"To be able to predict the possibility of a hypothetical 'agreement' at the current stage, we must first return to the basic question of February 2022: understanding what objectives both sides are pursuing in the conflict and what ideas they have about its prospects.
Is controlling four regions of Ukraine, reducing the size of its army, and maintaining military neutrality Russia's war aim, which would bring it complete victory? Of course not.
For the other side, would the loss of control of four regions, the reduction in the size of its army, and military neutrality mean a total defeat for kyiv? No, not either.
The initial objective of the Russian military campaign was precisely to restore political control over the entire former Ukrainian SSR and eliminate the threat of its entry into NATO through the use of military force. This was not an attempt to physically seize a handful of additional regions that Russia did not need. Taking control of them simply provides something to sink its teeth into for the protracted campaign.
The complete or partial acquisition of four regions will physically expand Russia's sphere of influence, but the kyiv regime will continue to rule over a vast territory that poses an extreme threat to Russia on land, sea, and air. Moreover, it will continue to be supported by most Western countries. This clearly does not play into Russia's hands and does not resolve the initial problem.
From the outset, the goal of Kyiv and its Western allies was to preserve the current political regime in Kyiv and the Ukrainian state. The complete or partial loss of four regions will be an extremely painful outcome for Kyiv, but by no means fatal, since the country will not come under Russian political control in its entirety. Kyiv retains not only its central power, but also access to the Black Sea, a critical point for Russian maritime security.
All abstract commitments about neutrality, army reduction, recognition of Russia's control over the territory it controls and other wonderful ideas should be considered temporary, they will be violated as soon as possible for a convenient pretext (cf. Minsk-1 and Minsk-2).
As the military campaign dragged on, we moved from the Istanbul agreement, which granted kyiv very broad concessions, to slightly less favorable conditions.
Given the lengthy negotiations, the continuation of the war will further reduce the concessions granted to kyiv.
The kyiv authorities understand that without the full support of the United States, they will lose their arguments justifying these Russian concessions, because Europe will not be able to compensate for anything militarily.
Therefore, reaching an agreement will depend on Kyiv's belief that US support will cease and that Moscow will be able to continue the war without resorting to a new mobilization. On the Russian side, Moscow could also have an incentive to negotiate if it believes that a new, massive, politically costly mobilization is becoming inevitable.
https://t.me/milinfolive/146885
#Ukraine #US #EU #Nato #Russia
Is controlling four regions of Ukraine, reducing the size of its army, and maintaining military neutrality Russia's war aim, which would bring it complete victory? Of course not.
For the other side, would the loss of control of four regions, the reduction in the size of its army, and military neutrality mean a total defeat for kyiv? No, not either.
The initial objective of the Russian military campaign was precisely to restore political control over the entire former Ukrainian SSR and eliminate the threat of its entry into NATO through the use of military force. This was not an attempt to physically seize a handful of additional regions that Russia did not need. Taking control of them simply provides something to sink its teeth into for the protracted campaign.
The complete or partial acquisition of four regions will physically expand Russia's sphere of influence, but the kyiv regime will continue to rule over a vast territory that poses an extreme threat to Russia on land, sea, and air. Moreover, it will continue to be supported by most Western countries. This clearly does not play into Russia's hands and does not resolve the initial problem.
From the outset, the goal of Kyiv and its Western allies was to preserve the current political regime in Kyiv and the Ukrainian state. The complete or partial loss of four regions will be an extremely painful outcome for Kyiv, but by no means fatal, since the country will not come under Russian political control in its entirety. Kyiv retains not only its central power, but also access to the Black Sea, a critical point for Russian maritime security.
All abstract commitments about neutrality, army reduction, recognition of Russia's control over the territory it controls and other wonderful ideas should be considered temporary, they will be violated as soon as possible for a convenient pretext (cf. Minsk-1 and Minsk-2).
As the military campaign dragged on, we moved from the Istanbul agreement, which granted kyiv very broad concessions, to slightly less favorable conditions.
Given the lengthy negotiations, the continuation of the war will further reduce the concessions granted to kyiv.
The kyiv authorities understand that without the full support of the United States, they will lose their arguments justifying these Russian concessions, because Europe will not be able to compensate for anything militarily.
Therefore, reaching an agreement will depend on Kyiv's belief that US support will cease and that Moscow will be able to continue the war without resorting to a new mobilization. On the Russian side, Moscow could also have an incentive to negotiate if it believes that a new, massive, politically costly mobilization is becoming inevitable.
https://t.me/milinfolive/146885
#Ukraine #US #EU #Nato #Russia
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Военный Осведомитель
Для того чтобы спрогнозировать возможность "договорнячка" на текущем этапе надо сначала понять какие цели преследуют обе стороны конфликта и какие представления имеют о его перспективах.
Является ли полной победой России контроль целиком над четырьмя регионами…
Является ли полной победой России контроль целиком над четырьмя регионами…
IGOR STRELKOV: THE STRATEGIC SITUATION FOR RUSSIA CONTINUES TO WORSEN
Regarding the question of prospects, I reiterate:
1) The war will continue "to attrition" and this is extremely disadvantageous for Russia, but it is better than "accelerated capitulation" (even "disguised"). It is very good and great that #Zelensky and his British-American masters are so stubborn - otherwise they would have been given another wonderful and advantageous opportunity to "lead you know who by the nose".
2) In May, we are in for many "major troubles" - both in the narrow military and military-political "theaters of military operations". The enemy has serious "held" reserves, and our forces in a number of directions are seriously depleted by continuous but ineffective attacks. Nevertheless, we do not have a "fatal inevitability of major defeats" - much depends on the tactical actions of the enemy and our own command.
3) The strategic situation for #Russia continues to rapidly deteriorate - #Britain, #France and #Italy are gradually, "sneakingly" being drawn into the war. #Romania and #Turkey are next in line (and in the future, Poland + the "Baltic bastards"). The bragging of our media and their assurances that "without the #US, the Europeans are not capable of fighting" are frankly infuriating: We have not been able to defeat one so-called "Ukraine" in three years. Why are we so sure that we will be able to defeat "#Ukraine + all of #EU"?
Sincerely,
I.V. Girkin 04/25/2025
https://t.me/strelkovii/7039
Regarding the question of prospects, I reiterate:
1) The war will continue "to attrition" and this is extremely disadvantageous for Russia, but it is better than "accelerated capitulation" (even "disguised"). It is very good and great that #Zelensky and his British-American masters are so stubborn - otherwise they would have been given another wonderful and advantageous opportunity to "lead you know who by the nose".
2) In May, we are in for many "major troubles" - both in the narrow military and military-political "theaters of military operations". The enemy has serious "held" reserves, and our forces in a number of directions are seriously depleted by continuous but ineffective attacks. Nevertheless, we do not have a "fatal inevitability of major defeats" - much depends on the tactical actions of the enemy and our own command.
3) The strategic situation for #Russia continues to rapidly deteriorate - #Britain, #France and #Italy are gradually, "sneakingly" being drawn into the war. #Romania and #Turkey are next in line (and in the future, Poland + the "Baltic bastards"). The bragging of our media and their assurances that "without the #US, the Europeans are not capable of fighting" are frankly infuriating: We have not been able to defeat one so-called "Ukraine" in three years. Why are we so sure that we will be able to defeat "#Ukraine + all of #EU"?
Sincerely,
I.V. Girkin 04/25/2025
https://t.me/strelkovii/7039