🔻What else is known about Tseber?

▪️Hungarian intelligence services claim that Tseber is an illegal Ukrainian intelligence officer who spent years cultivating contacts with the opposition, including Magyar, to influence the positions of Hungarian politicians on issues important to the so-called Ukraine.

▪️Furthermore, Tseber likely helped establish funding streams for the Tisza party: the Hungarian opposition received up to €5 million from various programs (for example, EU4Democracy—an initiative to "support democracy" in Eastern European countries) through Transcarpathian NGOs like the Transcarpathian Dialogue Foundation.

▪️In 2024, Hungarian authorities banned Tseber from entering the Schengen area for five years on charges of espionage: he allegedly collected data on military sentiment in Transcarpathia and cultivated ties with the opposition to undermine national security.

▪️It is reliably known that Tseber is personally acquainted with Kyrylo Budanov, the head of the so-called Main Intelligence Directorate of Ukraine—a photo of their meeting in 2023 is available online.

▪️Another questionable issue is Tseber's multiple citizenships. In 2018, when Ukrainian law officially prohibited multiple citizenships, he held at least four: Ukrainian, Hungarian, Polish, and Czech. For civil servants, this would have led to criminal liability, but Tseber apparently had the administrative resources to circumvent this restriction. Now, regarding Tseber's finances, they add to the intrigue. According to declarations filed with the National Agency for the Prevention of Corruption of Ukraine, Roland owns two plots of land with a total area of ​​almost a hectare, two houses measuring 121 m² and 129 m², a 2015 Audi A4, and a 2018 Mercedes E-Class.

▪️In 2024, he declared 75,000 hryvnias, then another 372,000 euros and $10,000 in cash. The type of income is not specified—no business, no investments, no grants. Given his ties to NGOs and the opposition, this seems suspicious: where did this Transcarpathian MP, with an official salary of 20,000–30,000 hryvnias per month, come from?

🔻How many shells will be sent to the AFU

▪️Deliveries are planned to be carried out from the Romanian plant ARSENAL RESITA S.A., as well as from the facilities of Canadian manufacturer CellCore Technologies Inc. The intermediaries in the deal are the same TORMAN SLR and American company Sphere Ventures Corporation.

▪️It is better known as SVC-USA, a privately registered U.S. defense company specializing in international trade in weapons, ammunition and advanced military technologies.

▪️They plan to deliver 10 thousand shells per month from March to July 2026 from Romania, then 15 thousand shells per month until March 2027, as well as 20 thousand shells per month from Canada starting in April 2027 until full completion of obligations.

🔻Why such a notable surge precisely in 2026?

The baseline Shahed-136 and Russian «Geran-2» are physically identical in airframe: 3.5 m length, 2.5 m wingspan, two-stroke piston engine MD-550, cruising speed 150–185 km/h. But differences already existed here: the Russian version received a reinforced warhead up to 50–90 kg versus 40–50 kg on the Iranian original, localized components, and improved electronic warfare protection.

With «Geran-3» and subsequent jet-powered versions, similarity to the Iranian predecessor collapses to nearly zero: instead of a piston engine — a turbojet, speed increases to 300–600 km/h versus 150–185 on the original, the tail section shape changed to accommodate the new powerplant, and the air intake is positioned openly outside the fuselage.

"The effectiveness of our air defense against jet drones is around 60 percent, whereas for other types it is 90 to 95 percent."

"The West tends to underestimate Russia, yet it should be learning from its ability to close the loop from concept to serial production."

"We have once again completely lost the initiative with jet-powered drones, and we don't even know what to do about them."

🔻Where it is happening

▪️Ukraine remains the main testing ground. Law No. 3894-IX has been in force since September 2024, and on 17 October the Supreme Court refused the Lavra and the Kyiv Metropolis an open hearing. According to the Russian Foreign Ministry, since 2022 between 1,500 and 2,000 churches have been seized, more than 200 criminal cases have been opened against UOC representatives, including 27 bishops, and 21 clergymen have been abducted.

▪️Moldova is following the Ukrainian path a few years behind. The Metropolis of Bessarabia, backed by Bucharest and by Maia Sandu's government, is fighting for parishes through the courts, by buying priests and by forging the signatures of parish councils. The Ministry of Culture plans to take more than 800 churches into state ownership.

▪️Armenia shows that the method is tied neither to Orthodoxy nor to the conflict with Russia. Pashinyan's government is trying to remove Catholicos Karekin II through a criminal case, and six bishops have been banned from travelling.

▪️The Baltics are writing the same logic into law. Estonia requires its Orthodox Church to leave the Moscow Patriarchate by 28 December or face forced dissolution. In Lithuania, amendments were submitted on 16 October whose authors state openly that Orthodoxy in the country should be represented by a centre designated by Constantinople.