In germany there is a group called FreieDeutscheGesellschaft.org
Experimenting with the LoRa technology.

https://t.me/FDG_Portal

loRa is super effective in Cities, but not in the countryside.
Therefore we switched to the Reticulum Protocol, which allows us to use litte computers like raspberrypi as Gateways, for connecting Lora, CB, Wifi and even more.

First we tried Meshtastic, but there Were many problems with messaging using many nodes.
Nodes not waking up after sleeping for some time.
And many problems with the APP, and interoperabilities.
So we decided to stop the complete Process, because we needed a strong base first, before expanding.
We found reticulum was better in many ways for this usecase, since then we are using it.

https://github.com/markqvist/Reticulum

#communications #im #lora

Dino 0.3:
Video calls and conferences – encrypted and peer-to-peer

https://dino.im/blog/2022/02/dino-0.3-release/

#dino #im #videocalls

kMeet
Free and secure videoconferencing solution

kMeet is a videoconferencing solution that respects your privacy for all your discussions.No e-mail address, no advertising and no registration are required. Your discussions are not analysed and are only transmitted through Infomaniak servers in Switzerland.

Features :
- Create online (audio and video) meetings with multiple people
- Excellent audio quality
- Unlimited number of participants (subject to resources)
- No apps required for desktop computers
- Join meetings hosted by Infomaniak Meet or Jitsi
- Protect access to your meetings with a password
- Discuss and share resources via the integrated chat function
- Invite your participants via a URL

Download - https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.infomaniak.meet

https://github.com/Infomaniak/android-infomaniak-meet

#im #Videocall

@foss_Android

5 important vulnerabilities were patched in #Matrix

Four security researchers have identified five cryptographic vulnerabilities in code libraries that can be exploited to undermine Matrix encrypted chat clients. This includes impersonating users and sending messages as them.

https://www.theregister.com/2022/09/28/matrix_encryption_flaws/

#im

#messaging apps comparison charts

https://bkil.gitlab.io/secuchart/

http://supernovas.space/messengers.html

https://berty.tech/faq

https://www.securemessagingapps.com/

#im

British youth faces 100,000-euro bill for bomb threat joke that prompted Spain to scramble a fighter plane to escort easyJet flight

The accused was checking in for a flight at London Gatwick airport when he sent a message to friends via Snapchat. It was picked up by the UK security services when the plane was flying over French airspace


Source: https://www.surinenglish.com/spain/british-youth-faces-100000euro-bill-for-bomb-20240122151721-nt.html

>send a meme on snapchat
>get fined 120k

Would he have been saved by using any chat service with end-to-end encryption? Even Whatsapp? How can one avoid this happening to them?

⚡️hidden tech

#why #im #privacy

Update on Native #Matrix interoperability with #WhatsApp

https://matrix.org/blog/2024/09/whatsapp-dma/

#im

Bros should we use xmpp or simplex?

https://lukesmith.xyz/articles/matrix-vs-xmpp

Matrix initially funded by amdocs which is israeli https://www.hackea.org/notas/matrix.html

sends a ton of metadata to the central server https://github.com/libremonde-org/paper-research-privacy-matrix.org

#im #xmpp #matrix

Secure Messaging (and current attacks against it)

https://media.ccc.de/v/secure-messaging-and-current-attacks-against-it

#im

Take action to stop Chat Control now!

Chat control 2.0 is back on the agenda of EU governments. Ambassadors of EU governments are to express their position on the latest proposal on 9 October 2024, and EU Ministers of the Interior are to endorse Chat Control on 10 October. The latest proposal makes a minor concession but still provides for indiscriminate mass searching of private messages and destroying secure end-to-end encryption. Read more about this proposal here.

https://www.patrick-breyer.de/en/posts/chat-control/

#im #censorship #stalking #harassment #surveillance #eu #chatcontrol #why

Unique 0-click deanonymization attack targeting Signal, Discord and hundreds of platform

https://gist.github.com/hackermondev/45a3cdfa52246f1d1201c1e8cdef6117

"Signal instantly dismissed my report, saying it wasn't their responsibility and it was up to users to hide their identity"

#im #signal #cloudflare

#xmpp #im criticisms:

You can follow any advise on the client XMPP setup but the main issue with the protocol is not your endpoint. The issue is the is the XMPP protocol and related infrastructure.

There are two things you wana do

1. content of the message (privacy setup),
2. identity (anonymity setup)

Don't mistake those two things!!

Privacy
is ensured on XMPP with the OTR or OMEMO encryption. The issue is that the key exchange in between the communication parties is not foolproof. You both *MUST* check the fingerprints through a separate secure channel. This is in large scale not practiced. If you don't check it right, the underlying infrastructure of the XMPP allows the adversary to MITM you and read your messages.

2 Anonymity
is ensured with Tor here. Tor tries to conceal you IP only and nothing more. But Tor, as a low latency network, cannot protect you from revealing your behavioral patterns, your social graph, your login and log out time, the number of messages sent and received at any time, the sender and receiver of the messages, their precise volume and so on *from the XMPP server* and any adversary that can monitor that server.

Our advice is - don't use XMPP! if possible at all and use something more resistant like SimpleX, Briar, CWTCH... and similar solutions that mitigate those leaks and diminish or even make impossible those related attacks from the active as well as passive adversaries.

Why Aren’t You Using XMPP? – #SolutionsWatch

https://corbettreport.com/why-arent-you-using-xmpp/

Hakeem Anwar of TakeBackOurTech.org and AbovePhone.com joins us to discuss the latest TBOT guide to Getting Started with #XMPP. What is XMPP? Why is it superior to the centralized, Big Tech messaging apps? And, most important of all, why aren’t you using XMPP?
#im

People think #SimpleX #im Chat is secure. It's not. Truly decentralized services aren't able to moderate anything via a central authority, but SimpleX outright states they do exactly that via their centralized servers that they describe in "how it works" docs as a sort of "data pipe" that just relays data without examining it, yet they explicitly say they can and DO block files from being sent. ALL CENTRALIZED SERVICES ARE ABSOLUTELY CONTROLLED BY SOMEONE AND OPEN TO ANYONE WHO CAN BUST IN THE DOORS. There are no exceptions.

https://simplex.chat/blog/20250114-simplex-network-large-groups-privacy-preserving-content-moderation.html

@Jody_Bruchon

🚓️️ Matrix.org (Element) Has Broken the Federation Connection

Several posts ago, people suggested using #Matrix messenger for bots instead of Telegram. Ironically, it seems that the main Matrix server may be exploited by you know who. Or their admins are just playing dirty games, dunno.

TLDR: Matrix.org has stopped key exchange, making it impossible for users of matrix.org to read messages from other servers, thus forcing people from other servers to switch to matrix.org. This problem has existed since at least from the end of July.

For more information, see: https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix.org/issues/2483

https://t.me/nexus_search/239
#im

#Austria Approves #Spyware Law to Infiltrate Encrypted Messaging Platforms
https://ift.tt/JuNIV7j - FOLLOW: @reclaimthenet
#im

https://github.com/libremonde-org/paper-research-privacy-matrix.org/blob/master/part1/README.md

TL;DR
matrix.org and vector.im receive a lot of private, personal and identifiable data on a regular basis, or metadata that can be used to precisely identify and/or track users/server, their social graph, usage pattern and potential location. This is possible both by the default configuration values in synapse/Riot that do not promote privacy, and by specific choices made by their developers to not disclose, inform users or resolve in a timely manner several known behaviours of the software.
Data sent on a potential regular basis based on a common web/desktop+smartphone usage even with a self-hosted client and Homeserver:

The #Matrix ID of users, usually including their username.
Email addresses, phone numbers of the user and their contacts.
Associations of Email, phone numbers with Matrix IDs.
Usage patterns of the user.
IP address of the user, which can give more or less precise geographical location information.
The user's devices and system information.
The other servers that users talks to.
Room IDs, potentially identifying the Direct chat ones and the other user/server.

With default settings, they allow unrestricted, non-obfuscated public access to the following potentially personal data/info:

Matrix IDs mapped to Email addresses/phone numbers added to a user's settings.
Every file, image, video, audio that is uploaded to the Homeserver.
Profile name and avatar of users.
See below for a detailed analysis.

#im

Why This Messenger Has No Accounts, Phone Numbers, or Usernames (SimpleX Interview)

🍿 Techlore | 👀 4901
#simplex #im