed in a shooting attack by a Palestinian near the Halamish settlement, west of Ramallah. Video: Jewish settlers hide in fear following the shooting in Rammallah.
According to Israeli media, the Palestinian who carried out the Halamish shooting attack is freed Palestinian captive Qadri Samara from the town of Biddu, northwest of Jerusalem.
Photo: His weapon
Photo: His weapon
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WarfareAnalysis News 🔻
A farewell without his body.
Video 1: The father of Palestinian Sami Zawayda after his son was killed by Israeli army gunfire. The Israeli army continues to withhold his body.
Video 2:
Sami Zawayda’s cousin speaks about how the family received the news that he had been killed by Israeli army gunfire near Haddad military camp after soldiers opened fire at his vehicle, claiming he had attempted to carry out a ramming attack.
Video 1: The father of Palestinian Sami Zawayda after his son was killed by Israeli army gunfire. The Israeli army continues to withhold his body.
Video 2:
“He was displaced… He was returning home from work. Then they told us he had been killed.”
Sami Zawayda’s cousin speaks about how the family received the news that he had been killed by Israeli army gunfire near Haddad military camp after soldiers opened fire at his vehicle, claiming he had attempted to carry out a ramming attack.
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The Israeli army closed Palestinian streets, roads, and neighborhoods in Jerusalem under the pretext of the Jewish holiday of Yom Kippur.
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A Palestinian woman was critically wounded by Israeli army gunfire in Jabalia al-Balad, northern Gaza.
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Over the past 24 hours, Saudi warplanes carried out 28 airstrikes using F-15 and Typhoon fighter jets that took off from Khamis Mushait and Taif air bases and targeted the governorates of Taiz, al-Jawf, and Marib.
This brings the total number of Saudi airstrikes since the beginning of the Saudi escalation against our country and people to 760.
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Saudi imams have started warning against traveling to Syria with the intention of fighting Israel if a war breaks out between Israel and Syria Saudi Sheikh Suleiman al-Ruhaili: “I issue this fatwa knowing what I am saying: It is not permissible for young…
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“These Palestinians, we’re tired of them, and you’ve exhausted us just like them. You’re neither harsh with them nor leaving them alone.
brother, Do what Bashar al-Assad did, Bashar al-Assad slaughtered 100,000 in just one week.
And you, for 76 years, 100,000 of you and them have died!
You’re far too compassionate.”
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The Israeli army opened fire on a Palestinian in the al-Sinaa area, north of Khan Younis, seriously wounding him.
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“I have trained Saudis, and they are some of the worst military on the face of the planet.”
“MBS started a war and got his rear end handed to him. If we hadn’t come in and pulled him out of the mess, he wouldn’t have had any success.”
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Field commander Salim Jamal al-Maghari (September 11, 1981 – April 11, 2026)
Weapons and Combat Services Battalion, Central Brigade.
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⚡️Syrian sources:
A Syrian army arms depot “exploded” in the al-Eis area in the southern Aleppo countryside, sending projectiles flying in several directions
Such “explosions” at Syrian army weapons depots have become increasingly frequent in recent months, with several similar “incidents” recorded across Syria.
A Syrian army arms depot “exploded” in the al-Eis area in the southern Aleppo countryside, sending projectiles flying in several directions
Such “explosions” at Syrian army weapons depots have become increasingly frequent in recent months, with several similar “incidents” recorded across Syria.
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What Does Saudi Arabia Want From Yemen?
It can be said with confidence that this is the wrong question, one on which we have wasted twenty years.
There is probably no Yemeni of my generation who has not heard this question, or asked it himself at least once, at a qat gathering or in a public place, or heard it on television or from the mouth of a political analyst, or read it in a newspaper or on a website.
What does Saudi Arabia want from us? We ask it as though we are searching for a hidden intention, as though uncovering it would solve the puzzle. After years of following this issue, I believe that the question itself lies at the root of our analytical problem. We ask about intent, when in reality the problem is structural.
Let us begin where we should begin: Riyadh does not conduct a foreign policy toward Yemen. And this is an important point to understand. It manages an internal security file.
This is not a rhetorical phrase, but an institutional description. For decades, the Yemen file was not handled by the Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but by the “Special Committee for Yemeni Affairs,” which was headed by Prince Sultan bin Abdulaziz. It was a committee that paid salaries to Yemeni sheikhs, officers, journalists, and religious scholars. It was not buying loyalty; it was buying behavior. Whoever understands the difference between the two understands half of our modern history with our northern neighbor.
The second point is geography. Geography, not conspiracy, created this arrangement.
The Kingdom’s longest land border is its border with us, stretching more than 1,300 kilometers across mountains, deserts, and tribes extending across both sides.
This border was legally demarcated twice: through the Treaty of Taif on May 20, 1934, following the defeat of Imam Yahya, and then through the Treaty of Jeddah on June 12, 2000. Yet the border remained a space for negotiation rather than simply a dividing line, because what crosses it is not armies, but people, weapons, goods, and influence.
From this comes a principle that many of us Yemenis refuse to grasp: Saudi Arabia does not view northern Yemen as a neighboring state in the full sense of the term. Rather, it views it as an extension of its own tribal hinterland. Dealing with an extension is therefore different from dealing with a state.
Then come demographics and poverty as secondary considerations. We are more numerous, poorer, and too close to be ignored.
This disparity produced chronic anxiety in Riyadh, while also giving it one of its most effective tools: the labor market. In 1990, when Saleh took his position on the invasion of Kuwait, hundreds of thousands of Yemeni workers were expelled within weeks.
The figures commonly cited range from 700,000 to one million, estimates for which there is no precise count. But the number is not what matters. What matters is that Riyadh discovered that day that economics could take effect faster than an army, while we discovered that proximity could be turned into collective punishment with a single decision. Thirty years have passed, and both sides still behave according to the lesson they learned that year.
Here we must also dispel another comforting illusion that we frequently repeat: the illusion of permanent sectarian hostility. It is often said that Saudi Arabia is a permanent doctrinal enemy of Zaydism. This claim does not withstand history.
In 1962, Riyadh backed the Zaydi royalists against the republicans, who were a mixture of Shafiis and Zaydis, because the threat at the time was Nasserist nationalism, not sectarianism. In the 1980s, it funded Salafi expansion in Saada because the threat had changed. For Riyadh, sectarian identity is a tool invoked when needed and set aside when it is not, rather than a doctrine governing its decisions. Anyone who builds his analysis on the assumption of permanent sectarian hostility will be surprised every time.
Then came the war, exposing what we had concealed from ourselves.
Part 1/3
It can be said with confidence that this is the wrong question, one on which we have wasted twenty years.
There is probably no Yemeni of my generation who has not heard this question, or asked it himself at least once, at a qat gathering or in a public place, or heard it on television or from the mouth of a political analyst, or read it in a newspaper or on a website.
What does Saudi Arabia want from us? We ask it as though we are searching for a hidden intention, as though uncovering it would solve the puzzle. After years of following this issue, I believe that the question itself lies at the root of our analytical problem. We ask about intent, when in reality the problem is structural.
Let us begin where we should begin: Riyadh does not conduct a foreign policy toward Yemen. And this is an important point to understand. It manages an internal security file.
This is not a rhetorical phrase, but an institutional description. For decades, the Yemen file was not handled by the Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but by the “Special Committee for Yemeni Affairs,” which was headed by Prince Sultan bin Abdulaziz. It was a committee that paid salaries to Yemeni sheikhs, officers, journalists, and religious scholars. It was not buying loyalty; it was buying behavior. Whoever understands the difference between the two understands half of our modern history with our northern neighbor.
The second point is geography. Geography, not conspiracy, created this arrangement.
The Kingdom’s longest land border is its border with us, stretching more than 1,300 kilometers across mountains, deserts, and tribes extending across both sides.
This border was legally demarcated twice: through the Treaty of Taif on May 20, 1934, following the defeat of Imam Yahya, and then through the Treaty of Jeddah on June 12, 2000. Yet the border remained a space for negotiation rather than simply a dividing line, because what crosses it is not armies, but people, weapons, goods, and influence.
From this comes a principle that many of us Yemenis refuse to grasp: Saudi Arabia does not view northern Yemen as a neighboring state in the full sense of the term. Rather, it views it as an extension of its own tribal hinterland. Dealing with an extension is therefore different from dealing with a state.
Then come demographics and poverty as secondary considerations. We are more numerous, poorer, and too close to be ignored.
This disparity produced chronic anxiety in Riyadh, while also giving it one of its most effective tools: the labor market. In 1990, when Saleh took his position on the invasion of Kuwait, hundreds of thousands of Yemeni workers were expelled within weeks.
The figures commonly cited range from 700,000 to one million, estimates for which there is no precise count. But the number is not what matters. What matters is that Riyadh discovered that day that economics could take effect faster than an army, while we discovered that proximity could be turned into collective punishment with a single decision. Thirty years have passed, and both sides still behave according to the lesson they learned that year.
Here we must also dispel another comforting illusion that we frequently repeat: the illusion of permanent sectarian hostility. It is often said that Saudi Arabia is a permanent doctrinal enemy of Zaydism. This claim does not withstand history.
In 1962, Riyadh backed the Zaydi royalists against the republicans, who were a mixture of Shafiis and Zaydis, because the threat at the time was Nasserist nationalism, not sectarianism. In the 1980s, it funded Salafi expansion in Saada because the threat had changed. For Riyadh, sectarian identity is a tool invoked when needed and set aside when it is not, rather than a doctrine governing its decisions. Anyone who builds his analysis on the assumption of permanent sectarian hostility will be surprised every time.
Then came the war, exposing what we had concealed from ourselves.
Part 1/3
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