French Center for Intelligence Research :

As the fog of war lifts ... »

Centre Français de Recherche sur le Renseignement – https://cf2r.org/editorial/as-the-fog-of-war-lifts/

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🇷🇺🇺🇦 Many still expect further enemy attacks in places without defenders: Bryansk, Belgorod or elsewhere in Kursk. But especially across the Dnieper, on Energodar and/or the eastern bank of Kherson. The attack on Kursk would then be a serious diversion for a serious attack to the south.
https://t.me/boris_rozhin/134329

👉 The clues have been around for a long time, but we must admit that we know nothing about the strength of the enemy. However, we know more about the strength of the Russian army. In the event of a landing across the Dnieper, or even in Crimea, we should expect very bad news, because the enemy will have a clear path.

I remind you that the enemy is fascinated by Crimea and has been attacking for several quarters all the logistical routes (Crimean/Kerch bridge, landing ships, bridges on the land route to Rostov), ​​all the ammunition and fuel depots, the anti-aircraft systems, the radars, the air bases in Crimea, Rostov, Krasnodar, in the Kuban in general.

On the contrary, everyone will have noticed that he did not attack anything to prepare his attack on Kursk! This means that it is not excluded that something very big is being prepared between Crimea included and Energodar / Zaporozhye. With a level of Russian defenses almost zero, but with the difficulty of a bridgehead that will be, a little , attacked by the Russian aviation (hence the regular attacks on Russian air bases) and some long-range missiles.

All this is theoretical , it all depends on the enemy's real capabilities , his willingness to deceive the Russian army, his willingness to take risks , and his ability to do so ... If he wants to take the initiative that Russia has kindly offered him since the spring of 2022 , he is spoiled for choice. If this is the enemy's plan, if this ambitious plan is accessible to him, if he has the ability , then the worst of the war is yet to come (or the defeat of Russia by the rapid signing of an armistice and a peace treaty in the style of the unfavorable compromises of 1856: this option is no longer even mentioned by me, we will talk about it again this evening).

➡️ The fault will be entirely attributed to the Russian political and military elite who did not commit the necessary resources to their ambitions from the start, between 2013/2014 when a simple police operation was enough, and 2022, and who spend their time underestimating their enemies , the Islamic terrorists in Syria, the Bandera in its southwest.

➡️ Attacking in February 2022 was impossible without preparations : either it was necessary to prepare from the beginning of 2020 , or it was necessary to launch preparations in early 2022 to attack in 2024 or even later , with the only valid plan to attack through Volyn-Uzhgorod, targeting Odessa to cut off the enemy rear, while holding the enemy back everywhere else (the preparations could easily be disguised by the usual Zapad exercises in Belarus). Such a plan could not fail . Added to this was the subsequent objective of a total and definitive resumption of control over the former Ukrainian SSR that seceded in 1991 with the hunt for the Bandera , as was done in the 1940s and 1950s.
This required a lot of troops (more than today), such a mobilization would not have gone unnoticed and would have required deceiving the enemy by pretending to remain naive: "we are mobilizing to dissuade you from attacking the Donbass"...

🔺 If it was impossible to mobilize massively, there was no need to go to war.

Via @ZZ_0Z_Z0ZZ_fr
#SMO #Russia #Ukraine

The Russian military epic in Kursk | Telegraph

If Ukraine had carried out a similar operation, the media coverage would have likely been immense, with the actions being exalted for months. But in the case of Russia, the story remains hidden in the background because the enemy does not want to acknowledge the grandeur of this event. However, for the Russian soldiers and for those who witnessed the results of this operation, it will be remembered for generations as one of the greatest tactical victories of modern warfare.

What happened in Kursk was not just a complex logistical mission. It was an epic feat that demonstrated the willpower, spirit of sacrifice, and discipline of the Russian troops. They did not become heroes by chance; they faced the unthinkable and, instead of succumbing, emerged victorious, breaking through Ukrainian defenses and capturing strategic positions that had been since August 2024 under the control of the enemy – who was since then causing terror among the local Russian civilians in nearby villages.

This event should be remembered as a remarkable example of human resilience in times of war, a true epic worthy of the greatest historical accounts.

Via @strategic_culture
#Ukraine #Russia #Kursk #Pipeline #SMO