Forwarded from Rybar in English
🇭🇺🇷🇺🇺🇦 Negotiations have begun in Moscow between Russian leader Vladimir Putin and Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, a significant portion of which will clearly be devoted to the topic of the so-called Ukraine.
It is unlikely that any breakthrough decisions can be expected - the position of the main sponsors of the Kyiv regime remains unchanged and is to "fight to the last Ukrainian." Moreover, they have previously publicly rejected the conditions voiced by the President of Russia.
At the same time, as a result of the meeting, in addition to the now familiar statements about the need to achieve peace, some purely bilateral agreements may be reached, such as the return of captured AFU members of ethnic Hungarian origin from Zakarpattia to Hungary.
Nevertheless, it is worth noting that as the mobilization resource of the Ukrainian formations is exhausted, and even more so in the event of an increase in the pace of the advance of the Russian Armed Forces, the topic of negotiations in the West will be heard more and more often, including from the mouths of officials. With clarifications on the importance of complying with Russia's demands.
#Hungary #Russia #Ukraine
@rybar
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It is unlikely that any breakthrough decisions can be expected - the position of the main sponsors of the Kyiv regime remains unchanged and is to "fight to the last Ukrainian." Moreover, they have previously publicly rejected the conditions voiced by the President of Russia.
At the same time, as a result of the meeting, in addition to the now familiar statements about the need to achieve peace, some purely bilateral agreements may be reached, such as the return of captured AFU members of ethnic Hungarian origin from Zakarpattia to Hungary.
Nevertheless, it is worth noting that as the mobilization resource of the Ukrainian formations is exhausted, and even more so in the event of an increase in the pace of the advance of the Russian Armed Forces, the topic of negotiations in the West will be heard more and more often, including from the mouths of officials. With clarifications on the importance of complying with Russia's demands.
#Hungary #Russia #Ukraine
@rybar
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Рыбарь
🇷🇺🇺🇦 Также российский лидер озвучил развернутые условия для начала переговоров по т.н. Украине: полный вывод украинских формирований с территории Донбасса и Новороссии (включая Херсона, Запорожья, Славянска, Краматорска и других городов), а также отказ от…
Ukraine cuts off Russian oil for Hungary
Hungary and Russia are trying to resume oil deliveries by Lukoil after Ukraine imposed tougher sanctions on the Russian company. Ukraine's recent sanctions prohibit Lukoil from using the country as a transit route.
Hungarian energy company, Mol, and Lukoil are seeking a solution, according to Hungarian Foreign Minister Peter Szijjarto. This announcement came after Szijjarto met with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov at a UN session in New York.
#Russia #Hungary #Ukraine #Oil #Gas
@RTnews_unc3
Hungary and Russia are trying to resume oil deliveries by Lukoil after Ukraine imposed tougher sanctions on the Russian company. Ukraine's recent sanctions prohibit Lukoil from using the country as a transit route.
Hungarian energy company, Mol, and Lukoil are seeking a solution, according to Hungarian Foreign Minister Peter Szijjarto. This announcement came after Szijjarto met with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov at a UN session in New York.
#Russia #Hungary #Ukraine #Oil #Gas
@RTnews_unc3
Forwarded from Rybar in English
🇩🇪🇺🇦 In Germany, there has been renewed talk of stripping Ukrainian refugees of benefits who refuse to work.
This time, it was stated by the Secretary General of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), Carsten Linnemann.
🔻Out of 800,000 Ukrainian refugees of working age, only 234,000 are currently employed in Germany. About 187,000 of them have permanent jobs, and 47,000 are employed on temporary or fixed-term contracts.
Most refugees receive the civil allowance known as Bürgergeld, which amounts to 563 euros (over 52,600 rubles) per month. Many refugees also live in state-funded housing and receive other economic benefits.
In May, data published by the Federal Employment Agency showed that almost two-thirds of Bürgergeld recipients in Germany have a migration background - in some states, this figure reaches three-quarters.
🔻Linnemann suggested that more than 100,000 people who currently receive benefits and flatly refuse to work should be the first to lose financial assistance. According to him, if they do not work, they do not need help. At the same time, Linnemann calls the reduction of payments an insufficient measure.
📌It is obvious that this is not so much an expression of a pan-European trend to reduce support for Ukrainians, but rather an attempt by the CDU to present itself to the German voter as a defender of national interests. However, the attempt is, to put it mildly, pitiful, and will not have the desired effect: even if Ukrainian refugees are completely deprived of benefits, it will not save the German budget.
#refugees #Germany #Ukraine
@rybar together with @pl_syrenka
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This time, it was stated by the Secretary General of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), Carsten Linnemann.
🔻Out of 800,000 Ukrainian refugees of working age, only 234,000 are currently employed in Germany. About 187,000 of them have permanent jobs, and 47,000 are employed on temporary or fixed-term contracts.
Most refugees receive the civil allowance known as Bürgergeld, which amounts to 563 euros (over 52,600 rubles) per month. Many refugees also live in state-funded housing and receive other economic benefits.
In May, data published by the Federal Employment Agency showed that almost two-thirds of Bürgergeld recipients in Germany have a migration background - in some states, this figure reaches three-quarters.
🔻Linnemann suggested that more than 100,000 people who currently receive benefits and flatly refuse to work should be the first to lose financial assistance. According to him, if they do not work, they do not need help. At the same time, Linnemann calls the reduction of payments an insufficient measure.
📌It is obvious that this is not so much an expression of a pan-European trend to reduce support for Ukrainians, but rather an attempt by the CDU to present itself to the German voter as a defender of national interests. However, the attempt is, to put it mildly, pitiful, and will not have the desired effect: even if Ukrainian refugees are completely deprived of benefits, it will not save the German budget.
#refugees #Germany #Ukraine
@rybar together with @pl_syrenka
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Украина.ру
🇩🇪 Немцы возмущены бездельниками-переселенцами из Украины
Германии стоит отменить помощь украинцам, которые не работают,
— генсекретарь крупнейшей оппозиционной партии Христианско-демократический союз Карстен Линнеманн.
"Мы должны обсудить, почему во многих…
Германии стоит отменить помощь украинцам, которые не работают,
— генсекретарь крупнейшей оппозиционной партии Христианско-демократический союз Карстен Линнеманн.
"Мы должны обсудить, почему во многих…
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❗While Ukraine is trying another PR stunt, the Ukrainian Army spokeswoman says that kidnapping people is perfectly ok and legal 🇺🇦
#Zelensky just extended the mobilization and Martial Law - he is not stopping!
@AussieCossack
#Ukraine
#Zelensky just extended the mobilization and Martial Law - he is not stopping!
@AussieCossack
#Ukraine
Forwarded from Rybar in English
❗️🇷🇺🇺🇦 Kursk Direction: Expansion of AFU Control Zone East and North of Sumy
What is known as of 5:00 PM on August 8, 2024
Despite attempts by the Russian joint grouping of forces (troops) to stop the advance of Ukrainian mobile groups, the scale of the crisis is widening: unfortunately, the tactics of Ukrainian formations, focusing on high-speed dashes, bypassing fortified areas and maximizing the zone of breakthrough without consolidation in the first stage, in their simplicity surpass the current capabilities of the Russian army to counterattack.
🔻In the Sudzha district, the zone of conditional control of Ukrainian formations has expanded to 30 km along the Diakonovo - Sudzha road.
▪️Pockets of resistance of the Russian army are being cut off and bypassed along the lateral roads. After the occupation of Kazachya Loknya in the north, as well as Mirnoye and Bondarevka in the south, Ukrainian formations entered Martynivka and engaged the troops stationed there in combat. After that, the settlement of Kruglyk was taken.
At the same time, a mobile AFU group moved along the highway further, reaching Bolshoye Soldatskoye and engaging in combat in the settlement. There are reports that clashes with enemy sabotage and reconnaissance groups are also taking place further along the highway.
▪️Fierce battles are raging in the surrounding settlements 15 km south of Lgov.
▪️In the context of active use of enemy electronic warfare in certain areas, the "fog of war" still prevails, so it would be premature to speak of the complete destruction of the strongholds that the enemy has passed or bypassed.
🔻In the Korenevo district, the AFU do not abandon attempts to capture the administrative center.
Simultaneous battles were fought at the entrance to Korenevo, and attempts were made to capture Olgovka and Kremyanoye. For part of the Ukrainian troops advancing in this area, it is necessary both to pin down the forces of the Russian Armed Forces in combat and to break through to the Rylsk - Lgov highway in order to expand the scale of the operational crisis of the Russian Armed Forces and stretch the forces of the Russian troops.
📌At the same time, Ukrainian formations have already begun digging in on the reached lines, introducing a second echelon. The capture of Sudzha has become an inspiring factor for the AFU, with which they are now trying to make up for their losses and demonstrate that the game is worth the candle.
The biggest problem in organizing the defense in the Kursk tactical direction remains the fragmentation of units and the lack of the proper number of forces, which are now allegedly being withdrawn from other directions. At the same time, Russian information resources, which are racing to write the names of brigades and divisions that are about to arrive (but never do), are adding chaos to the information space.
High-resolution map
English version
#digest #map #Kursk #Russia #Ukraine
@rybar
Original msg
What is known as of 5:00 PM on August 8, 2024
Despite attempts by the Russian joint grouping of forces (troops) to stop the advance of Ukrainian mobile groups, the scale of the crisis is widening: unfortunately, the tactics of Ukrainian formations, focusing on high-speed dashes, bypassing fortified areas and maximizing the zone of breakthrough without consolidation in the first stage, in their simplicity surpass the current capabilities of the Russian army to counterattack.
🔻In the Sudzha district, the zone of conditional control of Ukrainian formations has expanded to 30 km along the Diakonovo - Sudzha road.
▪️Pockets of resistance of the Russian army are being cut off and bypassed along the lateral roads. After the occupation of Kazachya Loknya in the north, as well as Mirnoye and Bondarevka in the south, Ukrainian formations entered Martynivka and engaged the troops stationed there in combat. After that, the settlement of Kruglyk was taken.
At the same time, a mobile AFU group moved along the highway further, reaching Bolshoye Soldatskoye and engaging in combat in the settlement. There are reports that clashes with enemy sabotage and reconnaissance groups are also taking place further along the highway.
▪️Fierce battles are raging in the surrounding settlements 15 km south of Lgov.
▪️In the context of active use of enemy electronic warfare in certain areas, the "fog of war" still prevails, so it would be premature to speak of the complete destruction of the strongholds that the enemy has passed or bypassed.
🔻In the Korenevo district, the AFU do not abandon attempts to capture the administrative center.
Simultaneous battles were fought at the entrance to Korenevo, and attempts were made to capture Olgovka and Kremyanoye. For part of the Ukrainian troops advancing in this area, it is necessary both to pin down the forces of the Russian Armed Forces in combat and to break through to the Rylsk - Lgov highway in order to expand the scale of the operational crisis of the Russian Armed Forces and stretch the forces of the Russian troops.
📌At the same time, Ukrainian formations have already begun digging in on the reached lines, introducing a second echelon. The capture of Sudzha has become an inspiring factor for the AFU, with which they are now trying to make up for their losses and demonstrate that the game is worth the candle.
The biggest problem in organizing the defense in the Kursk tactical direction remains the fragmentation of units and the lack of the proper number of forces, which are now allegedly being withdrawn from other directions. At the same time, Russian information resources, which are racing to write the names of brigades and divisions that are about to arrive (but never do), are adding chaos to the information space.
High-resolution map
English version
#digest #map #Kursk #Russia #Ukraine
@rybar
Original msg
Kiev's goal in the #Kursk region may be to disrupt all Russian gas supplies to Europe, according to The Washington Post.
"Some analysts have speculated that Kiev's goal might be to halt all Russian gas deliveries to #Europe as a means of leverage. Despite this, gas was still flowing on Thursday through Sudzha, the last operational transit point for a pipeline carrying Russian natural #gas to Europe via #Ukraine. While Ukraine benefits from lucrative transit fees, it has also expressed a desire to cut off Russia's remaining energy business in Europe," the publication writes.
@DDGeopolitics
#Russia
"Some analysts have speculated that Kiev's goal might be to halt all Russian gas deliveries to #Europe as a means of leverage. Despite this, gas was still flowing on Thursday through Sudzha, the last operational transit point for a pipeline carrying Russian natural #gas to Europe via #Ukraine. While Ukraine benefits from lucrative transit fees, it has also expressed a desire to cut off Russia's remaining energy business in Europe," the publication writes.
@DDGeopolitics
#Russia
Forwarded from Rybar in English
🇷🇺🇺🇦 We confirm - the Ukrainian special services were indeed preparing an assassination attempt on the son of the former Russian Prosecutor General Igor Chaika. The plans of the Deputy Head of the SBU Oleksandr Poklad, responsible for other terrorist attacks in Russia, were thwarted thanks to the joint work of the FSB and the SVR.
However, another point is extremely important here: Chaika Jr. is the one who, on the Russian side, is essentially responsible for prisoner exchanges. Therefore, the enemy's desire to eliminate him is nothing other than an intention to completely stop the entire exchange process.
And this best illustrates the plans of the Kyiv regime to wage a "war to the last Ukrainian," in which it is ready to very easily sacrifice its prisoners and their relatives. Needless to say, in such conditions, the authorities of the so-called Ukraine are also not interested in ceasefires.
And in general, against the background of all this, I would like to once again greet the naive "Cheburashkas" living in a parallel reality, who still sincerely hope for some kind of negotiations with the West.
#Russia #Ukraine
@rybar
Support us Original msg
However, another point is extremely important here: Chaika Jr. is the one who, on the Russian side, is essentially responsible for prisoner exchanges. Therefore, the enemy's desire to eliminate him is nothing other than an intention to completely stop the entire exchange process.
And this best illustrates the plans of the Kyiv regime to wage a "war to the last Ukrainian," in which it is ready to very easily sacrifice its prisoners and their relatives. Needless to say, in such conditions, the authorities of the so-called Ukraine are also not interested in ceasefires.
And in general, against the background of all this, I would like to once again greet the naive "Cheburashkas" living in a parallel reality, who still sincerely hope for some kind of negotiations with the West.
#Russia #Ukraine
@rybar
Support us Original msg
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Дети Арбата
Будучи главным идеологом продолжения войны, руководитель Офиса президента Украины Андрей Ермак поставил задачу по усилению диверсионной работы на территории России: с подачи главы СБУ Василия Малюка новой целью был выбран сын бывшего генерального прокурора…
🇷🇺🇺🇦 Many still expect further enemy attacks in places without defenders: Bryansk, Belgorod or elsewhere in Kursk. But especially across the Dnieper, on Energodar and/or the eastern bank of Kherson. The attack on Kursk would then be a serious diversion for a serious attack to the south.
https://t.me/boris_rozhin/134329
👉 The clues have been around for a long time, but we must admit that we know nothing about the strength of the enemy. However, we know more about the strength of the Russian army. In the event of a landing across the Dnieper, or even in Crimea, we should expect very bad news, because the enemy will have a clear path.
I remind you that the enemy is fascinated by Crimea and has been attacking for several quarters all the logistical routes (Crimean/Kerch bridge, landing ships, bridges on the land route to Rostov), all the ammunition and fuel depots, the anti-aircraft systems, the radars, the air bases in Crimea, Rostov, Krasnodar, in the Kuban in general.
On the contrary, everyone will have noticed that he did not attack anything to prepare his attack on Kursk! This means that it is not excluded that something very big is being prepared between Crimea included and Energodar / Zaporozhye. With a level of Russian defenses almost zero, but with the difficulty of a bridgehead that will be, a little , attacked by the Russian aviation (hence the regular attacks on Russian air bases) and some long-range missiles.
All this is theoretical , it all depends on the enemy's real capabilities , his willingness to deceive the Russian army, his willingness to take risks , and his ability to do so ... If he wants to take the initiative that Russia has kindly offered him since the spring of 2022 , he is spoiled for choice. If this is the enemy's plan, if this ambitious plan is accessible to him, if he has the ability , then the worst of the war is yet to come (or the defeat of Russia by the rapid signing of an armistice and a peace treaty in the style of the unfavorable compromises of 1856: this option is no longer even mentioned by me, we will talk about it again this evening).
➡️ The fault will be entirely attributed to the Russian political and military elite who did not commit the necessary resources to their ambitions from the start, between 2013/2014 when a simple police operation was enough, and 2022, and who spend their time underestimating their enemies , the Islamic terrorists in Syria, the Bandera in its southwest.
➡️ Attacking in February 2022 was impossible without preparations : either it was necessary to prepare from the beginning of 2020 , or it was necessary to launch preparations in early 2022 to attack in 2024 or even later , with the only valid plan to attack through Volyn-Uzhgorod, targeting Odessa to cut off the enemy rear, while holding the enemy back everywhere else (the preparations could easily be disguised by the usual Zapad exercises in Belarus). Such a plan could not fail . Added to this was the subsequent objective of a total and definitive resumption of control over the former Ukrainian SSR that seceded in 1991 with the hunt for the Bandera , as was done in the 1940s and 1950s.
This required a lot of troops (more than today), such a mobilization would not have gone unnoticed and would have required deceiving the enemy by pretending to remain naive: "we are mobilizing to dissuade you from attacking the Donbass"...
🔺 If it was impossible to mobilize massively, there was no need to go to war.
Via @ZZ_0Z_Z0ZZ_fr
#SMO #Russia #Ukraine
https://t.me/boris_rozhin/134329
👉 The clues have been around for a long time, but we must admit that we know nothing about the strength of the enemy. However, we know more about the strength of the Russian army. In the event of a landing across the Dnieper, or even in Crimea, we should expect very bad news, because the enemy will have a clear path.
I remind you that the enemy is fascinated by Crimea and has been attacking for several quarters all the logistical routes (Crimean/Kerch bridge, landing ships, bridges on the land route to Rostov), all the ammunition and fuel depots, the anti-aircraft systems, the radars, the air bases in Crimea, Rostov, Krasnodar, in the Kuban in general.
On the contrary, everyone will have noticed that he did not attack anything to prepare his attack on Kursk! This means that it is not excluded that something very big is being prepared between Crimea included and Energodar / Zaporozhye. With a level of Russian defenses almost zero, but with the difficulty of a bridgehead that will be, a little , attacked by the Russian aviation (hence the regular attacks on Russian air bases) and some long-range missiles.
All this is theoretical , it all depends on the enemy's real capabilities , his willingness to deceive the Russian army, his willingness to take risks , and his ability to do so ... If he wants to take the initiative that Russia has kindly offered him since the spring of 2022 , he is spoiled for choice. If this is the enemy's plan, if this ambitious plan is accessible to him, if he has the ability , then the worst of the war is yet to come (or the defeat of Russia by the rapid signing of an armistice and a peace treaty in the style of the unfavorable compromises of 1856: this option is no longer even mentioned by me, we will talk about it again this evening).
➡️ The fault will be entirely attributed to the Russian political and military elite who did not commit the necessary resources to their ambitions from the start, between 2013/2014 when a simple police operation was enough, and 2022, and who spend their time underestimating their enemies , the Islamic terrorists in Syria, the Bandera in its southwest.
➡️ Attacking in February 2022 was impossible without preparations : either it was necessary to prepare from the beginning of 2020 , or it was necessary to launch preparations in early 2022 to attack in 2024 or even later , with the only valid plan to attack through Volyn-Uzhgorod, targeting Odessa to cut off the enemy rear, while holding the enemy back everywhere else (the preparations could easily be disguised by the usual Zapad exercises in Belarus). Such a plan could not fail . Added to this was the subsequent objective of a total and definitive resumption of control over the former Ukrainian SSR that seceded in 1991 with the hunt for the Bandera , as was done in the 1940s and 1950s.
This required a lot of troops (more than today), such a mobilization would not have gone unnoticed and would have required deceiving the enemy by pretending to remain naive: "we are mobilizing to dissuade you from attacking the Donbass"...
🔺 If it was impossible to mobilize massively, there was no need to go to war.
Via @ZZ_0Z_Z0ZZ_fr
#SMO #Russia #Ukraine
Telegram
Colonelcassad
Относительно потенциальных планов противника.
Помимо активных действий в Курской области и потенциальных вспомогательных ударов на границе Белгородской и Брянской областей, противник предпринимает определенные меры по концентрации сил для потенциального…
Помимо активных действий в Курской области и потенциальных вспомогательных ударов на границе Белгородской и Брянской областей, противник предпринимает определенные меры по концентрации сил для потенциального…